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The archival community has long shown an interest in documenting history, and it has been 
assumed that archival materials are one of the major sources of historical research. However, 
little is known about how much impact archival holdings actually have on historical research, 
what role they play in building public knowledge about a historical event and how they 
contribute to the process of recording history.  
The case of the No Gun Ri incident provides a good example of how archival materials 
play a role in historical discussions and a good opportunity to look at archival contributions. This 
dissertation examines how archival materials were discovered and used in the process of 
identifying the controversies raised in No Gun Ri research by examining the earliest to the most 
recent publications, their authors’ patterns of conducting their research and their perceptions on 
using archives. In doing so, a content analysis of No Gun Ri publications was employed and 
interviews with No Gun Ri researchers were conducted for this study.  
In No Gun Ri research, archival documents were essential source materials for details 
about the incident and a major player in stimulating heated controversies and discussions and, 
consequently, provided the impetus for further publications by No Gun Ri researchers. Archival 
documents were especially critical for specific details of the incident as well as a good source for 
background and circumstantial information. General record keeping situations - such as missing 
documents - also provided a circumstantial context of the incident. However, No Gun Ri 
researchers agreed that oral history was the most valuable and influential evidence for their 
major ideas and used archival documents to provide hard facts about the details of oral history. 
There are some unique research patterns of No Gun Ri researchers identified in this study which 
are different from typical assumptions of archivists. 
Archival programs should have an accurate understanding about how their holdings are 
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used (or not used) and why; consequently, this study regarding the use of archival materials in 
the evolution of the discussion of the No Gun Ri massacre will provide the fundamental 
information within an empirical framework. 
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TRANSLITERATION FOR KOREAN NAMES OF PERSONS AND PLACES 
The Korean alphabet is not rooted in a Roman script. It has its own characters (letters) which are 
disimilar to any belonging to a Western language. Therefore, a consistant method to transliterate 
Korean names of persons and places into the Roman alphabet of English is necessary for this 
study. There are several standards to Romanize Korean characters:  one regulated by the South 
Korean government and one by the OCLC in the U.S. called the “McCune-Reischauer system.” 
In this study, the McCune-Reischauer system from OCLC is adopted since it is more commonly 
used in the United States and the transliteration of the Korean language is easier and simpler than 
the South Korean standard. However, if Korean authors publish their work in the U.S. and use 
their own method to transliterate their names, this study will utilize that personal transliteration 
in its citation. 
A Korean personal name consists of a family name and a given name in a different order 
to that of the U.S. In Korea, a family name normally precedes a given (or first) name, and 
Koreans usually do not have middle names. Therefore, the way to present a Korean name is as 
follows: [family name] [given name] such as Sinn Donghee (신동희); Sinn as the family name 
and Donghee as the given name. However, in this study, personal names will be written using the 
Western naming pattern, a family name following a given name, to be consistent in citations. 
 
 
 xi 
1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 STATEMENT OF PROBLEMS 
In the 1990s, thirty South Koreans filed several petitions to the U.S. government, alleging a mass 
killing of refugees by American soldiers at No Gun Ri, a small village in South Korea, during the 
Korean War. For these claims and for their demands for an investigation of this incident and 
compensation for the victims, the South Korean petitioners only received denials from the U.S. 
government on the ground that there was no evidence to substantiate the Koreans’ claims. More 
frustratingly, their claims about the massacre did not have much resonance within Korea either, 
partly due to the exceptionally suppressive atmosphere of Korean society in the past and partly 
due to the passive attitude of the Korean government, thereby maintaining their traditional 
friendship with the U.S. Therefore, the victims’ families and other survivors had to take an 
indirect route to publicize their story.  
These Korean survivors of the massacre not only filed legal petitions, but also collected, 
over the years, all information available to them about this incident, constructing a public 
memory of the event. Some of the victims and families collected survivors’ oral histories 
repeatedly over the years. They took pictures of the traces of gun fire on the massacre site not 
long after the event. They collected copies of newspaper articles and chapters from history books 
if they found anything related to the refugee killing or the battle in Yong-dong to which No Gun 
Ri belongs. They even collected genealogical documents showing the same death date of 
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villagers who were killed at this incident. Their efforts at collecting all available evidence finally 
resulted in the publication of a book.  
Eun-yong Chong, a survivor’s husband, published a factual novel called Do You Know 
Our Agony?(그대, 우리의 아픔을 아는가  Kudae, Uri Ui Apumul Anunga) based on his own 
research and collection of information about the incident, in the spring of 1994 at the age of 
seventy three. This novel caught the eye of some Korean journalists and the story was finally 
reported, albeit in an unpopular political magazine. From his research, the author of the novel 
figured out that the 1st Cavalry Division was stationed in the area at the time of the massacre.1 
The survivors’ efforts to inform the public of their story did not stop with this publication. The 
son of the novelist contacted journalists as much as he could to spread the word of the No Gun Ri 
story and about the novel that his father published for the same purpose. Among those journalists 
contacted was one from the Associated Press (AP) who resided in Korea. 
Sang-Hun Choe, the Korean reporter for the AP, submitted the No Gun Ri story, 
including the petition of the victims and denial from the U.S. government, to his headquarters in 
New York. AP headquarters found this event a newsworthy story and started its own research 
within the archival materials at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and 
at other military archives and also began to collect victims’ and veterans’ interviews. Finally, in 
1999 the AP published a story about the No Gun Ri massacre citing some war records that 
discredited the U.S. governments’ assertion that there was no proof “to show that the U.S. 1st 
                                                 
1 With further research it was subsequently revealed that the specific army unit of the 1st Division engaged in this 
killing was the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cavalry Regiment. 
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Cavalry Division was in the area where the incident allegedly occurred.”2. The story published 
by the AP finally garnered an active reaction from both governments.  
The massacre was alleged to have occurred in the middle of a refugee evacuation 
operation by American soldiers during the last week of July, 1950, at an early and chaotic phase 
of the Korean War. During the operation, the American soldiers opened fire on the refugees. The 
veterans say that they thought there were North Korean infiltrators among the refugees. The 
survivors claim they were searched for prohibited items such as weapons and nothing suspicious 
was found among their belongings. The survivors said the massacre lasted for four days with 
hundreds of people killed.  
From the beginning of its publicity, this politically and diplomatically sensitive incident 
caused considerable controversy and engendered bitter arguments about the account of the 
massacre itself, the veracity of sources involved, and the interpretation of declassified military 
documents. Other than the fact that the massacre itself was shocking news, the whole process of 
how the story was researched and broken was notable. In various research attempts there 
emerged controversy regarding the testimonies of the victims and veterans. The accounts from 
victims widely differed from those of participating veterans. Korean survivors seemed to 
recollect more vividly what they went through with accentuated memories of their own particular 
experiences of the incident. An American researcher even asserted that the victims’ memories 
tended to be distorted or exaggerated in relation to their compensation claims. 3  American 
veterans’ accounts also vary one from another. Some researchers questioned the sincerity of the 
                                                 
2 United States Armed Forces Claims Service-Korea, letter to Chongju District Compensation Committee. Dec. 1997. 
The U.S. Army later accepted that their efforts to discover the truth were incomplete and that their initial statement 
was based on faulty research conducted at that time and published in its final investigative report, Report of the No 
Gun Ri Review. Department of Army, Report of the No Gun Ri Review (January 2001), 3. 
3 Robert L. Bateman, No Gun Ri: A Military History of the Korean War Incident (PA: Stackpole Books, 2002), 126. 
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US government in seeking the truth of the incident because the Army Secretary, Louise Caldera, 
announced at the beginning of the investigation that soldiers who testified to their criminal 
behaviors could be charged in a court of law, an announcement that could have influenced the 
truthfulness of interviews with veterans.4 Since subsequent No Gun Ri researchers had to deal 
with varying versions of the event, archival materials became a critical element of No Gun Ri 
history.  
There remain some military documents related to this event, but most of them contain 
contextual and circumstantial information rather than direct description about the event. These 
documents were created during the war and contain some general information such as rigid 
refugee policies and cases of harsh orders from higher commanders to treat refugees as the 
enemy which can be interpreted or inferred as applying to the case of No Gun Ri. However, there 
are no records directly mentioning the No Gun Ri massacre. This lack of military documentation 
relating to the specific massacre was used to support some researchers’ arguments asserting that 
there was no deliberate massacre in No Gun Ri. These researchers take the narrowest 
interpretation of those documents, accepting that no documentary evidence mentioning the 
killing at No Gun Ri to mean there was no killing there, not taking oral history of the victims into 
account. The U.S. government’s investigation, the No Gun Ri Review, also takes a similar 
position and concludes that there were an unknown number of people killed and injured during 
this period of time at No Gun Ri but that this was an unfortunate tragedy inherent to war and not 
a deliberate killing since there was no clear documentary evidence found to substantiate the 
                                                 
4 Ku-do Chong, “The Questions raised from the Government Investigation,” Issues on Modern History 12 (Feb. 
2001): 57. (정구도, “노근리사건 조사결과보고서의 문제점: 한미공동 발표문”과 한국정부”노근리사건 조사결과보고
서”를 중심으로,” 근현대사강좌 12, (Feb. 2001): 57).
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assertions of the petitioners.5 On the other hand, other researchers insist that the massacre itself 
cannot be disputed because of the availability of the oral histories of victims and military 
documents that support oral history with attendant background information. The controversy 
over the interpretation of the records underlies the whole process of No Gun Ri research from 
1999 to the present. 
Another problem related to the interpretation of archival documents is that all the 
remaining official documents were those created by American soldiers while very few records 
initiated by Koreans exist. Due to this anomaly, some doubts about the objectivity of war records 
were raised since these records were created by so called “offenders of the massacre,” suggesting 
why it is very hard to find records directly related to the massacre. Some researchers insist that 
the possibility of American soldiers not willingly recording their wrongdoings vigorously, if not 
purposely deleting them, should not be ignored. Furthermore, some mention the incompleteness 
of documents. These researchers cite an example of an entry for a certain document within the 
G-2 Journal of the 1st Division that was not left in the file folder. Of special importance, they 
note, many war diaries of the 7th Cavalry Regiment, whose soldiers allegedly participated in this 
event during the last week of July, were missing.6  
The history of researching the No Gun Ri incident has generated a series of controversies 
and arguments related to the use of archival materials and other historical sources; specifically, 
there was an incident during the No Gun Ri discussions that directly related to the use and 
manipulation of archival materials arising from false testimony. The Associated Press’ first 
publication on the event turned out to contain false testimonies by American veterans. Right after 
                                                 
5 Department of the Army Inspector General, No Gun Ri Review (January 2001), 185. 
6 Hwan-jun Lee, “The Truth and Lessons of the No Gun Ri Incident,” Military History 42 (Apr. 2001): 199-200. (이
환준, “노근리 사건의 진상과 교훈,” 군사 42 (Apr. 2001): 199-200). 
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the Pulitzer Prize was awarded to the AP reporters for their investigative work, two journalists 
from U.S. News and World Report and Stars and Stripes, a military newspaper, who are veterans 
of the 7th Cavalry Regiment of the 1st Division, reported on the fallacies of the interviews. One of 
the interviewees in the AP article testified that he fired upon the Korean civilians under an order 
from higher officers. However, it was later proved that he was not at No Gun Ri and did not 
belong to the 1st Cavalry Division during the time of the massacre.7 This discrepancy was 
corroborated by his military records. After these reports, the AP needed to prove that their 
original publication was not completely fictitious and still carried some truth regarding the event. 
The whole probing process of reporting over the veracity of the interview was carried out by 
adducing evidence from military records. This process provides some insights to archivists 
because this interviewee even manipulated his own military records. In the 1970s, the Army’s 
Personnel Record Center in St. Louis lost a large portion of its holdings due to fire. This institute 
collected copies of letters and documents from veterans about their military careers to fill in the 
gap in their military personnel records.8 In the course of such an event, the manipulation of 
military records was possible and it threatened the reliability of records located in the archives. 
As more vigorous research began with various perspectives, researchers tried to explore 
more evidence. In fact, the research process of reviewing this event was aggressive and 
competitive among researcher groups, especially journalists, who were eager to obtain critical 
documentary evidence to support their arguments and dispute those of others. Researchers began 
to put together all the clues of this tragedy in an attempt to disclose more evidence. They 
                                                 
7 For major articles on question and arguments of these false testimonies, see Sang-hun Choe, Charles J. Hanley, and 
Martha Mendoza, “War’s Hidden Chapter: Ex-GIs Tell of Killing Korean Refugees,” The Associated Press (Sept. 29, 
1999), at <http://wire.ap.org/APpackages/nogunri/> and Joseph L. Galloway, “Doubts about a Korean ‘Massacre’,” 
US News & World Report 128:21 (May 29, 2000), also available at 
<http://www.usnews.com/usnews/culture/articles/000522/archive_016967.htm >. (last accessed on June 5, 2006) 
8 Galloway, “Doubts about a Korean ‘Massacre’.” 
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included previous efforts by the survivors and their families to uncover the event. More archival 
records in the National Archives and Army Archives in the U.S. were being discovered or were 
receiving new attention by researchers. Other evidence from the incident site in Korea and 
interviews of the survivors and veterans were also examined by academics and government 
investigators. On some occasions, controversy induced the exploration of new documentary 
evidence and at other times newly recognized documents stimulated new controversy about No 
Gun Ri. Archival materials were the key to the investigation and to the development of 
knowledge regarding this event. Therefore, chronological examination of the developing 
knowledge of the massacre could provide a sense of the role and meaning of archival records in 
researching this event. A good analysis of the correlation between the evolution of discussion and 
emerging archival materials provides a clear view of the value of archival materials for 
disclosing the facts surrounding a historical event.  
The archival community has long shown an interest in documenting history, and this has 
been a major purpose of the archivists’ tasks. However, how much the documentation efforts of 
archivists have been used to clarify historic events may be more important to address. Archival 
programs cannot be meaningfully evaluated on their performances and roles without taking the 
usage of archives into account. In addition, it has been assumed that archival materials are one of 
the major sources of historical research.  However, little is known about how much impact 
archival holdings can make on historical research, how they play a role in building public 
knowledge about a historical event, and, therefore, how archival materials contribute to the 
process of writing history. Many archival researchers assert that the archival community needs to 
pay more attention to the impact of archival materials’ use after research is done by users.9  
                                                 
9 Paul Conway, “Facts and Frameworks: An Approach to Studying the Users of Archives,” American Archivist 49 
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The case of No Gun Ri provides a good example of how archival materials play a role in 
historical discussions, providing a good opportunity to look at archival contributions in this sense. 
This dissertation examines how archival materials were discovered and used to either overcome 
or reduce the controversies raised in the process of No Gun Ri research by examining the earliest 
to the most recent publications and their authors’ patterns of conducting their research and using 
archives. Therefore, the archival contribution to No Gun Ri research and researchers’ perceptions 
of using archives for their research are demonstrated in a detailed way. Archival programs may 
accurately observe how their holdings are used (or not used) and why from the patterns of use of 
archival materials in the evolution of the discussion on the No Gun Ri massacre. 
1.2 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
The significance of this study is threefold. First and foremost, this study presents how archival 
documents contributed to the historical research of the No Gun Ri massacre in a detailed manner. 
There has been little archival research to date that seeks to study the impact of archival materials 
on research from the point of view of publications. This study addresses, in the case of the No 
Gun Ri massacre, how archival materials influence the development of discussions and the 
building of knowledge of an incident from the analysis of No Gun Ri publications. The focus of 
the study is on archival materials used to understand and interpret this historical event. This 
study examines the process of the development of the No Gun Ri research and checks every step 
in the use of archival records in this process and finally establishes the concrete contribution of 
                                                                                                                                                             
(Fall 1986): 398; Jacqueline Goggin, “The Indirect Approach: A Study of Scholarly Users of Black and Women’s 
Organizational Records in the Library of Congress Manuscript Division,” Midwestern Archivist 11:1 (1986): 65. 
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archival materials in the actual research of the No Gun Ri massacre.  
Second, it will add significant new insight into how historical researchers perform their 
research activities with relation to using archives in general. This study intends to reveal in-depth 
understanding of researchers’ use of archival materials, their perception of archival materials, 
and their research patterns. In other words, this study provides a realistic picture of archives 
users and their use of archival materials. As new source material emerges or as new uses for long 
known sources develop, new insights and understanding about an event emerge. Inversely, as 
researchers acquire new knowledge on their research topic, they recognize new uses of old 
materials. Some archival researchers report that archives users, especially historians, often 
discover “the relevance of materials that they had previously rejected as unimportant,” as they 
gain more knowledge on their topic.10 Still, users’ research patterns relating to archives have not 
been identified comprehensively in archival literature. Therefore, understanding the actual 
process that No Gun Ri researchers followed offers practical insights to archivists and archival 
researchers about how archival materials are used in actual research.  
There is an additional aspect of significance to this study. In the case of No Gun Ri 
research, it was not academic historians who discovered the military records and initiated the 
research, but rather, the victims and families of survivors of the massacre and journalists. 
Historians, in this case, joined the research later. This study addresses how journalists and the 
general public, as well as historians, use archival materials and conduct research on a historical 
event. Therefore, a comprehensive understanding of archives users as a whole is presented. It is 
further believed that a study about specifically defined users within a topic is extremely helpful 
for archival programs to serve their users practically. 
                                                 
10 Wendy Duff and Catherine A. Johnson, “Accidentally Found on Purpose: Information-Seeking Behavior of 
Historians in Archives,” Library Quarterly 72:4 (2002): 492. 
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1.3 TERMINOLOGY 
This study uses conceptual terms of “public knowledge” and “public memory.” The explanation 
of these terms is necessary to provide an understanding of how they are utilized within this study.  
“Public Knowledge” can be explained as knowledge of a certain fact or an event that is 
understood and developed by general members of society.11 In this study, public knowledge is 
used to refer to a more contemporary idea by the public about a certain fact. The public 
knowledge of No Gun Ri, therefore, means the general knowledge of this event in a 
contemporary time frame, which has been accepted by the general readers through published 
news articles, academic works, as well as government reports. The full-dress research of No Gun 
Ri massacre began in 1999 even though the survivors had collected oral histories and conducted 
their own research since the massacre happened. Therefore, the public knowledge of No Gun Ri 
massacre indicates the knowledge of this event as it was researched and revealed in recent years 
(since 1999), excluding the survivors’ collective efforts to research it. This study, in part, 
attempts to understand how the knowledge of the No Gun Ri incident has been developed by 
historians, journalists, government officers, law scholars, and the general public, including 
survivors and families. Since this study does not only look at historians as major researchers, the 
term “public” was used to denote the knowledge of the No Gun Ri incident.  
On the other hand, the term “Public Memory” signifies memory, or beliefs, or ideas, 
which were developed and constructed within a group of people in a society about a certain event 
                                                 
11 “Knowledge” is defined as “In general sense: The fact or condition of being instructed, or of having information 
acquired by study or research; acquaintance with ascertained truths, facts, or principles; information acquired by 
study; learning; erudition” in the Oxford English Dictionary. This definition does not imply any time frame for 
understanding, but in this study, the author adds the time frame of “contemporary” to distinguish this term from 
public memory. 
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over a long period of time.12 The term is used in this study to refer to the accumulation and 
construction of memory of the No Gun Ri massacre over the years subsequent to the massacre. 
As the No Gun Ri incident has been remembered and recorded by the survivors and veterans and 
stored in various archives over the years, a public memory for the No Gun Ri incident was 
constructed as time passed by. Therefore, the term public memory is used to indicate the whole 
process of remembering, accepting, and interpreting the incident based on the accumulation of 
oral histories and archival evidence in military documents, and not limited to the vigorous 
research of recent years. However, even though this study differentiates the concept of public 
knowledge from that of public memory for convenience, it could be extrapolated that public 
knowledge is part of the broader meaning of public memory. The process of arriving at the recent 
understanding of the No Gun Ri massacre is not really different from the process of building 
public memory in terms of gathering all available evidence including the accumulated oral 
histories and memories from the victims’ community and remaining archives. 
1.4 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Archival materials are assumed to play a major role in historical research. However, little is 
known about how much archival materials influence public knowledge of a historical event as 
will be discussed in the second chapter of this study. Within this framework, the purpose of this 
study is to address how the debates and the development of knowledge about the No Gun Ri 
                                                 
12 This general definition which contains notions of constructed ideas by a group of people within a social context is 
accepted by many researchers. Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, edited, translated, and with an 
introduction by Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1992), 22; Kenneth Foote, “To 
Remember and Forget: Archives, Memory, and Culture,” American Archivist 53 (Summer 1990): 380; David Thelen, 
“Memory and American History,” Journal of American History 75 (March, 1989): 1119. 
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massacre have evolved according to the emergence of new information, especially from archival 
materials, and how and why archival materials play a role in this process. 
Based on this purpose, this study considers the following research questions: 
1. As seen in the No Gun Ri massacre research, how do researchers use archival materials? 
2. Has the research of the No Gun Ri massacre changed in light of an expansion of available 
archival resources? 
3. What does the use of archival materials in the building of knowledge about the No Gun Ri 
massacre reveal about the actual state of researchers’ archival use in conducting research on 
recent history? 
These research questions were raised to establish a framework from which to evaluate the 
development of knowledge and discussions about the No Gun Ri massacre and to analyze the 
interaction of that knowledge with the emerging available source materials; and to discover how 
researchers learn, approach, identify, and finally use archival materials and how much credibility 
they assign to archival materials in comparison to other sources available for their research.  
1.5 STRUCTURE AND OUTLINE 
This section provides an outline for the dissertation starting with the literature review.  
Chapter 2 comprises a literature review on the issues of public memory in relation to war 
memories and archival evidence, archival records as evidence and democratic accountability, and 
user studies in archives. One element that emerged from this literature review was how the 
archival community included the public memory paradigm in their academic literature. It was 
further noted that many archival researchers utilized conceptual and methodological approaches 
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to connect the concept of public memory to archives in an effort to emphasize the social function 
of archives or to see archives as an artifact of public memory. There have not been many studies 
that examined the actual relationship between the public memory building process and archival 
contributions. In addition, this section illustrates the way the archival community has accepted 
the concept of record as evidence throughout history as well as in current discourses. The notion 
of the democratic accountability of a society by recordkeeping was addressed as well with 
relation to the concept of record as evidence. The use/user study part identifies that archival 
use/user studies have contributed to a broader knowledge about archival users and provides 
practical understanding about how frequently archival holdings are used and how users approach 
archival holdings. However, it was also noted that many archival researchers still expect more 
active research about their users by investigating particular user groups and actual research 
publications.  
Chapter 3 describes the theoretical background and methodology of this study. It 
provides the description of the concept of “Grounded Theory” as theoretical background and its 
applicability to this research. It then provides the methodological framework of the study. The 
chapter explains the methodologies that this study employed (content analysis and interview) and 
the reason why this study utilizes them. It describes the specific process of content analysis of 
publications of No Gun Ri research and the interviews of the authors of those publications, in 
detail. For publication analysis, all published research on the No Gun Ri massacre were collected 
and analyzed. From among the authors of No Gun Ri research, those who had published in-depth 
research were selected and interviewed.  
Chapter 4 presents the historical sketch about the No Gun Ri massacre. It is a necessary 
process to understand the incident first with available historical materials. In the chapter, the 
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focus was set on the general comprehension about No Gun Ri in addition to the narratives of how 
this story came into light. The survivors’ allegations about the massacre were briefly described 
along with how historical research had been processed and developed. 
In chapters 5 and 6, the findings of the study are presented. Chapter 5 provides findings 
of the analysis of the publications regarding the No Gun Ri incident. This chapter addresses how 
the public knowledge of the No Gun Ri incident developed over time and how archival evidence 
affected this development. It also exhibits some quantitative data about which archival materials 
and secondary literature were used more frequently. Chapter 6 describes the researchers’ 
perceptions of archival evidence and of the use of archives, mostly based on interviews of No 
Gun Ri researchers. For the content analysis of publication and interview transcripts, coding 
schemes were created, and the data analysis was performed according to these schemes. In these 
chapters, the results of data analysis are presented in order to provide a context for the research 
results.  
The final chapter summarizes the major findings of this study. The research questions 
are once more stated and the findings for each question are presented. Through answering 
research questions, the implications of the final results of the study are discussed. Following the 
discussions of the implications and research findings, limitations of the study that were not 
identified in the beginning of this study are explored and suggestions for further study are 
presented. 
1.6 LIMITATIONS 
There are some limitations in this study. First, since this study is not a historical study to obtain 
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information about the massacre itself, it is limited to the issues of the use of documents, the 
development of knowledge about the incident, and the evolution of discussions. There are a great 
many contradictions about the war and the massacre, but this study only deals with the evolution 
of discussions without questioning the event itself.  
This study has another limitation on the subject of the research, confining itself to 
researchers in South Korea and the United States alone. In fact, Korea and America were the 
major countries involved in the Korean War, and since the No Gun Ri incident occurred in the 
course of American troops’ evacuation of the Korean people, it is naturally assumed that people 
in these two countries would be the primary researchers on this issue. 
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2.0  LITERATURE REVIEW 
This literature review addresses several major issues related to this study. First, a general review 
of public memory in relation to war memory and archives is described. For the analysis of 
developing knowledge of the No Gun Ri massacre, a basic understanding about the formation of 
public memory of a historical event cannot be overlooked. The No Gun Ri incident happened 
more than 50 years ago, and the survivors and the victims’ families have remembered and 
researched this event through the intervening years. Later, when this event became known to the 
public, more research was conducted, adding more evidence and new understanding which 
constituted the building blocks of the public memory of this event. In this chapter, the literature 
of public memory is reviewed in the context of understanding the building process of public 
memory of the No Gun Ri incident.  
Secondly, the value of archival records for evidence and accountability is reviewed. From 
the beginning of the investigation of the No Gun Ri massacre, accountability issues have 
challenged the debates on reliable recordkeeping and the use of archival materials. The veracity 
of some sources was questioned and debated as more research was conducted. The accountability 
of research sources including archival documents and oral testimonies was the central issue of 
the whole process of the No Gun Ri research. Thus, the review of literature on documents as 
evidence and accountability is necessary to understand the No Gun Ri incident.  
Finally, this section considers archival use and user studies. This study pursues a specific 
 16 
type of usage evaluation of the archival records of a specific event. The No Gun Ri researchers 
are central to this study while learning about their process and perception using documents and 
archives. Therefore, basic understanding of how the archival community has studied users of 
archival holdings is of benefit to this study. 
2.1 PUBLIC MEMORY, WAR HISTORY, AND ARCHIVES 
Public memory, also called collective memory and social memory, is often defined within the 
notion of a social framework. Maurice Halbwachs, a French sociologist, considered memory in a 
social context in the1930s. He states that memories are constructed socially by groups of people, 
and social groups determine which public events will be memorable and how. In his words, 
“every collective memory requires the support of a group delimited in space and time.” He also 
emphasizes that “While the collective memory endures and draws strength from its base in a 
coherent body of people, it is individuals as group members who remember.”13 Halbwachs’ idea 
of the social construction of public memory has been widely accepted since then. Kenneth Foote 
also defines public memory as “beliefs and ideas held in common by many individuals that 
together produce a sense of social solidarity and community.”14 Similarly, David Thelen in his 
article “Memory and American History,” published in a special issue of the Journal of American 
History on memory, addresses how people construct and narrate memories within the social 
dimensions of memory. Here he claims that memory, individual or collective, is constructed, not 
                                                 
13 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, edited, translated, and with an introduction by Lewis A. Coser 
(Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1992), 22. 
14 Kenneth Foote, “To Remember and Forget: Archives, Memory, and Culture,” American Archivist 53 (Summer 
1990): 380.  
 17 
merely reproduced, and this construction is not made in isolation, but in correlation within the 
context of community, broader politics, and social dynamics.15  
In the context of a social framework for memory, the past is a social construction 
reshaped and reorganized by the concerns of the present. Public memory in a social context 
concerns itself with what should be remembered, how it should be remembered, and what 
intellectual, social, and political traditions and conditions make public memory important. 
Problems and issues in the present are the starting points to address discussions regarding the 
past. This connection of the present to the past was illustrated by Paul Connerton when he said, 
“we may say that our experiences of the present largely depend upon our knowledge of the past, 
and that our images of the past commonly serve to legitimate a present social order.”16 Patrick 
Geary also explains why this connection exists. He states, “Individuals and communities copied, 
abridged, and revised archival records, liturgical texts, literary documents, doing so with 
reference to physical reminders from previous generations and a fluid oral tradition in order to 
prescribe how the present should be because of how the past had been.”17 Looking back from 
this vantage point in 2007, it is possible to see renewed interest in World War II and the Korean 
War as they neared and passed their 50th anniversary. The proximity of a major anniversary 
generated many discussions and revisitings on the meanings and lessens of the wars and its 
aftermath.18 The No Gun Ri massacre could have more attention from the public in this 
                                                 
15 David Thelen, “Memory and American History,” Journal of American History 75 (March, 1989): 1119. 
16 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 3. 
17 Patrick J. Geary, Phantoms of Remembrance: Memory and Oblivion at the End of the First Millennium (Princeton, 
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994), 8. 
18 A number of mass communication media had special programs to memorialize the World War II and the Korean 
War, and a number of works about the those wars have come out with new findings. Many organizations, including 
the National Archives and Records Administration and Library of Congress had special exhibitions about the 
memory of the WW II or the Korean War, either online or as physical displays. Several conferences on the Korean 
War, World War II, and Cold War Era were held.  
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atmosphere. If this event came to light in a different time period or in another social context, it 
would have not have received this much interest from the American people. 
However, a simple connection between the past and the present cannot be regarded as 
history. The connection draws on the notion of memory as a base of history, but is not the same 
as history. Patrick Hutton differentiates memory from history in a book where he investigates the 
history of how memory has been conceived, cumulated, tested, and used in societies, as follows: 
Memory confirms similarities between past and present. 
There is a magic about memory that is appealing because it 
conveys a sense of the past coming alive once more. It touches the 
emotions. History, by contrast, establishes the differences between 
past and present. It reconstructs the past from a critical distance 
and strives to convey the sense that its connections with the present 
are devoid of emotional commitment. . . . The images retrieved by 
memory are protean and elusive, whereas the data of history are 
durable and verifiable.19  
Jacques Le Goff, in History and Memory, underscores, “It is true that history involves a 
rearrangement of the past which is subject to the social, ideological, and political structures in 
which historians live and work.”20 He articulates the relationship between history and memory as 
follows: “memory is the raw material of history. Whether mental, oral, or written, it is the living 
source from which historians draw. Because its workings are usually unconscious, it is in reality 
more dangerously subject to manipulation by time and by societies given to reflection than the 
discipline of history itself. Moreover, the discipline of history nourishes memory in turn, and 
enters into the great dialectical process of memory and forgetting experienced by individuals and 
                                                 
19 Patrick H. Hutton, History as an Art of Memory (Hanover, NH: University of Vermont, 1993), 76. 
20 Jacques Le Goff, History and Memory, translated by Steven Rendall and Elizabeth Clamon (NY: Columbia 
University Press, 1992), xi. 
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societies.”21 Hutton again specifies that “Historical understanding is selective, but collective 
memory is sustaining. If popular mores and manners were ignored by an official historiography, 
they remained alive in the oral traditions that have recently recaptured the historians’ 
attention.”22
Literacy or writing/printing is not a prerequisite condition for social memory. Paul 
Connerton observes that social memory is conceptually different from historical reconstruction, 
which is a more specific practice. Historical reconstruction is seen to be built predominantly with 
written texts and treated with a focus on inscribed transmissions of memories. He tries to prove 
how practices in non-recorded methods are transmitted in traditions, and images and recollected 
knowledge of the past are conveyed and sustained by ritual performances. With this unique 
approach to memory, he points out, “one of the limitations of documentary evidence is that few 
people bother to write down what they take for granted.”23 In a similar context, Daniel Woolf 
agrees with Paul Connerton’s idea that literacy is not always necessary for memory; rather, 
memory and literacy are exclusive and contradictory techniques of recording knowledge. Woolf 
writes, “it is also true that this master-servant relationship between memory and writing would 
be subverted and ultimately inverted as time wore on by increasing literacy, by the advancing 
ubiquity of the printed word, and the evolution and expansion of what is here termed the social 
memory.”24  
From this historical study about memory, Jacques Le Goff demonstrates that memory is 
naturally political. He asserts that collective memory is a conquest, an instrument, and an 
                                                 
21 Le Goff, History and Memory, xi. 
22 Patrick Hutton, History as an Art of Memory (Hanover, NH: University of Vermont, 1993), 2. 
23 Paul Connerton, How Societies Remember (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 18. 
24 Daniel Woolfe, “Memory and Historical Culture in Early Modern England,” Journal of the Canadian Historical 
Association 2 (1991): 291.  
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objective of power for the best chance of understanding the struggle for domination over 
remembrance and tradition, which is the manipulation of memory.25 In his book, Phantoms of 
Remembrance: Memory and Oblivion at the End of the First Millennium, Patrick Geary agrees 
that public memory is essentially political. He claims the simple dichotomy of memory and 
history ignores the political dimensions of collective memory and history. “Historians write for a 
purpose, essentially to shape the collective memory of the historical profession and ultimately of 
the society in which they live.” He goes on to say that, “If the writing of modern historians 
appears analytic, critical, and rational, the reason is that these are the rhetorical tools that promise 
the best chance of influencing the collective memory of our age. Similarly, if historical memory 
is essentially political, so too is collective memory.”26  
In this context, if memory is essentially political, forgetting might be another activity 
forming public memory. David Lowenthal asserts, “Features recalled with pride are apt to be 
safeguarded against erosion and vandalism; those that reflect shame may be ignored or expunged 
from the landscape.”27 Kenneth Foote attempts to address interrelationships between cultural 
landscape and collective memory. He argues that cultural landscapes can be another way to look 
at a representation of the past because “human modifications of the environment are often related 
to the way societies wish to sustain and efface memories.”28 Especially when there is an event of 
violence and tragedy, a society is more likely to efface such an event and leave the memory 
behind. Foote argues, “If the violence fails to exemplify an enduring value, there is greater 
likelihood of the site, artifacts, and documentary record being effaced, either actively or 
                                                 
25 Le Goff, History and Memory, 98. 
26 Geary, Phantoms of Remembrance: Memory and Oblivion at the End of the First Millennium, 12. 
27 David Lowenthal, “Past Time, Present Place: Landscape and Memory,” The Geographical Review 65 (1975): 31. 
28 Kenneth Foote, Shadowed Ground (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1997), 33. 
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passively.”29 He also claims that, “Mass murder is the most common event to result in 
obliteration.”30 The effort to maintain written evidence is likely more neglected, if not 
discouraged, in cases of events that are illegal or reflect shame. An English historian, Peter 
Burke, identifies memory as a historical phenomenon in terms of the modes of transmission of 
public memories and the uses of these memories. He uses the concept of “social amnesia” 31 as 
the opposite of social memory and argues that social memory and social amnesia are related to 
who preserves the history or the past, the conflicts of memories, official censorship of the past 
and the strength of unofficial memory throughout history. He asserts that memory, or amnesia, of 
the past has not been stopped by writing and print, and in this context, he asserts, that historians 
should return to being “remembrancers” whose job it is to remind people of what they would 
have liked to forget. 
Pierre Nora and James Young assert that through commemoration activities, people 
attempt to forget what they do not want to remember as they delegate their responsibility of 
remembrance to the memorials, monuments, or even archives.32 One of the compensations for 
the No Gun Ri victims that the American government offered was building a memorial for those 
killed and injured during the Korean War, not particularly honoring the victims of the No Gun Ri 
massacre. In fact, survivors and families of victims complained of the fact that the American 
government tried to obscure their specific responsibility of this massacre by displaying regret of 
                                                 
29 Kenneth Foote, “To Remember and Forget: Archives, Memory, and Culture,” American Archivist 53 (Summer, 
1990): 385.  
30 Foote, Shadowed Ground, 26. 
31 Peter Burke, “History as Social Memory,” in Memory: History, Culture and the Mind, ed. by Thomas Butler 
(Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell Ltd., 1989), 105-110. 
32 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire,” Representations 26 (Spring, 1989): 13; 
James E. Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning (New Haven, CT: Yale University 
Press, 1993), 2. 
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all war victims of the Korean War.33 In addition, the reporting of the No Gun Ri incident also 
reflects the dereliction of the responsibility of remembrance, by labeling the incident as a 
superficially representative atrocity to negate all other wrongdoings.34 The No Gun Ri incident 
was the only negative incident labeled as an atrocity and remembered by the American people 
for the entire period of the Korean War. 
Certain public memories and histories, in its construction, often reflect different aspects 
of tragic events such as violence, war, and massacres. As a matter of fact, the approaches to war 
history or catastrophic events have been a way for ethnic or cultural groups to establish their 
identity in conjunction with building memorials and the memorial’s influence on contemporary 
historical interpretation. In Ian Buruma's The Wages of Guilt, the author discusses the memory 
and attitudes of Japanese and German peoples on the legacy of World War II and shows how the 
citizens of these countries saw their past and raised questions of moral responsibility and national 
identity in the creation of a public memory of those people.35 Like the Holocaust, a national 
traumatic event certainly contributes to the formation of a national identity. The whole process of 
identity seeking usually involves commemorative activities. Arthur Neal states that, “National 
traumas also provide the raw material for shaping national identities and revitalizing values for 
promoting the collective good.”36 In the case of the Holocaust, the identity-seeking process has 
been conducted on two planes: the public recognition of the crimes of Germans and Austrians 
and the public expression of the suffering of the Jews. In The Texture of Memory: Holocaust 
                                                 
33 Junho Hwang, “The Second Chapter of the History War surrounding No Gun Ri has begun,” Pressian June 1, 
2006. (황준호, “노근리를 둘러싼 한-미 역사전쟁의 2 막이 올랐다,” 프레시안 6/1/2006.) at 
<http://usacrime.or.kr/maybbs/showview.php?db=us&code=news&n=3884&page> (last accessed at Aug. 4, 2006). 
34 Marilyn B. Young, “An Incident at No Gun Ri,” in Crimes of War: Guilt and Denial in the Twentieth Century, ed. 
by Omer Bartov, Atina Grossmann, and Mary Nolan (NY: The New Press, 2002), 245. 
35 Ian Buruma, The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in Germany and Japan (New York: Farrar Straus Giroux, 
1994).
36 Arthur G. Neal, National Trauma and Collective Memory: Major Events in the American Century (Armonk, NY: 
M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 203. 
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Memorials and Meaning, James Young brilliantly demonstrates how commemorative activities 
are charged with a problematic struggle between collective memory and national identity, and the 
aspiration toward a future through the memorials and monuments whereby the meaning of the 
Holocaust is to be redefined from generation to generation. He pronounces that “If part of the 
state’s aim, therefore, is to create a sense of shared values and ideals, then it will also be the 
state’s aim to create the sense of common memory, as the foundation for a unified polis. Public 
memorials, national days of commemoration and shared calendars thus all work to create 
common loci around which national identity is forged.” 37  Halbwachs’s idea that collective 
memory is crucial for the identity of groups such as families, believers of a religion, or social 
classes seems to be proven true in the case of the Holocaust and national traumatic events. 
Therefore, public memory of war history is mutually related to public commemoration, political 
ideology, and official history. 
There have also been some works about Japan’s public memory for war history in 
particular. In her doctoral dissertation, Hiroko Okuda examines Japan’s public memory in 
memorializing World War II as evidenced in national and local/regional memorial discourses. 
She demonstrates the ways in which political institutions develop the therapeutic function of 
memory in healing the historical traumas of Japan’s defeat in war and the atomic bombing on 
Hiroshima. Okuda mentions, 
A rhetoric, memorializing the recent past, fosters and 
maintains identification among the members of a community by 
appealing to a re-invented historical continuity over time. A 
governing apparatus may attenuate the complexity and diversity of 
personal memories through inviting symbolic participation in ritual 
                                                 
37 Young, The Texture of Memory: Holocaust Memorials and Meaning, 6. 
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acts. Such collective acts predominate in institutional versions of 
answers to fundamental questions of re-inventing collective 
identity: who does the inclusive pronoun ‘we’ refer to and why are 
‘we’ who ‘we’ are.38
This viewpoint considers the ideological and identity-seeking function of public memory to be 
that of holding society together. Lewis Coser writes, “When it comes to historical memory, the 
person does not remember events directly; it can only be stimulated in indirect ways through 
reading or listening or in commemoration and festive occasions when people gather together to 
remember in common the deeds and accomplishments of long-departed members of the 
group.”39   
If history and public memory of the past are woven and written in a way of addressing 
the present within the context of a social framework, there needs to be a form of 
institutionalizing information and memory to be kept and handed down as part of public memory. 
The efforts to connect archives and public memory usually begin with an emphasis on the 
cultural function of archives in institutionalizing information to establish public memory. 
Kenneth Foote connects archives and memory within a broadened view of communication and 
culture. He observes archives as places that can be valuable means for “extending the temporal 
and spatial range of human communication.”40 He explains that social pressure on a historical 
event can influence and shape the archival records and tries to persuade readers of the cultural 
role of archives in a society.  
                                                 
38 Hiroko Okuda, Memorializing World War II: Rhetoric of Japan’s Public Memory, 1945-1949 (Ph D. Dissertation, 
University of Illinois at Evanston, 2001), 2. 
39 Lewis A. Coser, “Introduction,” in Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, edited, translated, and with an 
introduction by Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: the University of Chicago, 1992), 24. 
40 Foote, “To Remember and Forget: Archives, Memory, and Culture,” 379.  
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An archives is an institution to which is delegated the responsibility of remembering, by a 
society. A French sociologist, Pierre Nora, articulates that  
Modern memory is, above all, archival. It relies entirely on 
the materiality of the trace, the immediacy of the recording, the 
visibility of the image . . . Memory has been wholly absorbed by 
its meticulous reconstitution. Its new vocation is to record; 
delegating to the archive the responsibility of remembering, it 
sheds its signs upon depositing them there, as a snake sheds its 
skin.41  
The responsibility that “we are the result of the past and cannot easily jump out of its main 
current” involves the notion of “total archives,” where a diversified and contemporary 
documentary base for future historians is garnered with a global vision of the society and its 
component parts.42 In this relation with history, archivists “hold the keys to the collective 
memory,” as Jean-Pierre Wallot mentions. He continues to say, “In this world of superficiality 
and ‘instant’ everything, they must, more than ever before, develop the treasures of our ‘houses 
of memory,’ enriching them and making them more available and more visible to as many 
people as possible. An archives is about the past.”43 Through the examination of the general 
history of archives in relation to the concept of collective memory and heritage, Hugh Taylor 
asserts that archives need to work in interdepartmental cooperation within museums, art galleries, 
and local societies in the heritage spectrum to broadly contribute to the public memory of society 
and play a role as a public social service.44 In discussing the archivist’s role in the global context 
                                                 
41 Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire,” 7. 
42 Jean-Pierre Wallot, “Building a Living Memory For the History of Our Present: New Perspectives on Archival 
Appraisal,” Journal of Canadian Historical Association (1991): 263-282 
43 Ibid., 282.  
44 Hugh A. Taylor, “The Collective Memory: Archives and Libraries As Heritage,” Archivaria 15 (Winter 1982/83): 
124-125. 
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of the information age, Jean-Pierre Wallot also maintains that archivists serve two competing and 
complementary functions: as keepers of evidence and information of their parent institutions, and 
their “ultimate and essential role of long-term memory, identity, and values formation and 
transmission. This totality or combination of these missions, linked through the concept of 
memory, is greater than the sum of the parts.”45  
As a cultural institution and a place for social memory, archives may not be free from 
politics in the process of exploration of the past. Francis Blouin analyzes the argument that 
archives are not neutral in the process of historical inquiry because they are complicit in 
fostering certain perceptions based on institutional definitions and particular concepts of the state. 
He writes, “Absences [of archives] may, in fact, be purposeful in a way that skews the historical 
record. Some scholars argue that archivists are in actuality complicit in affirmations of existing 
political structures and power relationships.”46 Richard Brown and Beth Davis-Brown also 
emphasize a political role of archives in terms of ordinary daily function. This is because the 
awareness of political characteristics of documents unmasks archivists’ “struggle to build a 
reflective, democratic society.”47  
The political nature of archives has been further accentuated in the most recent discourse 
with a postmodern perspective to archival work in which the importance of archives is stated as 
dependant on the fact that it shapes the understanding of the world through archival holdings. 
This new discourse emphasizes the social role of archives. Among those with a postmodern 
perspective, Verne Harris and Brien Brothman take the position of viewing records within 
                                                 
45 Jean-Pierre Wallot, “Limited Identities for a Common Identity: Archivists in the Twenty-First Century,” 
Archivaria 41 (Spring 1996): 23. 
46 Francis X. Blouin, Jr., “Archivists, Mediation, and Constructs of Social Memory,” Archival Issues 24:2 (1999): 
104.  
47 Richard Harvey Brown and Beth Davis-Brown, “The Making of Memory: The Politics of Archives, Libraries, and 
Museums in the Construction of National Consciousness,” History of the Human Sciences 11:4 (Nov. 1998): 30.  
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broader contexts and pluralizing dimensions, deeply influenced by the famous French 
philosopher, Jacque Derrida.48 A South African archivist, Verne Harris, challenges a common 
notion that archives reflects reality and provides an image of an event or an action. He argues 
that documentary records provide only a sliver of a window into the event. Rather, they are an 
expression and instrument of prevailing relations of power. He views archivists as active 
documenters of society and shapers of social memory and “a shaping of the record as the carrier 
of memory rather than a participation in the processes of memory formation and storytelling.” 
Harris asserts that archives have been in a political power relation from the beginning. He states 
“the structure of archiving, then, involves a trace being consigned to a substrate, a place (and it 
can be a virtual place) of consignation. And consignation, structurally, involves the exercise of 
power, what Derrida calls archontic power: the power to consign; the power over the place of 
consignation; so that in all archiving, the diarist making an entry, the rock painter at work, the 
person sending an e-mail to a friend, archontic power is in play. And archivists, from the 
beginning and always, are political players.”49 Because of the characteristic of archivists and 
records having major power to form or influence social memory, he asserts that a more proactive 
role can be imposed on archivist for the sake of justice. He states, 
Archivists, wherever they work and however they are 
positioned, are subject to the call of and for justice. For the archive 
                                                 
48 For more discussion on the postmodernism perspective, other than those by these two researchers, see the 
following articles. Terry Cook, “Archival Science and Postmodernism: New Formulations for Old Concepts,” 
Archival Science 1 (2001): 3-24; Eric Ketelaar, “Tacit Narratives: The Meanings of Archives,” Archival Science 1 
(2002): 131-141; Mark A. Greene, “The Power of Meaning: The Archival Mission in the Postmodern Age,” 
American Archivist 65 (Spring/Summer 2002): 42-55; Elisabeth Kaplan, “Many Paths to Partial Truths: Archives, 
Anthropology, and the Power of Representation,” Archival Science 2 (2002): 209-220; Berndt Fredriksson, 
“Postmodernistic Archival Science – Rethinking the Methodology of a Science,” Archival Science 3 (2003): 177-
197. 
49 Verne Harris, “Seeing (in) Blindness: South Africa, Archives and Passion for Justice,” opening keynote speech at 
the August 2001 Silver Jubilee annual conference of the Archives and Records Association of New Zealand 
(ARANZ), Records: The Power, Passion and Politics, in Wellington, New Zealand. Also available at 
<http://www.caldeson.com/RIMOS/harris01.html>. (last accessed at July 20, 2006) 
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can never be a quiet retreat for professionals and scholars and 
craftspersons. It is a crucible of human experience, a battleground 
for meaning and significance, a babel of stories, a place and a 
space of complex and ever-shifting power plays. Here one cannot 
keep one’s hands clean. Any attempt to be impartial, to stand 
above the power-plays, constitutes a choice, whether conscious or 
not, to replicate if not to reinforce prevailing relations of power. In 
contrast, archivists who hear the calling of justice, who understand 
and work with the archival record as an enchanted sliver, will 
always be troubling the prevailing relations of power.50
Though it may not be as obvious as in Harris’s work, Brien Brothman also takes a page 
from postmodernism on archives and memory. He focuses heavily on the concept of records in 
this perspective, and by explaining the characteristics of records he further emphasizes the social 
context of archives working with social and organizational memory. His explanation on the 
contrast between the relations of memory and history to archives offers a clear picture that is 
easy to follow. He states,  
It is critical to emphasize . . .  that memory’s time and 
history’s time, memory’s past and history’s past, although different, 
can both mark an archives’ mission. . . . This move provides our 
warrant for developing a distinctive view of time and the past 
within the context of (organizational) memory. The approach 
attempts to dissolve, or, more precisely, to suspend, the apparent 
antithesis between the concepts of memory and archives. This will 
allow us to identify a role that archives may be suited to play in the 
working of social and organizational memory. At the conceptual 
level, being memory’s archivist and being history’s archivist may 
                                                 
50 Verne Harris, “The Archival Silver: Power, Memory, and Archives in South Africa,” Archival Science 2:1-2 
(2002): 85.  
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each involve radically different attitude to time and its objects. 
Memory’s archivist is interested in the past’s residue as material 
for promoting integrated knowledge, social identity, and the 
formation of group consciousness; history’s archivist is interested 
in finding records and, in them, uncovering evidence to develop a 
linear narrative about a past that is ours, yet different from us.51
In a similar vein, Tom Nesmith argues that communication through the mediation that we have 
shaped human understanding and, therefore, rational communication is the basis of intellectual 
social progress. Based on this concept, he views archivists as key mediators or constructors of 
the knowledge available in archives and archives as a product of mediations of communication 
which will ultimately determine the intellectual understanding of a society.52  
In 2002, an archival journal, Archival Science devoted all the issues of that year to the 
theme of “archives, records, and power.” In this collection, authors argue that the power that 
archives imply and archivists wield over societal memory need to be recognized. With this 
perspective, archivists are viewed as “performers in the drama of memory-making” and 
“memory is not something found or collected in archives, but something that is made, and 
continually re-made.”53 By refusing the traditional view of archives as a neutral institution, Joan 
Schwartz and Terry Cook assert that archives should serve as “one foundation of historic 
understanding” and “validate our experience, our perceptions, our narratives, our stories,” for our 
memory.54 They view records as political, and the context and information of records in archives 
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53  Terry Cook and Joan Schwartz, “Archives, Records, and Power: From (Postmodern) Theory to (Archival) 
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imply “power” over collective memory and national identity. The “power” they argue is naturally 
generated in the relationship between archives and the societies that create and use them. They 
also assert that archivists themselves should maintain transparency in their archival work and be 
accountable since political power is involved. In this sense, Verne Harris suggests that this power 
should be shared so that archives users participate in this power yield process to control and 
check archivists’ exercise of the power and to shape society’s memory and knowledge together.55
On a more practical level, there have been some efforts to link archival tasks to the 
process (or the formation) of public memory. Richard Cox suggests the possibility of adopting 
the concept of public memory to specific archival work for public programming. He identifies 
archives as institutions and as definite products of public memory activities. The foundations of 
many archives, especially college and university archives as well as state archives, seem to be 
directly connected with centennial and bicentennial celebrations or other related activities. 
Richard Cox argues that, “a large portion of our archival and historical manuscript repositories 
are themselves artifacts (or documents?) of public memory discussions and activities.”56 Given 
the idea of a product of public memory, he suggests archives need to be part of public memory 
through the actual archival work and principles of acquisition, preservation, and use, rather than 
by trying to be theoretically utilized. Through the commitment of archivists to public 
programming, the image, awareness, and success of archives can be determined within the 
context of how society views its past; that is public memory. At the same time, he warns, “Such 
archival outreach activities will take root and sprout while the climate is right, but they will be 
greatly susceptible to mood swings by the public unless archivists build a solid appreciation of 
                                                 
55  Wendy M. Duff and Verne Harris, “Stories and Names: Archival Description as Narrating Records and 
Constructing Meanings,” Archival Science 3 (2002): 275-280. 
56 Richard J. Cox, “The Concept of Public Memory and its Impact on Archival Public Programming,” Archivaria 36 
(Autumn 1993): 126.  
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what they actually stand for in their work.”57
For other archival tasks, Wendy Duff and Verne Harris explore archival description as a 
field of archival thinking and practice in a broader context. They argue that traditional archival 
description and descriptive standards, including crucial archival notions of respects des fonds, 
provenance, and original order, only reflect rigid information of record creation and use. They 
state that with the arrangement and description of records, archivists tell stories about records. 
Each story they tell about their records changes the meaning of the records and re-creates them. 
They maintain “records are always in the process of being made, that ‘their’ stories are never 
ending, and that the stories of those who are conventionally called records creators, records 
managers, archivists, users and so on are (shifting, intermingling) parts of bigger stories 
understandable only in the ever-changing broader contexts of society.”58  
In relation to memory, the most relevant archival task seems to be appraisal and selection. 
Barbara Craig suggests the idea of archives as a physical space for memory in which it is 
recalled or made in a social-construction sense. She views linking memory to archives leads to 
emphasis on the selection of archives and the function of archival appraisal. “Appraisal emerges 
as the foremost responsibility of the archivist” because it “manifest[s] our sensitivity to the 
importance of archives in making public memory and in its nourishment.”59
Records are created for reasons. Ciaran Trace rejects the positivist assumptions that 
archival documents are “authentic as to procedure and impartial as to creation because they are 
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created as a means for, and as by-product[s] of, action, and not for the sake of posterity.”60 She 
illustrates records as socially constructed and maintained entities created for reasons far from 
impartial. Moreover, they are often considered inauthentic and very cognizant of posterity. As 
records are created for reasons, there is a necessary process to interpret them to construct 
memory. In the case of the No Gun Ri incident, most of the records discovered are war records 
by American soldiers. In this case where there are two parties at stake: victims and American 
soldiers, this inauthentic and cognizant aspect of the records was the center of major arguments 
of this incident while being used as primary evidence at the same time. The interpretation of war 
records has always been an essential part of investigating the No Gun Ri incident because in 
many cases only contextual information was retained in the documents. This viewpoint of 
records as manifestations of political and social power with relation to public memory should be 
taken into consideration when examining No Gun Ri research and history since history is written 
with what has remained in archives. 
Individuals’ acceptance of a historical event occur differently, based on their own 
experiences, but as their stories are cumulated and interpreted, the whole process becomes part of 
the public memory in understanding their past. Edward Linenthal concludes in the case of the 
Oklahoma bombing incident that “the bombing moved from ‘event’ to ‘story,’ as family members 
of those killed and survivors lived out several stories: a progressive narrative, a redemptive 
narrative, a toxic narrative, and a traumatic narrative. These private, intimate narratives became 
public stories through which the event was interpreted.”61 Individual stories of the No Gun Ri 
massacre have been repeatedly told in the survivors’ communities for more than fifty years and, 
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later, researchers collected and interpreted them in their research. These cumulated stories, in 
conjunction with the documentary evidence and American soldiers’ accounts, have formed the 
public memory of this event and been used in the investigation. Some literature of the No Gun Ri 
story illustrate that No Gun Ri research literally began on the basis of public memory that family 
members of survivors had constructed with the information and evidence that survivors had 
accumulated over the years.62 Since there are no manifest documents or other sources that reflect 
the whole event without any subjective interpretation, the whole process of the No Gun Ri 
research involves visiting all the possible traces of public memory including archival materials, 
oral history, and the incident site. Therefore, the whole process of researching No Gun Ri and 
building the blocks of knowledge of this event resembles the process of building public memory. 
In effect, it is a part of forming the public memory of this event in a broader context. 
2.2 DOCUMENTS AS EVIDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN LEGAL AND 
ARCHIVAL ASPECTS 
Throughout history, archival documents have been recognized as a means of verifying the 
activities of their creators. According to Luciana Duranti, as early as the Roman era, an archives 
was defined as “locus publicus in quo instrumenta deponuntur (i.e., the public place where deeds 
are deposited), quatenus incorrupta maneant (i.e., so that they remain uncorrupted), fidem 
faciant (i.e., provide trustworthy evidence), and perpetua rei memoria sit (i.e., and be continuing 
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memory of that to which they attest).”63 Duranti focuses on archives as a place where 
trustworthy records are physically held, but the prime purpose of an archives was to provide 
trustworthy documents, which have the “capacity of serving as evidence and continuing memory 
of actions.”64 The conceptual discussion about archives as evidence, rather than as place, began 
to be accepted in archival tasks from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The Dutch 
archivists, Muller, Feith, and Fruin (1898), had clearly defined the concept of record as 
“organizational evidence,” and similarly Margaret Cross Norton and T. R. Schellenberg of 
America developed the concept of an archival theory of the evidential value of documents in the 
function of appraisal. In Germany, Adolf Brenneke defined archives as “the whole of the 
writings and other documents that were accumulated by physical or juridical persons by reason 
of their practical or juridical activity, and that, as documentary sources and evidence of the past, 
are destined to permanent preservation in a determined place.”65 Duranti also insists that the 
mission of archives is to protect “reliable evidence of action and decision” through accountable 
recordkeeping of “authentic documents embodying complete transactions.”66 Richard Cox has 
the same notion that the fundamental mission of the archival profession “should be to ensure that 
the essential evidence of organizations will be maintained, in whatever form is necessary—
including electronic.”67 All of them accept a record to be equal to evidence. Consequently, Cox 
concludes that, “Thus, by the mid-twentieth century, there was a firm sense of a record as a 
transaction and as evidence of transactions.”68 This sense of a record continues to be accepted by 
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contemporary researchers in repeating the importance of the characteristics of evidence in 
archives.69 Glenda Acland maintains the “pivot of archival science is evidence, not 
information,”70 and Peter Hirtle asserts, “A document may contain lies, errors, falsehoods, or 
oversights—but still be evidence of action by an agency . . . Pure archival interest in records 
depends not on their informational content, but on the evidence they provide of government or 
business activity.”71 Finally in 2001, the International Standard Organization in Geneva defined 
a record as “information created, received and maintained as evidence and information by an 
organization or person, in pursuance of legal obligations or in the transaction of business.”72  
The concept of a record with the added element of evidential value is also explained 
through a philosophical approach. Heather MacNeil tries to understand the archival notion of the 
truth-value of records as evidence from the empiricism of John Locke, using judgments of 
probability. Judgments are grounded by conformity with one’s experience, and for judgments, all 
possible testimonies are taken into consideration. Assent to any proposition is to be based on the 
strength of the evidence. The ideas of Locke significantly influenced the western philosophical 
and social background of the emerging disciplines of law and history, “because it was assumed 
that documentary evidence constituted a form of testimony and thus fell under their general 
theory of evidence and knowledge.”73
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The concept of record as evidence advocates that records are solely evidence of 
transactions; they imply impartiality and objectivity in their contents, and therefore, they are kept 
for purposes of administration and accountability. However, the firm notion of record as 
evidence has been challenged in recent years. Some archival researchers dispute that this concept 
only limits the characteristics of record to “recordness” indicating objectivity and truthfulness as 
a feature of record and, therefore, exclude the possibility of other qualities or attributes of record. 
This understanding is based on the epistemological concept of records in a societal context, or 
record as memory paradigm, which was a product of postmodernism discourse in the archival 
field. Within this perspective, the way to look at records is broadened to include the valuable and 
irreplaceable documentary heritage of a society.  
Brien Brothman proposes the concept of records as cognitive memory artifacts rather 
than merely as legal, evidence-bearing artifacts. In this way, he opens up a potentially endless 
expansion of the functions of archives. He argues that archives with cognitive science and 
cognitive technology and records as cognitive artifacts can provide new opportunities for 
archivist to form a vital part of the memory of a society.74 Evidence, the core value of records in 
traditional archival practice, is questioned and recognized as socially contingent. He argues that 
the concept of evidence has become implicated in the concept of record because of the record 
keepers’ effort to avoid the enumeration of specific kinds of media in definition to accommodate 
the complexities of record media including electronic means. He maintains that there are 
significant differences between record and evidence and the differences are temporal in nature. 
The elusiveness of the temporal relationship between record and evidence naturally appears at 
the practical level and it exemplifies, in his term, the “complex politics of temporality.” This is 
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because the ambiguity of the concepts emerges during the interrelated pursuit of institutional 
power, social influence and knowledge. The core idea of his argument is that the effort “to fix 
these two concepts’ semantic value and relationship are maneuvers to bolster professional 
identity and to establish the nature of our social commitments.”75  
The concept of record as memory or cultural heritage does not deny the function of 
record as evidence. Both the evidential value of record and the broader value as item of cultural 
heritage are clearly characteristics of record and explain its creation and use. A philosophical 
background of records and how to view them certainly controls how records should be treated in 
archival tasks. Obviously, where the emphasis lies determines the hegemony within the 
recordkeeping paradigm and attitudes toward archival tasks, and that emphasis will certainly 
influence every step of business in the field of archives. However, as previously mentioned, 
these characteristics only represent different aspects of records. These two values are not always 
in conflict with each other; therefore it does not imply that one is more important than the other 
or that one is illegitimate in anyway with regards to the other.76 On a practical level, a record can 
function as either of them or both of them, at different times and in different contexts. What is 
incontrovertible is that records have served and will serve as documentary evidence for 
transactions and, further, guarantee accountability in public sectors even under the paradigm of 
record as memory. Moreover, the term of “evidence” can imply a spectrum of meanings, from 
the specific to the general. In the general sense of evidence, which is not limited to the evidence 
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of somebody’s activity within certain period of time, it might not be too complicated to say that a 
record can be used as evidence (as a tool to remember) of human experience from the past in a 
social context.  
In the narrowest concept of record as evidence, accepting a record as evidence in court 
did not develop along with the archivists’ positivist concept of record. Paper documents were not 
admissible in court until relatively recently because this evidence could not be cross-examined.77 
It was “oral testimony by honorable citizens” that courts regarded as the strongest evidence, and 
therefore, “accountability was socially constructed and communally enforced.”78 Over several 
centuries, textual evidence was very slowly introduced as a secondary source of evidence, such 
as endorsements of oral testimony, rather than the content of the evidence. Finally, in modern 
society, written records have taken the place of oral testimony as major evidence of judicial facts, 
and records have become a basic element for accountability. The U.S. Best Evidence rule accepts 
admissibility of the original document to prove its content. The Federal Rule of Evidence only 
grants a duplicate in courts as follows: “a duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an 
original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the 
circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.”79 In the case of 
hearsay, records are not admissible in any case. Hearsay is defined by the Federal Rule of 
Evidence as “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or 
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hearing, offered in evidence to include a written assertion.”80 According to Michael Buckland, as 
regulated in various legislations, “society seems to have decided that you can make people 
honest by requiring enough documentation – or, at least, that you can make them more 
accountable,”81  
The notion of accountability of records in court cases also requires accountable 
recordkeeping systems, emphasizing the social roles of archives. The National Archives of 
Australia (NAA) prepared a document to assist archivists in dealing with the implications of 
legislation ensuring the admissibility and reliability of records. In this document, the NAA 
maintains the importance of authentic recordkeeping systems regulated by a formal policy for 
accountable records and states that “To ensure that records are authentic, accurate and reliable, 
an agency must maintain a comprehensive, credible information and recordkeeping regime. Such 
a regime requires formal organizational arrangements and clarification of responsibilities in 
relation to the management of records. These should be stated in policies and guidelines relating 
to records management and recordkeeping systems.”82  
The traditional focus on unbroken custody for the authenticity of records has shifted 
toward democratic accountability, social memory, and identity through accountable 
recordkeeping. Two Australian researchers, Sue McKemmish and Glenda Acland, identify five 
important functions that accountable recordkeeping serves; (1) facilitating good governance; (2) 
underpinning an accountability mechanism; (3) constituting corporate, national, and social 
memory; (4) constructing individual, community, and national identity; and (5) providing 
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authoritative sources of information.83 They adopt a broad concept of accountability that 
“encompasses historical and cultural accountability as they relate to memory and identity, as well 
as democratic accountability.”84  
Democratic accountability of a society through legitimate recordkeeping is more 
challenging in the digital age when online information is known to be ephemeral and vulnerable. 
Adrian Cunningham and Margaret Phillips review the challenges of archives associated with e-
government and e-democracy in the Australian arena. They argue democracy and governance 
depend on the availability of authentic and reliable information. However, there are technical, 
organizational, legal, financial, and political factors that make digital information vulnerable. To 
deal with these factors that make information at risk of loss, they demand archivists and 
librarians to “become more proactive in influencing the behavior of government agencies to 
ensure that important evidence of democratic governance is created and managed in ways that 
facilitate their accessibility and long-term preservation.”85
A series of recent cases, such as the PROFS case in the United States, the Somalia affair 
in Canada, and the Heiner Affair or “Shreddergate” in Australia, demonstrate the importance of 
democratic accountability through reliable and authentic evidence in records.86 Brien Brothman 
argues that the reason why the archival community has been emphasizing more and more, the 
accountability and evidence of record in recent years is because of “the waning of faith in 
symbols of public authority and public institutions. . . and a loss of faith in effectiveness of 
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government-driven social and economic engineering during periods of financial duress and 
social distress.”87 Marion Renehan asserts that records should be considered a tool for proving 
government accountability. She provides an example of a record’s function as a “watchdog” for 
the government during an investigation of documents in the audit process in Australia. Records 
and their management, in her opinion, are the basis of proving accountability between 
government and citizens. She concludes, “If records provide the evidential basis upon which this 
role [providing evidence in the audit process] is executed, equal recognition needs to be given to 
the significance of the regulation of recordkeeping practices within the public sector.”88 Peter 
Hirtle also emphasizes,  
Records as evidence provide internal accountability for an 
agency and make it possible for the agency to determine what it 
has done in the past. More important, archives—when they contain 
records that can serve as evidence—can force leaders and 
institutions to be accountable for their actions. Government 
archives that contain evidence of the actions of the government can 
ensure that the rights of individual citizens are protected.89  
The importance of archives for holding public officials accountable and protecting the 
rights of individual citizens forms the basis of a current vision statement of the U.S. National 
Archives and Records Administration, with a view to ensuring continuing access to essential 
evidence of the rights of American citizens, the actions of federal officials, and national 
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experiences.90 Records are now recognized as essential for the establishment of public trust in 
government. As a Canadian government archivist claims, records are “instruments of 
accountability,” and “without records there can be no demonstration of accountability. Without 
evidence of accountability, society cannot trust in its public institutions.”91
However, as David Wallace points out, the American archival community has overlooked 
this aspect of archives’ role for democratic accountability in the past.92 Most of the codes of 
ethics for archivists and information professionals include broad objectives to resist government 
secrecy. However, archival literature shows that the archival community has focused mainly on 
everyday tasks of archives such as cataloging, indexing, appraising, creating guides, and so on. 
Susan Steinwall investigates the archival appraisal of the FBI case files and writes, “the judge 
ruling in American Friends v. Webster clearly believed that archivists’ loyalty should be to the 
American public. ‘The thrust of the laws Congress has enacted,’ wrote Judge Greene, ‘is that 
governmental records belong to the American people and should be accessible to them . . . for 
legitimate historical and other research purposes.’”93 Along the same line, Terry Eastwood, an 
archival educator in Canada, believes archival institutions have gone through three stages 
(archives as cultural artifacts, legal authorities, and administrative agencies) and suggests that for 
the fourth stage, archivists need to do their task within a broader context of accountability. He 
declares that “It is the archivist’s task to spirit an understanding of the idea of archives as 
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arsenals of democratic accountability and continuity into society and into its very corporate and 
social fabric.”94  
Related to the idea of archives as a watchdog of democracy in a society, archival tasks 
presumably support this function of archives. Terry Eastwood set the goal of archival appraisal 
for the preparation of democratic governance. He contends that archival appraisal serves two 
functions. Appraisal is a tool of for the enlightenment of citizens for retrospective understanding 
of the actions of government in a democratic polis; further, it should meet the demand to foster 
the recognition and identity of cultural communities in pluralistic democratic societies.95
Verne Harris asserts the raison d’être of archives is the call for justice in a society, and he 
urges archivists to serve the interests of justice in their work. Based on his own experience as an 
archivist in South Africa through the period of dramatic shift from apartheid to democracy, he 
saw that archives existed in the middle of conflicting political power relations, working against a 
systematic forgetting which would only secure an extraordinary degree of opacity in government. 
In this sense, archives could not be an impartial custodian by any means. He suggests the concept 
of “deconstruction” to be melded into archival practice within the notion of archives for justice 
because it inspires a radically activist practice for archives. He argues, 
. . . archivists of deconstruction are without certainty or 
clear-cut destination. They move outside of binary oppositions. 
They see no hard boundaries between concepts and conceptual 
realms. . . . They know that every move they make is a 
construction of knowledge, and exercise of power. They feel 
compelled to disclose their complicity in these constructions and 
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exercises. Of crucial importance, they are bound by the principle of 
hospitality of otherness. They respect every other, invite every 
other in. So that whether they are making records available, or 
describing records, or appraising recordkeeping systems, they 
listen intently for the voices of those who are marginalized or 
excluded by prevailing relations of power.96
When it comes to dealing with war records, archives and archivists need to adopt a more 
proactive role because more often than not they relate closer to classification/declassification and 
passive information policies of government in releasing them. In a report from the U.S. 
Department of Defense, the current situation of the classification of military documents is 
addressed. It reads that “There is evidence that a number of 1950s-era documents which had 
been declassified in the 1970s were reclassified in the 1980s under the Reagan order’s 
interpretation of ‘foreign government information.’ ”97 Within this framework, the Cold War of 
past years and national security against terrorism in recent years were the reasons used to restrain 
active information requests. This situation obviously affected the declassification of Korean War 
records. Wilbur Edel, a professor of political science, argues,  
Thanks in part to the Cold War, the more recent tendency 
in Washington has been to delay for longer and longer periods the 
release of post-World War II records. This country’s more active 
participation in world affairs and complications involved in 
seeking the cooperation of an increasing number of government 
agencies also add to the time required to complete each project. 
The interval widened first to twenty years, then twenty-five. With 
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the publication of the 1952-54 Korean War volumes [of Federal 
Records of the U.S.] during the Reagan Administration, the lag 
grows to thirty years.98  
In his book, A Culture of Secrecy: The Government versus The People’s Right To Know, Athan G. 
Theoharis worries about the possible distortion in historical research in such a situation. He 
states,  
This culture of secrecy did not merely foreclose 
contemporary awareness of the most important presidential 
decisions and intelligence agency programs of the cold war era. 
Historical research was thereafter adversely affected. Classification 
restrictions in effect ensured a distorted understanding of 
presidential decisions and priorities. The selective release of 
formerly classified documents and the release of sentences or 
isolated paragraphs of other documents pose a further research 
dilemma: how to interpret a knowingly incomplete record? 
Researchers are thereby denied an understanding of the context, 
and thus the general purpose, of the disclosed program or 
decision.99
In the case of the No Gun Ri massacre, military documents have been the main source in 
the development of the knowledge base about the incident. In fact, in the process of investigating 
the incident, researchers revealed there was a veteran who manipulated his military career with 
military documents and caused a major controversy over the veracity of evidence. The No Gun 
Ri research, from the beginning, has been a process to discover related war documents, to cause 
controversy over the veracity of evidence, to compete and argue with various interpretations of 
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the contents of those documents, to realize the current status of researchers’ archival use and the 
current status of military recordkeeping, and consequently, to confirm the importance of 
accountability in archives. Furthermore, this incident clearly demonstrates that democratic 
accountability is also another aspect that archivists need to consider to provide trustworthy 
evidence to researchers because it demonstrates that justice and truth could be realized and 
understood through documents. 
2.3 USER STUDIES IN ARCHIVES 
This study is not a conventional user study, but shares the purpose of a user study by intending to 
look at how No Gun Ri researchers use archival materials to bolster their arguments in research. 
This study aims to address how archival documents have contributed to the process of No Gun Ri 
research and within this context, the actual status of archival use for No Gun Ri research is 
examined concomitantly. Thus, learning how the use of archival holdings has been studied within 
archival community generally provides insights on better understanding the relationship between 
No Gun Ri research and archival contribution. Therefore, the literature of use and user studies is 
reviewed in this study within such a context.  
From the late 1970s, use and user studies began to be developed by many archival 
researchers. These studies made a great effort to illustrate practical pictures of archival programs 
and produce clear suggestions for a better understanding of who uses archives for what purpose 
and by what methods. Thanks to these studies, the archival community was able to accumulate a 
great deal of important information about their users. These studies address the necessity to 
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move attention from materials to clients100; patterns of archival users’ information-seeking 
processes101; irrelevance of current reference and access systems for research use; the 
importance of use and user studies102; researchers’ citation patterns of archival materials103; and 
experienced users’ archival knowledge.104 These studies provide valuable understanding about 
archival users in the traditional view of archival use studies. 
These use and user studies not only address the status of users and use of archival 
holdings, but also suggest a variety of possibilities to improve archival services in a practical 
way, besides making better decisions on acquisition and appraisal based on better understanding 
of their users. One of the popular recommendations is archival education for the users. Many 
proposed this should include information literacy on primary sources beyond imparting 
knowledge about the local archives.105 Helen Tibbo suggests that archival institutions need to 
advertise their holdings and features more proactively while at the same time, archivists need to 
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be experts on archival information retrieval in general, not limited to their collections.106 
Revising and improving search tools in archives is one of the implications drawn from user 
studies. Especially where digital information and electronic records prevail, new tools and 
methodologies, including finding aids and published guides in print or on the web, to inform on 
the holdings and facilitate their use, need to be designed reflecting the demands of the people 
who use them. These new insights from user studies enable archivists to envision and design 
various critical methods to improve archival services, but there are still some aspects to consider 
when evaluating archival users studies. 
By and large, these existing studies warn that simple studies about the frequency of use 
are not meaningful enough to understand the use of archives, in any detail. An archival educator, 
Bruce Dearstyne, articulates that, “Archivists have traditionally measured use in terms of how 
many times a collection or document is used or how many researchers call, write, or visit during 
a given period of time. This focus on numbers rather than significance has obscured the need for 
a more realistic measure of the adequacy of use.”107 Similarly, Karen Benedict strongly alleges 
that “frequency of past use is not a valid determinant of the archival or research value of 
records . . . It is ahistorical and anti-intellectual to determine that, because a group of records has 
not been used within a limited period of time, those records are valueless.”108
In order to step around the limit of superficial numbers and frequencies of use in user 
studies, archival researchers have employed topical approaches. Until the 1980s, “Most articles 
on particular subjects or repositories [were] mainly concerned with reporting achievements or 
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outlining needs and opportunities,” as Susan Grigg noticed.109 A study that concentrates on the 
use of a collection is mostly about how a user group approaches the materials rather than how 
they interact with materials and use them in their research. Usually topical approaches were 
taken in research to improve acquisition and collection development in a certain area. Research 
employing the topical use study approach consists of history of science, women’s history, and 
social history. In these studies, archival researchers proved that all the materials users had seen in 
archives might not always be relevant to their research. In addition, all of the materials that a 
user sees or even cites cannot be considered to have the same value. Therefore, Jacqueline 
Goggin maintains the importance of “the quality of use” in evaluating archival use. She states, 
“Scholarly users may look at numerous collections and find nothing of value for their particular 
research topic. . . On the other hand, a researcher could make numerous meaningless citations of 
archival sources to dress-up the footnotes in a scholarly publication. The publication must be 
read and analyzed to determine the quality of use.”110 Her notion of the quality of use is 
“analyzing the role of documentation in the final product to determine whether or not the authors 
made use of the great variety of primary source materials available to them,” and in her research, 
she “judged the authors by how well they used the collections of organizational records they 
cited – by the quality of use.”111  
More recently, archival use and user studies have introduced various kinds of subject 
approaches and methodologies. William E. Brown, Jr. and Elizabeth Yakel recruited academic 
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administrators for a user study, instead of historians.112 They again broke the prejudice that 
major archival users are historians, a concept Elsie Freeman challenged more than 20 years ago. 
They interviewed fifteen administrators in five colleges and universities to evaluate the way in 
which academic administrators use their archives. They found several important facts: 
administrators tend to assume the information delivered by the archives to be authentic and 
reliable and they expect the information to be extracted, packaged, and filtered for the core 
information. It turns out again from Brown and Yakel’s research that archivists need to be more 
proactive in determining their users and providing information that users demand. William 
Jackson employed a methodology that is not typical in archival research. He used Trueswell’s 
80/20 rule from library science, which states that 80 percent of the use in a library involves only 
20 percent of the collection. This rule was proved to be also true in an archival setting. He asserts 
that “use” should not simply be the “indicator” for appraisal or disposal, but from a study of 
“use” archivists should attempt to find ways to play an active role in appraising, accessing, and 
disposing archives, to make non-users users, and to make this 80% of unused material usable.113  
In terms of the methodology of use and user studies, citation analysis has been one of 
the most popular methods. However, in citation analysis, a user’s determination toward citing 
materials does not identify the materials most critical to his or her research. In this method, 
there is still a question about whether the author used the best sources or all of the available 
sources.114 Accordingly, new methodologies must be developed to obtain these answers, and 
various attempts should be tried with combinations of multiple methodologies. In a 
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benchmarking article with this perspective, Paul Conway writes, “By identifying systematically 
both the physical use of archival materials and the impact of archival information beyond a 
single repository, archivists can better evaluate and plan archival programs and more clearly 
realize the value of the services they provide.”115 He also lamented that there have not been 
many studies that cover researchers in multiple repositories and the impact of archival 
materials’ use after the research is done.116
William Maher questions the typical methodologies in use studies and maintains that 
methodologies for use studies need to be able to answer the following questions; “What is the 
relationship between the number of questions asked, the number of records series and collections 
used and the ‘satisfaction’ of users? What is an appropriate measure of user satisfaction? What 
would users like to see an archives do to improve access to its holding?”117 Since the ultimate 
purpose of a use and user study is the users’ satisfaction with their work in archives, research 
design should be reflected more inclusively from the users’ perspective. Dearstyne also states, 
“Here the objective is to look beyond ‘use’ in the elementary sense – directly seeking and 
deriving information from archival material. Instead, the focus turns to ultimate users and 
beneficiaries – ‘people who may never visit an archives but utilize archival information 
indirectly.”118  
Unfortunately, archivists have taken a long detour to learn this. They recently began to 
understand the need to learn about the users’ research patterns. Fredric Miller confirmed from his 
research that, “They (historians) do not use as many sources as they could, or find and use 
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records exactly as archivists would prefer.”119 Miller determined that, “historical research is not 
intellectually archives-driven . . . While social historians may sometimes ask archivists to save 
everything, in reality they have concentrated on reinterpreting existing holdings. Their research 
is primarily question centered, not material centered.”120 In this context, archivists need to know 
“at what point researchers turn to archival materials, and where, how, and why such materials are 
used,” and “what are historians’ patterns of use of primary, secondary, and tertiary sources and 
how do these interplay with the formulation of ideas, hypotheses, and arguments?”121 That is, 
use and user studies should be designed to observe users’ actual research and the actual 
application of records in publications, following the questions of how users perform their 
research and how archival materials interact and influence this process of research. Only with 
this perspective of research design will archival researchers be able to learn concretely how 
history is researched by using archival materials, and as a result, how archives contribute to the 
building blocks leading to an understanding of history. 
More specifically, a topical user study with a specifically targeted user group may be 
necessary to see the relationship between researchers and documents. Many archival educators 
and practitioners have identified the needs of research employing a focused group of users as a 
form of research agenda.122 Similarly, Donald Case emphasizes that information professionals 
need to try to avoid typical library or archives user studies and “focus our studies of information 
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needs and uses more closely on the behaviors of specific communities of scholars . . . We need 
in-depth studies of particular groups of scholars – much narrower than the vague collections of 
‘humanists’ studied elsewhere, and narrower even than the varied ‘American historians’ 
examined here.”123 However, not many archival researchers actually have tried to conduct a 
use/user study with focused user groups. There has not been prolific research to review how 
much archival materials influence or contribute to historical research,, especially evaluating 
archival impact from the publications of archival users within narrowed topic.  
In this study, those who have conducted any kind of in-depth research on the No Gun Ri 
massacre are chosen as a specific target group for study. This study adapts the basic concept and 
purpose of a use study and is inspired by the research design of seeking to learn about users’ 
research patterns with documentary evidence and their perception of using archives. As a method 
to examine the contribution of archival materials to the knowledge of the No Gun Ri massacre, 
the ways No Gun Ri researchers conduct their research are investigated in this study. This study 
aims to learn how No Gun Ri researchers knew of the existence of the materials they used, which 
methods they took to discover documentary evidence for their argument, and how they 
interpreted and used these materials in their research. All these implications are drawn from the 
published research works and from the authors of the publications. Therefore, the data from these 
concrete sources present the most specific picture on archival use of No Gun Ri research. Only 
through an understanding of the tangible information about the communication of No Gun Ri 
researchers and archival materials, should how and why archival materials played a role in 
building knowledge of the No Gun Ri massacre be completely comprehended. 
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3.0  METHODOLOGY  
To collect data for the examination of the evolution of developing knowledge about the No Gun 
Ri massacre and the role of archival materials in the knowledge development, this study 
employed two methods: content analysis and interviews. These methodologies provided 
quantitative and qualitative data on the descriptive analysis of the role of archival materials in 
historical knowledge development. 
3.1 RESEARCH DESIGN 
Archivists have long tried to understand users from a viewpoint of their archival collections. 
However, such an approach misses very important perspectives about use in and users of 
archives, which are how they perform their research and develop knowledge on their research 
subjects while using archives, and how much weight they give to archival materials relative to 
their other sources. Only when archivists and archival scholars understand how their users utilize 
archival materials for the purpose of building their knowledge can archival programs finally 
provide adequate services to users.  
This study was inspired by the research design of some archives and library users’ studies 
that encourage archivists and librarians to better understand users from their work patterns, 
interpretation processes, hypotheses-building methods, and final results of their research 
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products.124 This study was, therefore, designed to achieve an understanding of archival 
materials from users’ perspectives, using, for a descriptive analysis, how information on the No 
Gun Ri massacre became known to the public and was researched within archives. It was also 
designed to provide both qualitative and quantitative evidence on the various archival factors 
affecting the developing knowledge of the No Gun Ri incident, from the research process to the 
research findings. 
3.2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
3.2.1 Grounded Theory Approach 
Many descriptive studies rooted in the social sciences are hard to set up to develop a concrete 
hypothesis; the research questions of this study do not fit into a scientific framework to prove a 
hypothesis either. In fact, this study tries to find a pattern (or a theory) of how knowledge 
develops from an empirical situation of actual research and how researchers learn and accept 
knowledge. In doing so, this study applied grounded theory as the theoretical foundation for 
analysis. Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss first proposed this approach in 1967. Grounded 
theory is “an inductive theory discovery method that allows a researcher to develop a theoretical 
account of the general facets of a research question and to ground that account in empirical 
observations or data.”125 Library and Information Science has been using this approach for some 
                                                 
124 For those that influenced this study, see the following: Donald Owen Case, “The Collection and Use of 
Information by Some American Historians: A Study of Motive and Methods,” Library Quarterly 61:1 (1991): 61-82; 
Karl Weintraub, “The Humanistic Scholar and the Library,” Library Quarterly 50 (Winter 1980): 22-39; Fredric 
Miller, “Use, Appraisal, and Research: A Case Study of Social History,” American Archivist 49 (Fall 1986): 371-392. 
125 Elizabeth Hewins, Impacts of Bibliographic Information on Veterinary Clinical Decision Making (PhD 
dissertation, University of Texas at Austin, 1997), 100. 
 56 
time because much research in these fields is often best accompanied by findings from 
qualitative data.126 It is known that qualitative data in social science is more beneficial because 
this method allows the discovery of a “theory from data systematically obtained from social 
research. . . . [and] theory in sociology is a strategy for handling data in research, providing 
modes of conceptualization for describing and explaining.”127  
In grounded theory, a theory is “grounded” in data. Concepts, theories, and hypotheses 
related to data are discovered through the process of collecting and analyzing the data. With 
grounded theory, no preconceived idea or extant theory is adopted in a study as a way to verify it. 
Such an approach requires a researcher to discover a grounded theory rather than to frame a 
study within a hypothesis and test it with an existing theory. Grounded theory analysis is 
processed during the collection of data, not at the end of it. Therefore, it allows for flexibility in 
the construction of a theory and also in the direction of the research influenced by what is 
discovered in the research process. 
In generating a theory from data, concepts and hypotheses that emerge from the data are 
systematically worked out in relation to a theory, during the course of the research. The way to 
derive a theory that is grounded in data is through constant comparison which is a procedure to 
compare phenomena being coded under a certain category so that a theoretical elaboration of that 
certain category can begin to emerge. Therefore, comparative analysis of collected data is 
conducted continuously along with the process of conceptualizing, categorizing, and coding the 
data. A researcher is required to generate conceptual categories from evidence or to establish the 
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generality of a fact. Subsequently, the researcher finishes a comparative analysis based on the 
distinctive empirical elements distinguishing the units of comparison on the level of data. Once 
the analyst turns to theoretical concerns, the analyst continually checks out theories that the 
researcher looks for as the data become available.128 Analysis of qualitative data in grounded 
theory means “a nonmathematical process of interpretation, carried out for the purpose of 
discovering concepts and relationships in raw data and then organizing these into a theoretical, 
explanatory scheme.”129 Based on interpretation of data, conceptual categories and theoretical 
schemes, concepts, theories, and/or realities of social behaviors or phenomena will be revealed. 
3.2.2 Applicability to this Research 
This study is an analysis of developing knowledge recognized by the public and researchers on 
the No Gun Ri massacre. It is a descriptive and explanatory study. From this perspective, 
grounded theory is a good match for the theoretical background of this study since grounded 
theory and its constant comparative analysis provides a framework for generating a descriptive 
theory. As a library science researcher mentioned, grounded theory is an inductive theory 
discovered within a contextual and process approach. Elizabeth Hewins states that, “[t]he focus 
of the theory building is not to provide an objective and static description, but rather to provide a 
process-oriented, within-context description of the phenomenon of using electronic bibliographic 
databases to obtain information for patient-care problem-solving tasks,” for the justification of 
her study. 130  Similarly, grounded theory was used for the descriptive analysis of evolving 
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knowledge of the No Gun Ri massacre. The context for the analysis is the knowledge of the No 
Gun Ri massacre derived from published research by various researchers including academics, 
journalists, families of victims, and government investigators. This study intends to look at the 
process of the knowledge building and argument development of the No Gun Ri incident and the 
No Gun Ri researchers’ work patterns by investigating information within publications and by 
interviewing the researchers about their perceptions on archives. It does not try to simply address 
an objective and static description of a story on No Gun Ri.  
Grounded Theory is especially applicable to this study because this author did not simply 
extract key words and scan them in the text as a means of processing analysis for coding the data 
automatically. Rather, in this study, the author thoroughly read the publications to detect the 
contents of a certain category and identify/link them according to a coding scheme. While 
reading and analyzing the contents, the interplay between the author and the data was better 
worked out and the analysis process became “the foundations for making comparisons and 
discovering properties and dimensions” of data.131 The description of the development of No 
Gun Ri knowledge, therefore, is examined with constant comparisons to a meaningful coding 
scheme based on conceptual categories of the contents, and it finally addresses the purpose of 
this study, which is to identify the impact and roles of archival materials among other 
information used in researching the No Gun Ri massacre. 
                                                 
131 Strauss and Corbin, Basics of Qualitative Research, 5. 
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3.3 DATA COLLECTION AND CONTENT ANALYSIS 
In order to investigate the proposition underlying the study and the related questions, two major 
steps of research were required. The first stage of research was to understand how recognition of 
the No Gun Ri massacre developed and how and why archival materials have interacted with the 
expanding and emerging knowledge about the incident. To understand these factors, this study 
adopted content analysis as its methodology. In the second stage, the research process and the 
role of archival materials were addressed by in-depth interviews with the researchers who 
conducted research on the No Gun Ri massacre. In this process the researchers’ notions of 
archival materials and their value in the research were examined. 
3.3.1 Data Set of Historical Description: Contents of Research 
At the initial stage of research, content analysis was conducted on all the published research 
about the No Gun Ri massacre in Korea and the United States. This process was designed to 
identify how discussions of the massacre changed and evolved according to the expansion and 
emergence of new documents and information and how researchers informed readers about their 
use of sources. 
The most common type of studies employed to understand the relationship between 
research and source materials is citation analysis. The citation analysis method offers great 
advantages in learning what kinds of materials have been used in research and how frequently. 
However, this method, which merely shows the types and the frequency of use of materials, was 
not considered sufficient to understand how research progressed and knowledge changed on the 
topic of the No Gun Ri massacre. Therefore, this study adopted content analysis to seek deeper 
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knowledge than mere citation analysis. 
The content analysis methodology describes the complete progress of discussions on the 
topic of the No Gun Ri massacre and its knowledge development process. Content analysis also 
shows the subtle significance of how and why researchers find and use certain archival materials; 
therefore, their impact is described in a more detailed way than citation analysis would be. No 
Gun Ri researchers described, in footnotes or in the text, why they use (or do not use) certain 
materials to support their arguments and how they interpret archival materials. 
The goal of this examination was to produce a detailed description of the development of 
knowledge related to the massacre and the interaction of that knowledge with the emerging 
available source materials. Particular questions to be addressed during a content analysis of 
published research products include the following: 
? How did the knowledge of the No Gun Ri massacre develop chronologically? 
? What kind of archival documents were discovered in the process of conducting No Gun 
Ri research? What were the major documents used in the research? 
? How does the expansion of available archival materials affect the development of 
knowledge of the No Gun Ri massacre?  
The scope for the content analysis in this study was all of the research publications on the 
subject. The No Gun Ri incident is a narrow topic and the number of publications was 
manageable for a dissertation study. The research publication included (1) news articles from 
major news companies, (2) academic research, (3) research by survivors and their families, and 
(4) governmental investigation reports, published either in print or online. Research publications 
were collected in Korea and America. This author tried to collect only original news articles from 
major news agencies since there are tremendous numbers of copies of specific news reports on 
the Internet, often from one original source. In all cases, only research-oriented publications were 
included. The analyzed publications for news articles from major news publications were 
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approximately four hundreds thirty two articles from the Associated Press, US News and World 
Reports, the New York Times, the Washington Post, and other such major publications in the 
United States, and Hankyoreh, News Maker, Sin-Dong-a, Monthly Mal, and other major Korean 
publications, published as of May 2006. Academic research publications included approximately 
forty-five journal articles, eight monographs, one symposium proceeding, and four theses, 
available as of May 2006. Two governmental reports, one from the United States and one from 
Korea were examined as well. Detailed information about these publications is given in 
Appendix A of this dissertation.  
3.3.2 Data Set of User Perception: Interview of Researchers 
The second stage of research was an interview with researchers who published original research 
on this event. To fill the gap that could not be addressed from content analysis and to support and 
enrich the findings of this methodology, the interview method was employed as a follow up step. 
Donald Case challenges that, “Interviews are time-consuming and are based on unreliable self-
reports of thought, motivation, and action.”132 However, interviews also have major advantages 
for investigating informal methods of research; that is, methods of using archival materials not 
only for direct reference but also for the impression and influence of the materials to the 
researchers. In fact, the interview method has high design flexibility. Thus, this method can be 
applied when a study has to answer problems that are difficult to fit in a fixed frame or have a 
large number of variables.  
By combining interviews with reading and examination of the products of No Gun Ri 
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massacre research, this author collected comprehensive information about how researchers learn, 
approach, identify, and finally use archival materials and how archival materials play a role in 
research about the event. These interviews implied considerable significance in indicating the 
concrete ideas of researchers and their work patterns with archival materials through focused 
responses about their research. Therefore, interview results addressed major objectives of this 
study in a detailed way. 
The interview process was performed to answer the following questions: 
? What were the research processes of the No Gun Ri massacre researchers? 
? How did the researchers on the No Gun Ri massacre identify, locate, and finally use 
archival materials? 
? How much weight and credibility did the researchers grant archival materials, among 
other resources, for research of the No Gun Ri massacre? 
? What is the contemporary researcher's perception of using archival holdings for 
understanding the No Gun Ri massacre? 
The subjects were defined as researchers who have produced published works on the No 
Gun Ri massacre using historical inquiries. In the process of content analysis, subjects for 
interview were practically identified from the research publications. Researchers in both Korea 
and the United States were included as interview subjects. The subject groups included 
journalists from major newspapers and news magazines, academic researchers (in disciplines of 
history, social science, and law), survivors and families of victims, and government investigators 
in Korea and the United States. There were a considerable number of researchers who published 
research on this event: approximately twenty six academic researchers, forty two journalists, and 
two survivors and families, identified as of May 2006.133 The researchers interviewed were 
selected from among those who had written major news reports and journal articles, those who 
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had written multiple articles, or those who had published a significant number of pages of 
research such as books or research reports. Finally, a total of eleven researchers were 
interviewed; four journalists, four historians, one military officer, one law scholar, and one 
victim’s family. Among those interviews, five interviews were held in person, four in written 
form, and two on the phone. The list of the interviewed subjects is provided in Appendix C. 
Even though these two methodologies (content analysis of publications and interview) 
were described in this section as distinct and separate procedures from each other, in effect, they 
were performed simultaneously in many cases. Before having an interview, the publications of 
the interviewee was read, if not fully analyzed, for a better understanding of what the writers 
mention in terms of their own experience of researching in archives and of using archival 
materials for their argument. 
3.4 DATA ANALYSIS PROCESS AND TECHNIQUE 
3.4.1 Publication Analysis 
The first step of the content analysis of publications was to identify all the publications on the No 
Gun Ri incident by searching databases in the U.S. and Korea, such as LISA, ERIC, Academic 
(Lexis Nexis), America: History and Life, JSTOR, KINDS (Korean Integrated News Database 
System) and the national bibliographic databases of Korea.  
Location and analysis of comments about major discussions on the No Gun Ri incident as 
well as using sources, archival records, or other artifacts for the inference of No Gun Ri history 
were performed in the content analysis. Detailed objects for analysis were citations, comments in 
footnotes, and the text bodies of research. With such an analysis, this study could address a more 
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dynamic and richer history of the emerging recognition of this massacre. The analysis was 
performed while reading all the publications, by marking specific discussions and using source 
materials of each discussion. Also, during the analyzing process any comments about authors’ 
argument building process and their perceptions on supporting evidence were identified. The 
analyzed data were saved in a Word Processing program and later converted into qualitative data 
analysis software, NVivo. In this process, categories of contents were elaborated in terms of their 
properties and dimensions and a coding scheme was developed based on the categories. By using 
NVivo, linking contents to a code was automatically processed and the collected data were easily 
organized, sorted and counted to draw findings and insights in a process to finalize research 
results. 
While processing the content analysis of publications, a serious problem was discovered. 
Researchers used different formats to cite archival materials with different levels of fullness. For 
example, many publications cited war diaries a great number of times, but the details of those 
citations varied from an entry for a specific date to a collective entry that covered several months. 
The No Gun Ri Review, an investigation report by the American government, cited war diaries in 
a form as “War diary, 1st Cavalry Division, 25 June-November 1950. In the Records of U.S. 
Army Commands, Military Historian's Office, Organizational History Files, Box 42, RG 338, 
NARA.” This citation did not specify the date or the time of the diary entry and contained diary 
entries over a long period time. As the above example illustrates, citations were not clear in 
indicating which document was referred to or whether citation referred to the same document 
cited in other publications. Therefore, in this study, anything in doubt was confirmed with text 
and the context of text.  
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3.4.2 Interviews 
Interviews were conducted in accordance with the regulations and requirements of the 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) for human subjects’ research and the guidelines recommended 
by the Oral History Association. Selected interview subjects were informed of the purpose and 
procedure of the study prior to the interview. The subjects were also informed of the anticipated 
uses of their interviews and their possible contributions to this particular project. The interview 
subjects were also notified that if they required a copy of their transcripts and/or a copy of this 
dissertation, one would be gladly provided. Some interviewees willingly gave a permission to 
release their identification along with their comments, and one interview respondent suggested 
that he would be happy if his transcript was deposited in an archives for future use.  
A detailed procedure for interviews follows. First, this author identified the interview 
subjects from the research they published. Next, their contact information was acquired, 
primarily from the Internet, with one case where contact information was acquired from a 
publisher. Email was the main method of contact. Once the interview subjects agreed to 
participate in this study, interviews were conducted in person, using a written form, or on the 
phone. The interviews were recorded utilizing voice recording equipment and personally 
transcribed by the researcher. 
The interview questions were designed to encourage interview respondents’ spontaneous 
and open responses and discussions and were not meant to elicit yes or no answers. The 
questions were loosely structured with open-ended questions to draw out personal experiences 
and perceptions from the subjects. The interview respondents talked as freely as possible, and in 
many cases an answer for a question led to another question or covered several questions. 
Therefore, questions were not asked in the same order of each interview subject. The following 
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questions were asked of the interview respondents: 
1. How did your research involve the use of archives and historical material about the No Gun Ri 
massacre? 
2. Did you need to use archives for the No Gun Ri research and if so, how did you locate the 
materials you used? 
3. What kinds of archives and historical materials did you use for your research on the No Gun Ri 
massacre? 
4. Can you describe your research procedure during your No Gun Ri research? 
5. How much weight and credibility did you give archival materials relative to other resources 
you used? 
6. For the building of your major points and arguments concerning the No Gun Ri research, how 
much do you think you have been influenced by archival materials relative to other resources? 
7. Have your views of and research about the massacre changed as new archival materials have 
been discovered? Can you describe the specific archival documents that changed your research 
results? 
8. What were the barriers that you experienced in using archives? For example, were these 
barriers preservation issues, accessibility issues, classification/declassification issues, or others? 
9. How did you deal with any practical problems of approaching and using archives, such as 
traveling to the United States or Korea and language differences? 
After the interviews were transcribed, the analysis of the transcripts was performed. This 
process was very similar to the publication analysis; categorizing the contents (primarily based 
on each interview questions) and developing a code scheme with the categories.  According to 
the code scheme, the transcripts were coded and analyzed by using NVIVO. Then, the coded 
data were interpreted to draw a picture of the individual researchers’ work patterns on No Gun Ri 
research and their perception on using archives. 
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4.0  NO GUN RI MASSACRE: HISTORICAL SKETCH 
In the Korean War that had been fought from June 25, 1950 to July 
27, 1953, more than 3 million Koreans died while millions of 
refugees remained homeless and distraught. About 37,000 United 
States Soldiers were dead in the war. The ironic aspect of war is 
that the primary victims are civilians rather than the soldiers. 
Mass destruction, pain and sufferings are the fate of the innocent 
people in war.134
Any historical research requires understanding an event from all angles, but in the case of the No 
Gun Ri incident, it is a particularly important to know about the war situation preceding the 
incident and other related social and political circumstances to understand the incident. It is very 
unlikely that there is a single document that reveals a direct description of the killing of Korean 
civilians in the Korean War; thus, the best method to find the history of No Gun Ri seems to be 
checking and interpreting all possible political, social, tactical and historical military records and 
resources. Byong-su Choi and Ku-do Chong repeat that it is extremely crucial in the case of No 
Gun Ri to get evidence from all related documents and historiography, circumstantial or 
descriptive, to discover the truth.135
Son-ju Pang, a Korean-American historian, similarly insists that it is necessary to know 
the war situation in July 1950 during the opening weeks of the Korean War because it might 
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have affected later activities of the U.S. soldiers. 136 Before early July, the American soldiers 
were confident about achieving victory because they believed that the North Korean People’s 
Army (NKPA) had not experienced modern warfare. Bruce Cumings, a historian and Korea War 
specialist, describes this confidence as “American G.I.s were told, and believed, that as soon as 
Korean soldiers saw the whites of Yankee eyes, they would turn tail and run.”137 This 
misjudgment about North Korean troops, in fact, began at the top. The Commander of the United 
Nation forces, General Douglas MacArthur, expressed extreme confidence about the war in a 
conversation with John F. Dulles, stating that MacArthur could handle the war with one arm tied 
behind his back and repulse North Koreans with only the first Cavalry Division.138 In the same 
vein, the First Cavalry Division Commander, Major General Hobart Gay, told a press conference 
that “he did not intend to take the ROK Army into consideration at all in making his estimates 
and disposition.”139 A historian, Philip West, remarked that MacArthur was “blind to Korean and 
Chinese realities from the outbreak of the war to his dismissal, with devastating results for all 
sides.”140 The fact that the American Army did not correctly view the reality of the Korean War 
and the consequent result of ill-prepared troops were frequently mentioned as major factors for 
the No Gun Ri incident by many researchers.  
In battlefield situations, the North Korean Army’s war forces had proven extremely 
effective from the beginning of the war. The 24th Division’s Commanding General, William F. 
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Dean, stressed that the American war force was not effective and dangerously disappointing 
compared to the North Koreans after the first engagement. He warned MacArthur that “the North 
Korean Army, the North Korean soldiers, and his status of training and the quality of his 
equipment have been underestimated.”141 As a matter of fact, the majority of North Korean 
soldiers had fought with the Chinese Communists and the Soviet Army in World War II, and 
they were equipped with heavily armored tanks and very effective ammunition from Russia.142 A 
series of defeats of U.S. troops and the superiority of the NKPA affected the morale of U.S. 
soldiers and spread fear among them. This was exemplified in Taejon, approximately 120 miles 
south of Seoul, where American troops engaged North Korean troops with heavy casualties 
inflicted on the U.S. Army’s 24th Division in July 19th-20th 1950. The losses included Major 
General Dean’s disappearance and 1,150 casualties out of the 3,933 soldiers of the 24th Division 
which is nearly 30 percent of manpower lost and virtually all the equipment of the troops.143 The 
Taejon battle was partially valued later for holding up the frontline for a short time period to buy 
additional time for further reinforcements. However, after this battle, the North Korean Army 
was considered tactically dominant, and the American soldiers were extremely terrified of the 
North Korean troops. A Korean military historian mentions that the battle at Taejon was the 
direct cause for the re-disposition of the 1st Cavalry to Yongdong. North Korean infiltrators and 
guerrilla bands in South Korea, from that point on, caused panic among the American soldiers.144 
Roy Appleman, a military historian, states about the Taejon defeat that “On the American side, 
the lack of information of the true state of affairs caused by the almost complete breakdown in 
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all forms of communication was the major factor leading to the disaster.”145 At Taejon, 
American soldiers clearly experienced the front assault and guerrilla warfare from the back, and 
from this point onward, the U.S. troops began “burning villages suspected of harboring partisans; 
in some cases they were burned merely to deny hiding places to the guerrillas.”146  
The suspicion of refugees, caused by infiltration and the harboring of spies, became more 
intense among American soldiers as they encountered refugee columns everywhere. The refugee 
problems stemmed from military policies and the incorrect expectations of the war. The 1st 
Cavalry Division Commander, Hobart R. Gay, stated in a press conference that “his solution for 
the Communists’ infiltration tactics was to force every Korean out of the division’s area of 
responsibility, on the theory that once they were removed, any Korean caught in the area would 
be an enemy agent.”147 This simple solution adversely caused brutal results. Hundreds of 
thousands of refugees shared the roads on which U.S. troops’ supplies and ammunitions were 
transported and thus provided a method for North Korean infiltration. Dongchun Kim, a Korean 
historian, also maintains that a great percentage of Korean people actually became refugees due 
to evacuation by U.S. troops for war operations, U.S. Air Force’s large-scale air attacks and 
combat activities related to the infiltration tactics of the enemy.148  
The chaotic situation due to the refugee problems and North Korean infiltration was 
quite well known during wartime.  American newspapers reported refugee-related problems in 
Korea everyday in July 1950, as one of articles in the New York Times reported: 
Hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing before the 
advancing Red armies clogged the roads of South Korea today, and 
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hidden in their midst was a small core of Communist sympathizers, 
spies and infiltrating guerrillas. Although the number of 
Communist sympathizers among South Korea’s 20,000,000 people 
actually is small, their ranks still can be expanded by the Northern 
Reds if they desire. The pro-Reds in South Korea inhabit almost 
inaccessible mountain areas, which make up almost three-fourths 
of the peninsula. Trained organizers from the north have drawn 
heavily from these regions for their guerrilla bands and their 
replacements.149
Descriptions of the U.S. troops’ consequent reactions toward this situation continued to fill the 
pages of newspapers in July and August 1950. Another well known news article was by John 
Osborne, a correspondent of Time and Life magazines.  He states that North Korean tactics had a 
brutalizing effect on American soldiers: “To attempt to win it [the war against Communists] so, 
as we are now doing in Korea, is not only to court final failure but also to force upon our men in 
the field an attitude of the utmost savagery. This means not the usual, inevitable savagery of 
combat in the field, but savagery in detail – the blotting out of villages where the enemy may be 
hiding; the shooting and shelling of refugees who may include North Koreans in the anonymous 
white clothing of the Korean countryside, or who may be screening an enemy march upon our 
positions.”150 Another journalist, Walter Sullivan, a war correspondent from the New York 
Times, reported that “The American G.I. is now beginning to eye with suspicion any Korean 
civilian in the cities or countryside. ‘Watch the guys in white’ – the customary peasant dress – is 
the cry often heard near the front.”151 Keyes Beech, another American correspondent, also wrote, 
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“It is not the time to be a Korean, for the Yankees are shooting them all. . .  nervous American 
troops are ready to fire at any Korean.”152  
It is easily assumed that the rumors and the fear about North Korean troops, their tactics 
and war operations’ efficiency affected the American soldiers’ morale and activities, especially 
the green recruit soldiers of the 1st Cavalry Division who had just arrived in Korea. These 
American soldiers were not familiar with the Korean people, land, culture and weather, and in 
fact, the Korean War was totally different from any wars that they had heard or experienced, as it 
was guerrilla warfare. Due to the prevalence of guerrillas, they found themselves in “a new kind 
of war, in which the enemy and the people became indistinguishable.” Bruce Cumings connects 
this characteristic of the Korean War and how American soldiers would feel, stating that “The 
average G.I. arrived in Korea with the barest knowledge of where he was, who he was fighting, 
and why; he was thrown into battle in the steaming humidity, frequently rain squalls and muddy 
terrain of midsummer; he slogged through rice paddies fertilized with human waste, something 
common in peasant societies but overwhelming at the first scent; if he slaked his thirst with 
paddy water he got amoebic dysentery. In this UN ‘police action’ he faced an enemy who fought 
a total war, using every resource to turn Korean weakness into strength. Sometimes this meant 
using little kids to ferry ammunition; sometimes it meant driving weeping refugees into 
American lines to cover an infantry assault.”153 Then he prudently introduces another aspect of a 
racial attitude to consider how American soldiers treated the Korean civilians, which has not 
been addressed extensively in other Korean War research: “The average G.I. also came from an 
American society where people of color were subjugated and segregated, and where the highest 
law officer in the land, Attorney General McGrath, had called communists ‘rodents.’ It thus did 
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not take long for soldiers to believe that Koreans were subhuman, and act accordingly.”154 He 
continues to address this approach as follows; 
In contrast to the war in Vietnam, barely a voice was raised 
against such racism. . . . the same American society that fought for 
freedom in Korea prohibited Koreans from entering the country to 
reside in 1950 under existing racial quotas, and denied 
naturalization to 3,000 Koreans who came to the United States 
before 1924; fifteen states prevented Korean-Caucasian marriages, 
eleven states refused to allow Koreans to buy or own land; twenty-
seven occupations in New York City were proscribed to 
Koreans.  . . . 
Such attitudes shaped the battle, pitting young American 
soldiers by the thousands against an enemy that they were 
unprepared to fight, one which fought with rare courage, tenacity, 
and cunning. And these attitudes shaped the behavior of the enemy, 
who commonly remarked that “the Americans do not recognize 
Koreans as human beings,” and who needed nerves of steel to cope 
with an American army that, as the war ground on, increasingly 
seemed capable of anything.155  
A few days after the Taejon battle, the American troops again engaged North Korean 
troops in Yongdong County where No Gun Ri was located. Refugees were still very crowded in 
Yongdong and became objects of military attention. Roy Appleman mentioned that refugees 
were again used by North Koreans in Yongdong, “On 24 July, for example, a man dressed in 
white carrying a heavy pack, and accompanied by a woman appearing to be pregnant, came 
under suspicion. The couple was searched and the woman's assumed pregnancy proved to be a 
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small radio hidden under her clothes. She used this radio for reporting American positions. The 
Eighth Army tried to control the refugee movement through the Korean police, permitting their 
movement only during daylight hours and along predetermined routes.”156 This type of 
inhumane tactics of the North Koreans - using refugees to break though the American lines - 
have been well described in the official Korean War history of the U.S. and Korea. Stories like 
this relate that North Koreans drove several hundred refugees ahead of them through American 
mine fields,157 or that North Korean forces began their attack by making several hundred 
refugees approach a bridge near Yongdong that American troops had mined against an attempted 
crossing by the North Korean troops.158  
For these reasons, the U.S. Army as well as South Korean troops tried to control the 
refugees and did not allow them to approach any friendly lines. On July 25, a day before the No 
Gun Ri massacre, the South Korean Government announced that all civilians who make “enemy-
like action” in the war zone would be executed, all civilians must travel by special trains, 
civilians in the war zone would only be allowed two hours of daily liberty, and “all those found 
violating this regulation will be considered enemies and will be executed immediately.”159 This 
specific regulation was issued on the day prior to the No Gun Ri massacre, and American soldiers 
who encountered refugees at No Gun Ri might have been minding this regulation and other 
similar U.S. refugee policies issued during these days, stoking the fear of North Koreans’ 
guerrilla warfare.  
Yongdong was held by the 24th Division until the Taejon battle, when it was then released 
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to the 1st Cavalry Division which had recently arrived from Japan. On the second day in 
Yongdong there was an unknown disturbance among the new soldiers of the 2nd Battalion 7th 
Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division, which is the alleged army unit responsible for No Gun Ri, 
on the night before the No Gun Ri killing, which Appleman describes as follows: 
Reports reached them the night of 25-26 July of enemy 
gains in the 27th Infantry sector northward, which increased the 
uneasiness of the untested staff and troops. After midnight there 
came a report that the enemy had achieved a breakthrough. 
Somehow, the constant pressure under which the 27th Infantry 
fought its delaying action on the Poun road had become magnified 
and exaggerated. The 7th Cavalry Regiment headquarters 
immediately decided to arouse all personnel and withdraw. During 
the withdrawal the 2nd Battalion, an untried unit, scattered in panic. 
That evening 119 of its men were still missing.  
In this frantic departure from its position on 26 July, the 2nd 
Battalion left behind a switchboard, an emergency lighting unit, 
and weapons of all types. After daylight truck drivers and platoon 
sergeants returned to the scene and recovered 14 machine guns, 9 
radios, 120 M1 rifles, 26 carbines, 7 BAR's, and 6 60-mm. 
mortars.160  
The reason for this disturbance has not been identified but it was known later that there was no 
enemy contact with the 2nd Battalion, 7th Regiment. Then came the No Gun Ri incident on July 
26. Charles Grutzner, who reported the war for the New York Times, said that “Fear of infiltrators 
led to the slaughter of hundreds of South Korean civilians, women as well as men, by some U.S. 
troops and police of the Republic. One high-ranking United States officer condemned as 
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‘panicky’ the shooting of many civilians last July by one United States regiment.”161 This report 
did not particularly mention any more details about the slaughter, but this report could imply a 
similar incident or some clues of the general status of the U.S. soldiers in the summer of 1950, if 
not directly for the No Gun Ri incident. 
At this confused and chaotic moment, the No Gun Ri killing occurred. It was alleged to 
have happened from July 26 - 29, 1950.  According to the survivors, on July 23rd, a few 
American soldiers and a Korean police officer came in a jeep and evacuated the villagers of Chu-
Gok Ri because of the possibility of a battle taking place in the area. The villagers moved south 
to Im-Gye Ri, a secluded mountain village. On July 25th, 1950, a group of U.S. soldiers came to 
Im-Gye Ri and ordered the villagers to evacuate again. Around 500 people, including children, 
gathered with their belongings on their ox-carts and their backs. The soldiers escorted them to 
the south toward Pusan. When they arrived at Ha-Ga Ri that night, the soldiers led them to a dry 
streambed nearby and ordered them to stay overnight. Survivors said some people who strayed 
away from the group were shot. Overnight from 25th to 26th, there was an unknown disturbance 
and the American troops left and moved to the east. The villagers continued to go to the south by 
themselves in the morning. When they arrived near No Gun Ri, another group of American 
soldiers approached them with guns. The soldiers forced them to go onto the railroad tracks and 
searched their belongings. No prohibited items like weapons were found, and any farm tools and 
kitchen knives were confiscated. Then American soldiers communicated with someone by radio 
and left. Shortly afterwards, air crafts flew overhead and started to strafe and drop bombs on the 
refugees. In a moment, the railroad tracks were destroyed and ox-carts were bombed to pieces. 
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Approximately 100 people died from this strafing. The rest of the refugees ran off in confusion 
and narrowly reached a railroad bridge tunnel over a stream.162  
The air attack in Yongdong was described in some Korean War history literature. 
Cumings quoted a Korean soldier’s diary to describe the air attack that “The diary of a dead 
Korean named Ch’oe Sŏng-hwan, either a KPA soldier or a guerrilla, noted on July 26th that 
American bombers had swooped over Yŏngdong and ‘turned it into a sea of fire.’ ”163 In fact, the 
overwhelming large-scale air attack of the U.S. Air Force was often regarded as one of the 
marked aspects for the Korean War. Reginald Thompson, a journalist, found himself sickened by 
“the carnage of the American air war, machined military might used against an almost unarmed 
enemy, unable to challenge the aircraft in the skies.”164  
The refugees at No Gun Ri jumped into the twin railroad overpass tunnels to avoid the 
air strafing. Some refugees who sought shelter in other nearby areas were directed to move and 
join the refugees at the tunnels under the railroad by U.S. soldiers. One survivor recalled, “We 
thought it was safe. The tunnel I was in was packed with people. I saw people from my village 
and thought it was okay. Then the shooting came. . . . the shooting was from both sides. When 
there was shooting coming from one side, we rushed to the other side. But the bullets came from 
that side, too. We could not even raise our heads. We just dug under dead bodies.”165 The 
survivors said that shooting took place on and off for three more days. People attempted to 
escape at night, but if they were caught, they got shot. Survivors said among hundreds of people 
in the tunnels on the first night, most of the young people ventured to escape at night. “As the 
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time passed, dead bodies were piled up in both entrances and the stream of blood abounded 
within the tunnel. Survivors also testified that while shooting was in respite, some soldiers came 
up to the tunnels and helped some injured people. In such a way, the massacre continued for four 
days. When U.S. troops retreated and NKPA arrived there on July 29, North Koreans said ‘the 
U.S. army is gone. Any person alive can return to your home now.’ But, the cold corpses were 
silent,” Eun-yong Chung, a survivor’s husband and the representative of the No Gun Ri 
Survivors’ Organization, related.166 As the Associated Press report depicted, “it was a story no 
one wanted to hear.”167 Thanks to the AP’s report, the story finally became known to the 
American public and received more attention from the Korean people. 
The way in which this story was finally revealed to the public is painfully slow and 
frustrating. The survivors and the families of the victims could not speak out about what they 
went through during the Korean War, a war caused by conflicting political ideologies resulting in 
an exceptionally suppressed society on the subject of communism. The repressive postwar 
political climate in South Korea forced one not to mention any illegal deeds of Korean and 
American soldiers who served and died in the Korean War to keep the “freedom” in this country. 
Under such circumstances, when survivors tried to talk about their stories, the only reaction they 
received was that “they must have been communists if U.S. soldiers killed them”.  Likewise, the 
No Gun Ri survivors were tacitly forced not to raise their voices about their story. A survivor, 
Haechan Yang, had tried to claim his loss in the massacre, but he was politically investigated two 
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times because he was considered a communist sympathizer.168 Moreover, in the course of 
publicity about this incident within South Korea, No Gun Ri was intentionally ignored by the 
passive Korean government in order to maintain their traditional friendship with the United 
States. One survivor states that he could not accept the fact that a government would not actively 
investigate an incident in which its own people were killed.169  
When the Democratic Party won the Korean election in 1960, the political situation in 
Korea became a little bit more lenient than before. The survivors and victims’ families filed a 
claim for disclosure of the massacre and compensation for the dead and injured with a U.S. 
claims office in Seoul in October of that year. However, this claim was rejected due to the lack 
of evidence and the expiration of the statute of limitations.170 The victims attempted to file 
claims once more in December 1960, but they were also denied. In the 1970s and 1980s, South 
Korea was ruled by U.S. backed military-oriented dictators, so survivors and family members of 
the killed were not able to raise their voices. More than 30 years later, in 1994, affected families 
inquired again about receiving an apology and compensation from the U.S. government, but no 
reply was given. In the meantime, the survivors and family members did their own research and 
found that it was the 1st Cavalry Division that was stationed in the area at the time of the 
massacre. In August 1997, families once again filed for compensation from the U.S. government 
through the Korean government at the Chongju District of Justice Department, accusing the 1st 
Cavalry Division of the massacre. The reply they received from the United States Armed Forces 
                                                 
168 Sun-gu Hwang, “The Scene of Tragedy Everywhere in No Gu Ri,” Hankyoreh, (Oct. 1, 1999). (황순구, “노근리 
양민학살 곳곳에 참극 상흔, 온가족 몰살 호적정리도 못해,” 한겨레 Oct.1,1999). 
169 Sun-gu Hwang, “Chong Eun-Yong, the representative of No Gun Ri Victims’ Organization, Indignation with Our 
Government’s Indifference,” Hankyoreh (Sep. 29, 1999). (황순구, “노근리 양민학살 대책위원장 정은용씨, 우리정부
의 무관심 분통, 미국배상 받아낼 터,” 한겨레 Sep. 29, 1999). 
170 Sun-gu Hwang, “Treat them as enemy: American Documents Discovered,” Hankyoreh (Sep. 29, 1999). (황순구, 
“노근리 피난민 적으로 취급하라, 미군 양민학살 공식문서 확인,” 한겨레 Sep.29,1999). 
 80 
Claims Service-Korea stated that “there is no evidence to support the claims nor is there 
evidence to show that the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division was in the area where the incident allegedly 
occurred.”171 However, many historical books and archival records that have been discovered by 
victims and researchers indicate that the 1st Cavalry Division was in No Gun Ri. Bruce Cumings 
states that it took him only five minutes to find the evidence of the 1st Cavalry Division’s station 
in that area.172 In December 1997 and early 1999, more petitions were submitted to the U.S. 
Department of Justice and the U.S. Department of the Army, but they were all rejected with the 
same reason of “no proof.”173  
Besides these legal claims, the victims have tried to gain the public’s attention in many 
ways. One survivor’s family, Eun-yong Chung, published a factual novel called Do You Know 
Our Agony?(그대, 우리의 아픔을 아는가) in the spring of 1994, based on his research and oral 
history that he had collected from his family and villagers about the incident. This novel won the 
attention of Korean news reporters and inspired them to research the subject. Finally, several 
news publications about the incident appeared that year in Korea. One reporter recalled that 
when he first read this novel, he felt instinctively that it was not just a simple novel because of 
the fact that the author was a 73-year-old man who had never written a novel before.174 In July 
1994, this reporter wrote a special report about the No Gun Ri massacre in a political magazine, 
Monthly Mal (월간 말), entitled, “First Testimony – the Massacre of 300 Villagers by the 
American Soldiers.” This report was mainly based on the interviews of survivors and included 
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the list of the victims’ names. From this time onward, the story of the No Gun Ri massacre began 
to appear in some Korean newspapers and political magazines.  
However, this story did not receive wide public attention in Korea and did not spread to 
America until the Associated Press reported it in 1999. Sang-Hun Choe, a Korean reporter for 
the Associated Press, reported a story to its headquarters in New York when survivors and 
relatives of victims were rejected over a petition in 1998. This report, covering the survivors’ 
allegations and the U.S. military’s denial, was a compelling story to the AP itself. The AP began 
its own research, found records discrediting the denial, and obtained interviews from veterans 
who participated or witnessed the incident.175 Finally, the AP produced a story that caught great 
attention throughout the world on September 29, 1999, which appeared on the front pages of 
major newspapers including the New York Times and the Washington Post. The AP’s story 
finally prompted both American and Korean governments to react. The sensational AP story 
eventually won the Pulitzer Prize for investigative reporting in April 2000.  
Since the AP’s report, much research about the No Gun Ri incident, including two 
government investigative reports, has been published in the U.S. as well as Korea. In Korea, the 
first focus of academic research was a legal approach to the incident concerning whether 
compensation for victims of the massacre was still possible.176 In addition, some Korean 
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academic researchers sought information about the massacre from the historiography of the 
Korean War for circumstantial information and the on-site investigations for physical 
evidence.177 Previous research by survivors and families was slowly exposed and used by other 
researchers. The son of a survivor and a university professor, Ku-do Chung, actively published 
academic articles as well as opinion essays based on what he and his father had collected and 
researched.178 Some Korean journalists who had reported the event in earlier years published 
lengthy articles again in political journals and symposiums, compiling all the information and 
evidence they obtained. Symposiums and conferences were held in Korea under the topic of No 
Gun Ri. The issue of the statute of limitations for compensation and the investigation of the true 
circumstances of the incident were discussed in those meetings.  
In the United States researchers who had previously shown interest in the Korean War or 
other war atrocities prompted further research on No Gun Ri.  They tried to analyze the nature of 
the incident in a broader context of the Korean War and war atrocities. 179  Some previous 
research that could imply similar atrocities and provide clues for the incident was revisited 
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during this process.180 The AP news reporters continued further research with more documents. 
Law scholars produced much research on No Gun Ri from legal perspectives.181 Later, military 
historians joined the research process on No Gun Ri, some from the view of the American 
military.182  The tension between the survivors’ side and the American military side brought 
controversy among the researchers, especially when one of the news sources used for the AP’s 
first report was questioned for its veracity.  Overall, No Gun Ri research has been conducted 
steadily with various controversies and discussions emerging as new information and sources are 
found.  
Investigation from both governments was conducted extensively. The American 
government has changed its attitude from rejections and rebuttals of the petitions in the 1990s to 
the statement of regret made by President Bill Clinton. In January 2001, the U.S. Department of 
the Army published The No Gun Ri Review as a result of U.S. government investigation. The 
Department of the Army announced that it conducted comprehensive research on the incident 
with review of a great deal of military and government documents and interviewing almost 200 
veterans, but their investigation report presents only a passive and narrow interpretation of such 
materials. The U.S. report concludes that a tragic incident occurred at No Gun Ri with the killing 
of unknown numbers of Korean refugees by the U.S. force; however, it was not a deliberate 
                                                 
180 Cumings, The Origins of the Korea War II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950.  
181 Christopher D. Booth, “Prosecuting the ‘Fog of War?’ Examining the Legal Implications of an Alleged Massacre 
of South Korean Civilians by U.S. Forces During the Opening Days of the Korean War in the Village of No Gun Ri,” 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 33:4 (2000): 933-986; Tae-ung Baik, A War Crime Against an Ally’s 
Civilians: The No Gun Ri Massacre (Master’s Thesis, Notre Dame Law School, May 2000); T. U. Baik, “A War 
Crime Against an Ally’s Civilians: The No Gun Ri Massacre,” Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy, 
15: part 2, 2001. 
182 Moo-bong Ryoo, No Gun Ri Incident: Implications for the U.S. Army (School of Advanced Military, Studies 
United States Army Command and General Staff College, January 2001); Robert L. Bateman, No Gun Ri: A Military 
History of the Korean War Incident (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002); Dale C. Kuehl, What Happened 
At No Gun Ri? The Challenge of Civilians on the Battlefield (Master's Thesis U.S. Army Command and General 
Staff College, 2003). 
 84 
incident by an order from the chain of command.  The Korean government’s reaction 
immediately after the AP report was “fact finding through thorough investigation,” but high 
ranking officials were still worried about causing a crack in the traditional Korea-American 
amicable relationship by this situation.183 However, the final report of the Korean Ministry of 
National Defense, the Report of the No Gun Ri Investigation (노근리사건 조사결과 보고서), had 
a more open conclusion in favor of the victims’ claim about the killings than the American 
investigation. The No Gun Ri Review team from the U.S. and the Korean investigation team 
published the statement of mutual understanding about the incident based on the obvious and 
basic facts that both parties agreed on, excluding the complicated and sensitive aspects of the 
incident, such as the number of the refugees who died or were injured and the existence of the 
orders from the chain of command. Despite the thorough investigation, many questions remained 
unanswered.184 Researchers of No Gun Ri are still asking the same questions that the first AP 
reporters asked: “What chain of officers gave open-fire orders? Did GIs see gunfire from the 
refugees or their own ricochets? How high in the ranks did knowledge of the events extend?”185 
A No Gun Ri researcher stated that “Clearly there are still many unanswered questions over 
American involvement in Korea, questions that were not answered by the narrow view of the US 
Army's investigation.”186  
 Following the investigation, the U.S. government offered to establish a memorial at No 
Gun Ri for the general victims of the Korean War, not indicating it was in specific honor of the 
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No Gun Ri victims, and to provide scholarships for those who wish to study in the U.S. The 
survivors and journalists criticized this offer for diluting the responsibility of the No Gun Ri 
killings and framing it as an inevitable tragedy of the Korean War. However, once the 
governmental investigation was finished, the survivors and the victims’ families had no 
remaining options but to file a lawsuit for civil procedure with the U.S. government. Currently, 
in 2007, the lawsuit is still in process.  
 The compensations for the survivors and victims’ family on an individual level were 
finally settled by the Korean government. A special legislation for No Gun Ri investigation and 
compensation was accomplished and survivors and victims’ family were to receive reparation 
payments and further research was to launch including the excavations of remains of the victims. 
On the contrary, the compensation plan from the American government was not implemented 
and actually refused by survivors in the end. The plan to build a memorial and to establish a 
scholarship fund was set up with a four million dollar budget, but this offer was turned down by 
the survivors citing the reason that they could not accept the U.S. government’s intention to 
avoid the responsibility of No Gun Ri by expanding such compensation to honor all the Korean 
War victims. 
Since the No Gun Ri story came to light, various cultural approaches by the general 
public to the No Gun Ri killing have been attempted and these includes film-making, publishing 
a cartoon, publishing a children’s book on No Gun Ri and exhibitions of photographs. The site of 
No Gun Ri has been visited by many people including college students from all around the world.  
 86 
5.0  NO GUN RI INCIDENT: ARCHIVAL DOCUMENTATION 
The records do exist in fact: they just need to be deconstructed/read, 
not through objective lenses, but through subjective ones.187
 
There have been three benchmark events since the first No Gun Ri research. These benchmark 
events are directly related along with source materials to substantiate discussions on No Gun Ri 
and, therefore, exerted a great deal of influence on subsequent researchers. This study uses these 
benchmark events as perimeters for the analysis of the contents of No Gun Ri research in order to 
more easily identify the flow of No Gun Ri discussion and its correlation with source materials.  
Publications on No Gun Ri, therefore, were analyzed along with the four time-frames divided by 
these three perimeters for specific discussions and supporting source materials. The first 
benchmark event is the Associated Press’s publication of the No Gun Ri story on September 29, 
1999. The first time-frame is set from the first publication concerning No Gun Ri in 1994 to just 
before the AP’s report in 1999. There were few publications in the U.S. during this time but in 
Korea survivors and their families had researched the event as a desperate method to publicize 
their story; in this course, some progressive journalists became aware of the event and reported it. 
After the AP’s No Gun Ri story was published, major discussions were led by the AP’s research 
which included the documents and interviews that the AP team discovered and conducted. This 
period constitutes the second time frame of the analysis: September 29, 1999 to May 10, 2000. In 
                                                 
187 Carolyn Heald, “Is There Room For Archives in the Postmodern World?” American Archivist 59 (1996): 101. 
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May 11, 2000, there was another benchmark event when journalists from US News and World 
Report and Stripes.com (an online news service for veterans) published lengthy articles disputing 
the veracity of AP’s research sources. This event produced much controversy over the reliability 
of news sources and resulted in the discovery of yet more military records. The last perimeter 
was the publication of both governments’ investigatory reports on January 12, 2001; thus the 
final time frame is set from this time until the present. The U.S. government’s investigative team 
announced that it reviewed more than a million pages of military documents and, in turn, 
disclosed many such documents in its report.  Accordingly, the Korean government’s report 
provided other valuable approaches to the incident. Later researchers, consequently, would 
benefit from exposure of this abundance of source materials due to both governments’ research. 
Table 1. Timeframes for Analysis 
1. Before September 28, 1999 (Beginning of the early discussions) 
2. September 29, 1999 to May 10, 2000 (AP story’s predominance) 
3. May 11, 2000 to January 11, 2001 (Veracity discussions concerning news sources) 
4. After January 12, 2001 (Governments’ Investigation Reports) 
 
For analysis of publications, there was a two-step process: reading and then analyzing the 
contents of publications and citations. The lists of publications for each time frame are provided 
in Appendix A. All of the publications were read and analyzed by marking major discussions and 
source materials used. Journalistic publications do not follow a formal fashion of quoting source 
materials, so this researcher only counted evident source materials if the authors clearly state 
names of interviewees or what archival documents or secondary pieces of literature were used.  
If the journalistic research did not mention the title of a document but included its content - 
which was identifiable - it was marked and included for analysis.  
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Another aspect to consider before the analysis phase should be some guidelines of 
determining whether source materials are primary materials or secondary literature. This 
researcher considered newspaper articles from the time of the Korean War as the primary 
materials because No Gun Ri researchers utilized those materials for primary clues of the 
incident, rather than to seek their secondary arguments. In the same vein, official histories of the 
Korean War by military-oriented institutes or military historians of the U.S. and Korea were 
regarded as secondary literature since they provided authors’ arguments about the war and do not 
suggest any primary evidence of a certain event as other secondary literature does.  
There were some cases wherein authors published their writings in several places. For 
example, one author would publish an article in a newspaper, and later he would publish a 
collective book with his previous writings to include the newspaper article with or without 
additional arguments and revisions. In those cases, this researcher considers such writings as 
individual publications because the chance of the public’s being exposed to them is higher; thus, 
their influence to consequently build the public knowledge of this incident could increase. 
In analyzing the contents of publications, another point begs clarification before 
presentation of the data. When a certain discussion on No Gun Ri was identified in a publication, 
it was marked according to the scheme of categories of discussions. Any source material used in 
the discussion was then also marked. One discussion which used source materials composes a set 
as a unit for analysis. A set of a discussion and source materials is called a “passage” in this 
study. A passage is a semantic unit for a certain discussion, which could be comprised of a few 
sentences to a sub-chapter of a book.  
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5.1 BEFORE SEPTEMBER 29, 1999: Beginning Of the Early Discussions 
There is not much research in the first time period. The total number of journalistic publications 
is nine in addition to two academic products, including a novel that a survivor’s family wrote. 188 
Among them is one journalistic publication in the United States - all others are published in 
Korea. 
Table 2. The Number of Publications before September 29, 1999 
 Journalistic Publications Academic Publications 
Published in Korea 8 2 
Published in the U.S. 1  
Total 9 2 
* The list of publications in this period is provided in Appendix A. 1. 
 
During this time period, the research on No Gun Ri was mainly conducted or encouraged 
by survivors or victims’ families. One novel was written by a survivor’s husband and one 
academic article was co-authored by a son of a survivor, all contained in academic publications. 
Other journalistic publications seem to be inspired by the novel or report legal claims that the 
survivors’ organization has pursued.  
The first publication about the No Gun Ri incident in Korea is a novel from 1994. This 
novel was written based on what the author, his family and his villagers went through during the 
Korean War with accounts based mostly on oral history and some support from secondary 
                                                 
188 Academic publications indicate in-depth research products such as articles in academic journals or monographs 
on No Gun Ri. In this study, a novel by a victim’s family is included in this category. The author of the novel 
articulates that it is a research product based on oral history of his villagers and what the author experienced rather 
than simple fiction. There are also books that do not follow a strict format of academic writing in later time frames, 
but those are regarded as a result of in-depth research and categorized in “Academic publications,” rather than 
having another category. 
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literature. He mentioned in the prologue that he tried to reflect the true story based on the oral 
history that he had collected for forty years from his villagers. After this novel was published, 
some Korean news reporters expressed interest in this incident for their news coverage. However, 
this interest was limited to a local newspaper, short paragraphs of major papers, and a 
progressive political news magazine; therefore, there was no grand response from the public. The 
authors of these news articles heavily depend on interviews only with survivors to describe a 
picture of the incident and unfortunately did not expand their research to discover many archival 
documents. Some reporters simply covered the legal petitions that the survivors and victims’ 
families have filed. Other academic research was conducted through survivors’ efforts. A family 
member of a survivor, Ku-do Chong, co-authored an article with Byong-su Choi, a historian, in 
which the major arguments lay in seeking the Army unit responsible for the killing and 
compiling all the mosaic fragments from archival documents and secondary literature in order to 
provide a bigger picture of what survivors insist happened. In the United States, there was only 
one report by the Associate Press, addressing the submission of petitions by the survivors and the 
ultimate rejection of such petitions by the Pentagon in 1998.  
 
Who Was at No Gun Ri?  
No Gun Ri was not a well-known incident during this period of time. Researchers on No Gun Ri 
were not sure which U.S. Army unit was responsible for this incident. Researchers’ arguments, 
therefore, often began with an attempt to discover detailed war situations during the last week of 
July in the Yongdong area as a way to identify the U.S. divisions and regimental positions 
around No Gun Ri. Their research depended on official histories of the Korean War to finally 
determine that 5th, 7th, and 8th Regiments of the 1st Cavalry Division were in the area nearby No 
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Gun Ri until the day of their retreat, July 29th. The fact that front lines were formed several miles 
from No Gun Ri was ascertained and consequently corroborated the survivors’ claim that the No 
Gun Ri killing did not occur in the midst of an ongoing battle. In this course of addressing the 
war situation in Yongdong, other circumstantial evidence was also discussed based on secondary 
literature, including the devastating Taejon battle and the general status of U.S. soldiers who 
were ill-prepared and prone to panic about infiltration. The refugee situation and specific 
instances of North Korean infiltration were also mentioned.  
For the background discussions, archival documents were used on three occasions and 
secondary publications were used six times. The documents were a communication log of the 5th 
Regiment and a military record for operation, Operation Plan Number 10-50, and these 
documents were used to substantiate its position in addition to refugee contact on July 25th. The 
communication log of the 5th Regiment read “1950.7.25 01:35 Msg to CO 5 Cav as fol: An est 50 
natives w/ ox carts rptd earlier to have been near this unit in hills coming out & headed toward 
rear. None appear armed; we have not opened fire; req an immed answer. CO 2nd bn.  1950.7.25 
2:00 To CO 2 Bn (msg 1): re natives w/ ox carts – round them repreat round them immediately. 
CO 5 Cav.”189 This document showed that the 5th Regiment encountered a group of refugees but 
did not have any more information on what happened next. The 1st Cavalry Division’s Operation 
Plan Number 10-50 called for the 5th Cavalry to support the 8th Cavalry's disengagement from 
the NKPA and rearward movement out of Yongdong toward Hwanggan, and the 7th Cavalry's 
mission charged them with preventing enemy infiltration while also supporting the 5th Cavalry 
as the Divisions Reserve. As shown, the U.S. troops’ positions and missions were explained in 
these documents and No Gun Ri researchers used them for their supporting materials for this 
                                                 
189 S-2-3 Journal, the 5th Cavalry Regiment: Ka-Ri, Korea, 1950. 7. 25-29. (The details of this document are 
provided in Appendix B.2) 
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dicussion. Two North Korean newspaper articles were also used for corroborating the fact that 
the North Korean Army arrived at No Gun Ri on July 29th and for a general description of the 
killing. Secondary literature used in this time was mostly official histories of the Korean War 
from Korea, Japan, and the U.S.190
No Gun Ri researchers had only limited archival materials (a total of four documents) 
discovered in this period, and major supporting evidence for the details of the incident was 
interviews with the survivors. It was understandable that discovered documentary evidence was 
limited because it was discovered by survivors on an individual basis as the dearth of resources 
constrained the ability to search in other countries. Researchers contemplated reasons or factors 
for the killing and set forth several hypotheses: confused and panicked soldiers’ reactions in 
retreat; one way to solve the refugee problem and potential infiltration; and a revenge-laden 
reaction to the Taejon battle where a great portion of U.S. Army forces and war strength was 
damaged. In detailing the incident, survivors’ interviews were the predominant sources for 
researchers. Thirty-eight passages in six journal articles and twelve passages in two academic 
works were written for possible substantiation of the killing and the evolution of the incident 
based on two archival documents, one secondary material, and 28 quotations of survivors’ 
interviews. Major issues surrounding the killing include the evacuation on the previous night by 
warning and escort of American soldiers, the status of evacuating refugees, examining the 
refugees’ belongings, and air attacks on railroad tracks (around 100 people were killed by air 
strafing).  Additional issues concerned survivors’ individual experiences under the railroad 
                                                 
190 Korea Military Academy, History of the Korean War, 1987 (육군사관학교 편, 한국전쟁사, 1987); Ministry of 
National Defense, History of the UN Troops in the Korean War (국방부편, 한국참전 UN군 전사; Institute of Military 
History of Japan, The Korean War, 1986 (일본 육전사연구보급회 편, 한국전쟁, 1986); Roy E. Appleman, South to 
Naktong, North to Yalu (Center of Military History, United States Army; Washington D.C., 1992); First Cavalry 
Division Association, The First Team: The First Cavalry Division In Korea, July 18, 1950 -- July 18, 1952 (Paducah, 
KY: Turner Pub. Co., 1994). 
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overpass tunnels during the time of the massacre, i.e. where the shooting came from, how 
survivors avoided the shooting, how they were injured, how they escaped from the tunnels, and 
what they saw and heard in the tunnels.  The aftermath and trauma of the killing is of particular 
and compelling interest.  
Some other aspects of the incident were also argued. One controversial episode was an 
interview with a survivor who witnessed his cousin, a college student who spoke English, 
actually talking with one of the soldiers who indicated that he was only following an order to kill 
any suspected refugees. With this instance, researchers carefully raised the argument of an order-
issue to kill refugees. There were also considerable efforts to estimate the number of deaths.  
North Korean newspaper reports captured during the war by the U.S. military were a back-up 
source for this discussion because these reports included an estimated number of killed. The 
reports were written in an enraged and exaggerated style since they were used as a propaganda 
device to raise the morale of North Korean soldiers during wartime. However, No Gun Ri 
researchers gave significant credibility to these sources since they were written right after the 
incident by reporters of first-hand witnesses of the scene, which one would assume to be more 
accurate. Researchers also inserted discussions about North Korean infiltration tactics and the 
confusing refugee situation. Many official histories described North Korean troops’ using a 
refugee group to breakthrough a mine field or similar tactics. However, some No Gun Ri 
researchers interpreted them as an attempted deflection of the American atrocity, intentionally 
described like this to whitewash the refugee killing. In addition, the fact that these villagers have 
been honoring their dead the same day, year after year, for 50 years was noted by a researcher. 
Archival documents were used with significant credibility by some No Gun Ri 
researchers. On some occasions, researchers directly stated that they considered American 
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documents more credible if there were content conflicts with other sources. Researchers 
indicated the reason for this was that No Gun Ri was under the control of the American Army 
and archival documents of the American Army show very specific information of time and place, 
while secondary literature had only an overall description of general situations during longer 
periods of time and over wider places. In another example, some researchers used the 
communication log of the 5th Regiment from the night before the No Gun Ri incident, stating that 
the Commander of the 2nd Battalion of the 5th Regiment encountered about fifty refugees and 
reported this fact to his Regimental Commander who told him to stop them. 191 The document 
does not have any further information after this, but the researchers carefully assumed that the 
2nd Battalion of the 5th Regiment might have been the soldiers at No Gun Ri and the refugees in 
the document would have been the same refugees at No Gun Ri. They also presumed the number 
of refugees in the document (fifty) may have been mistaken for 500 if the refugees were the 
same group of people. However, it was later known that the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Regiment, 1st 
Cavalry Division had participated in the incident even though it was still arguable that soldiers 
who evacuated the refugees might not have been the same soldiers who fired at them at No Gun 
Ri. This interpretation could be seen as one that suggested researchers seemed to prioritize the 
use of archival documents; therefore, they endeavored to explain the incident using the limited 
evidence in those documents.  
The following table (Table 3) presents the number of passages in publications which 
were assigned for No Gun Ri discussions and the number of source materials that were used in 
those passages. This table is only a brief version of what has been described in this chapter. As 
                                                 
191 S-2-3 Journal, the 5th Cavalry Regiment: Ka-Ri, Korea, 1950. 7. 25-29; The 1st Cavalry Division, Operation Plan 
Number 10-50, Hwanggan (1088-1483), 1950. 7. 24. 23:15. (The details of these documents are provided in 
Appendix B.2) 
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already portrayed, the discussions about No Gun Ri in this period do not show variety in details 
and could be summarized in one table. In the table, specific discussions about No Gun Ri are 
enumerated on the left side. The number of publications and the number of passages that contain 
such discussion are exhibited next to each discussion. The next column displays what kind of 
supporting source materials were used and how many times they were used for this discussion. In 
this column, A stands for “archival materials,” S is for “secondary materials” such as published 
journal articles and books, and I stands for “interview testimony” of survivors and veterans.  As 
shown in the first row of this table, the discussion about the fact that U.S. soldiers were ill-
trained and the general military was not well-prepared for a war was included as one of the 
factors for the incident in publications in this period. In one academic publication (the article by 
Byong-su Choi and Ku-do Chong in early 1999), there was one passage for this discussion and 
one archival document (a military document of the 1st Cavalry Division; Operation Plan Number 
10-50; Hwanggan(1088-1483); 1950. 7. 24. 23:15) was used as supporting material in the 
passage and no other materials were used. In a larger category, the general battle situations 
including the status of U.S. soldiers, the Taejon battle and the U.S. troops’ positions were 
discussed in a total of 3 passages in 3 journalistic articles and 8 passages in 2 academic works 
using archival documents 3 times, secondary literature 6 times and no interview testimony. Over 
the whole period, there were 60 passages in 8 journalistic articles and 27 passages in 2 academic 
publications that discuss the No Gun Ri killing, and in those passages archival documents were 
used 9 times, secondary materials 15 times and survivors’ interview testimony was used 30 times.   
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Table 3. No Gun Ri Discussions in the First Period 
Discussions Numbers of passages and publications Source materials
Status of U.S. Soldiers: 
unprepared and under-
equipped 
Journalistic (0 passages in 0 articles) 
Academic (1 passage in 1 articles) 
1 A 
0 S 
0 I 
Disastrous Taejon Defeat Journalistic (0 passages in 0 articles) Academic (2 passages in 1 article) 
0 A 
1 S 
0 I 
General battle 
situations 
U.S. troops’ position and war 
situation at No Gun Ri  
Journalistic (3 passages in 3 articles) 
Academic (5 passages in 2 articles) 
2 A 
5 S 
0 I 
Refugee 
Problems 
NK infiltration and suspecting 
refugees 
Journalistic (3 passages in 3 articles) 
Academic (2 passages in 1 article) 
1 A 
2 S 
0 I 
Reason for the 
killing 
Military operation/ revenge 
for Taejon defeat/mistaken 
attack 
Journalistic (4 passages in 3 articles) 
Academic (3 passages in 2 articles) 
0 A 
1 S 
3 I 
Evacuation Journalistic (5 passages in 4 articles) Academic (1 passage in 1 article) 
1 A 
0 S 
3 I 
Air Strafing Journalistic (5 passages in 4 articles) Academic (1 passage in 1 article) 
0 A 
0 S 
3 I 
Shooting under the tunnels Journalistic (17 passages in 3 articles) Academic (3 passages in 1 article) 
0 A 
0 S 
14 I 
Order to Shoot Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (1 passage in 1 article) 
0A 
0S 
1 I 
Assuming the number of 
casualties 
Journalistic (4 passages in 3 articles) 
Academic (1 passage in 1 article) 
1 A 
0 S 
2 I 
Aftermath: survivors Journalistic (2 passages in 1 article) Academic (1 passage in 1 article) 
0 A 
0 S 
2 I 
Evolution of No 
Gun Ri 
Post U.S.-retreat  Journalistic (0 passages in 0 articles) Academic (1 passage in 1 article)  
Credibility of source 
materials/interpretation 
Journalistic (3 passages in 2 articles) 
Academic (3 passages in 1 article) 
3A 
6 S 
0 I 
Governments’ attitudes Journalistic (4 passages in 3 articles) Academic (0 passages in 0 articles)  
Survivors’ Efforts Journalistic (8 passages in 6 articles) Academic (2 passages in 1 article) 
0 A 
0 S 
2 I 
No Gun Ri 
Research 
Other Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (0 passages in 0 articles)  
Total  Journalistic (60 passages in 8 articles) Academic (27 passages in 2 articles) 
9 A 
15 S 
30 I 
(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony) 
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Because this time period evidenced only a small amount of publications, the arguments 
and discussions on No Gun Ri were also quite sketchy and less extensive. Arguments about 
circumstances around No Gun Ri were mainly supported by secondary literature, and major 
discussions about detailed descriptions of the refugee killing were primarily based on the oral 
testimonies of survivors and their families. There were four archival documents discovered from 
this time. These documents were used with significant credibility to identify the participating 
U.S. Army unit for the killing and war/refugee situation in Yongdong. These archival documents 
included a military document for war operations of the 1st Cavalry Division, a communication 
log of the 5th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division, and two North Korean newspapers in August 
1950.192 North Korean news reports were cited as evidence that No Gun Ri was not just an 
allegation of Korean survivors but a real atrocity committed by U.S. troops since the stories were 
written by first-hand witnesses and used as supporting materials to assume the number of the 
dead.  
5.2 SEPTEMBER 29, 1999 TO MAY 11, 2000: AP Story’s Predominance 
Once the Associated Press published a story about No Gun Ri, the world reacted with a 
surprising interest about this event. Major newspapers, including The New York Times and The 
Washington Post, headlined their front pages with the No Gun Ri story from the news wire. In 
following weeks, major news magazines like Times and Newsweek also reported this incident in 
                                                 
192 S-2-3 Journal, the 5th Cavalry Regiment: Ka-Ri, Korea, 1950. 7. 25-29; The 1st Cavalry Division, Operation Plan 
Number 10-50, Hwanggan (1088-1483), 1950. 7. 24. 23:15; Chon Uk (전욱), an article in Choson Inminbo (조선인
민보, Korean People’s Daily), Aug. 10, 1950; Chon Uk (전욱), an article in Choson Inminbo (조선인민보, Korean 
People’s Daily), Aug. 19, 1950). (The details of these documents are provided in Appendix B.2) 
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detail with their own interviews with related people. Once again in Korea, the story of No Gun Ri 
was reported by major news agencies, finally resulting in sensational interest by the public. Some 
newspapers reported the AP’s article and some cited the fact that American major newspapers 
reported the event, and both ways of reporting shared the spotlight and attention of the public 
one way or the other. There were a total of 126 research-oriented publications: among them were 
113 news reports and 13 academic writings published from September 29, 1999 to May 10, 
2000.193 There were a great number of news articles with only a few paragraphs that simply 
reported segmental facts of the incident without any involvement of research activities, 
especially in this time period, and those articles were excluded in this analysis.  
Table 4. The Number of Publications from September 29, 1999 to May 10, 2000 
 Journalistic products Academic products 
Published in Korea 66 11 
Published in the U.S. 47 2 
Total  113 13 
* The list of publications is provided in Appendix A.2. 
 
The AP’s report was written based on interviews with survivors and American veterans 
and archival documents from the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) and 
other military archives. Among the AP’s documents, some contained very important messages 
on policies toward Korean refugees which included treating them as the enemy if approaching 
American lines. This AP report prompted many news reporters to seek more historical details of 
the incident based on secondary literature and opinions of experts in the Korean War and 
                                                 
193 News articles that reports fragmental aspects of the incidence in a short paragraph are not regarded as research-
oriented. This study regards news articles which contain any substantiating evidence or interviews or any research 
activities about the incident as research-oriented.   
 99 
additional interviews with survivors and American veterans. In Korea, the materials that 
survivors and families discovered in previous years were revisited by researchers and received 
new attention. News reporters also tried to include diverse opinions about the incident from 
various groups of people, conducting interviews with academic historians, legal experts, 
religious leaders, representatives of veterans associations, and spokesmen in governmental 
departments.  
In a matter of days, higher officers in the U.S. Department of Defense and the Korean 
National Ministry of Defense had press conferences about conducting full investigations. Louis 
Caldera, Army Secretary, promised a “complete and thorough review” of the accounts of mass 
killings of South Korean civilians. In the following weeks, the methods for government 
investigation revolved around whether the investigation would be either one investigative inquiry 
shared by both governments (Korean government’s request) or a bilateral coordinating group 
(American government’s request).  Later, the fate of the investigation was decided in favor of the 
American government. A legal approach to the incident was also attempted in terms of the 
statute of limitation for criminal charges, compensation requests and a grant of blanket amnesty 
to all American military personnel for expediting the investigation. In this sensational 
atmosphere, The Washington Post published another report of No Gun Ri with its original 
research of American veterans’ interviews and new archival documents about the refugee 
problems and other related matters concerning No Gun Ri. Undoubtedly, there were opinionated 
articles that reflected the voice of American soldiers and the inevitability of this kind of incident 
during a harsh war situation. However, the common agreement during this time period among 
researchers was that the archival documents about policies promoting the treatment of refugees 
as the enemy was granted as a major contributory factor of No Gun Ri. 
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In December 1999, the AP published another eye-catching report that described the large-
scale aerial bombardment during the Korean War and introduced some related U.S. Air Force 
documents that also imply the allegation of strafing No Gun Ri refugees. For the following 
several months, journalists continued to report specific facts on the process of both governments’ 
investigations and on particular opinions of legal experts about the handling of this incident. In 
January, 2000, Army Secretary Caldera advised ex-soldiers of their rights if they testified and 
came under criminal jeopardy. His comment made survivors upset because it might have led 
veterans to be very passive or to outright refuse to testify. At last, in April 2000, the AP team 
won the Pulitzer Prize with the No Gun Ri story and several other U.S. and Korean prizes for 
investigative journalism. 
Some journalists in Korea republished their previous articles about No Gun Ri as a book 
with additional research during this period of time. Similarly, the AP team republished their 
report in an academic journal with some revisions in the U.S. Thus, the analysis of publications 
separates the categories between journalistic publications and academic publications, but the 
actual contents of research in both categories are somewhat overlapped. The AP’s No Gun Ri 
report has definite influence on the research following this time period by either providing 
substantiating source materials or inspiring other researchers to endeavor on the subject. Still a 
great deal of research heavily relied upon the survivors’ oral history for the details of the incident 
process. 
 
Ill-prepared, Ill-trained, Under-equipped Soldiers 
During this period of time, discussions about the background of No Gun Ri were prolific. 
Researchers conducted extensive analysis of historical materials for the background research. 
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They considered the circumstantial understanding about the general situation of the war in 
Yongdong at that time as essential information to explain the incident. Various aspects of this 
background include the general status of U.S. soldiers (ill-trained, under-equipped, ill-prepared 
in general and highly sensitized to the point of panic regarding North Korean infiltration), the 
Taejon battle, the specific battle situation in Yongdong and U.S. troops’ positions, and 
overwhelming large-scale aerial strikes at that time.  
Researchers argued that ill-preparedness for war and misunderstanding about the real war 
strength of North Korean People’s Army laid the general foundation of U.S. soldiers’ confusion 
and fear. The soldiers had little understanding of Korea and were not able to distinguish a friend 
from a foe. Also, the North Korean infiltration tactic made the soldiers extremely nervous when 
constantly confronting the refugee columns, especially after the dreadful Taejon battle. One No 
Gun Ri researcher described the soldiers involved in the killing as “raw recruits, rushed into 
combat from Japan, and they were in headlong retreat. These are circumstances that, in many 
wars, have made for both rage and panic, emotions more easily directed against the civilian 
population than the attacking army. Frightened and inexperienced soldiers are more likely to kill 
both brutally and randomly; military discipline reduces civilian casualties.”194 No Gun Ri 
researchers made a point of this background as an essential element to view the incident. This 
situation of the U.S. troops was well discussed in 21 passages of 11 journalistic articles and 11 
passages in 5 academic works based on secondary literature and veterans’ interviews.  
The local history of Yongdong related to guerrilla activities was identified by No Gun Ri 
researchers in this time period. One of the researchers reported the fact that local guerrillas in the 
Yongdong vicinity harassed the retreating Americans from the Taejon defeat. There was no 
                                                 
194 Michael Walzer, “The Bridge at No Gun Ri: Responses,” Dissent 47:2 (Spring 2000): 44-46. 
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further implication to link this argument directly to No Gun Ri; however, it seems that No Gun Ri 
researchers attempted to look at the incident from all possible angles. The New York Times news 
articles during wartime in 1950 provided space for this discussion.  
Like early research before September 1999, still many publications devoted their 
arguments to the U.S. troops’ dispositions and the war situation near Yongdong.  This time, No 
Gun Ri researchers were finally able to exhume more specific information from archival 
documents to determine that it was the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division 
that was stationed at No Gun Ri at the time of the incident. It was proved by the discovery of 
archival documents such as map coordinates of the 1st Cavalry Division, war diaries of the 7th 
Regiment, and communication logs of nearby U.S. units, in addition to several secondary pieces 
of literature. A total of eighteen passages in eleven publications argued that the 5th Regiment, 
7th Regiment, and 8th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division were stationed in Yongdong and the 
7th Regiment, in particular, was in No Gun Ri until July 29th. A U.S. military intelligence report 
indicated the North Korean’s front line was four miles from No Gun Ri on July 26th. A 7th 
Regiment war diary which was discovered by the AP team proved that 7th Regiment retreated at 
dawn on July 29th and further indicated that North Korean troops arrived at No Gun Ri in the 
afternoon on that day. North Korean newspapers also reported the No Gun Ri killing in early 
August 1950 stating that North Korean troops arrived on July 29th and found 400 bodies of 
civilians.  
The 2nd Battalion of the 7th Regiment arrived at Yongdong on July 25th – still in their very 
first week in Korea. Some documents were explored along with several secondary materials 
which indicate the soldiers retreated to No Gun Ri in disarray as word of an enemy attack on 
their flank the night of their arrival was received. This wartime “baptism by fire” resulted in a 
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very confusing and disorganized situation with 119 soldiers missing and major weapons left 
behind. The U.S. official history of the Korean War by Roy E. Appleman, South to Naktong, 
North to Yalu, was used as a major source for this information.  
During the Korean War, aerial bombardment was one of the most widely executed war 
operations. Since the survivors alleged that they were air strafed before being fired upon under 
the railroad overpasses, No Gun Ri researchers searched supporting sources to confirm the 
circumstantial evidence that air strikes might have targeted refugees. Some Air Force after-
mission reports from late July and early August 1950 were used for this argument. These 
documents clearly stated that pilots sometimes strafed “people in white” or “people appear[ing] 
to be evacuees” or people who “could have been refugees.”195 In Korea, one of the major 
broadcasting companies aired a TV program with aerial films of American F-80 fighters of the 
25th Fighter Bomber Group in July 29th, 30th, and August 13th 1950 documenting firing on 
refugee boats trying to cross a river.196 This film was not directly related to No Gun Ri, but still 
showed this aspect of war. This discussion was also supported by interviews with Koreans and 
American ex-pilots.  
The following table explains the specific numbers of passages and the number of 
publications for each discussion for the general background of No Gun Ri, including the status of 
U.S. troops, the Taejon battle, local history of communism, U.S troops’ position, the 7th 
Regiment’s status on the night of July 25, and large-scale air attacks, along with the number of 
times source materials were used. There were a total of 58 passages in 19 journalistic articles and 
                                                 
195 After-mission report, 35th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 8th Fighter Bomber Group, Mission 35-1, July 20, 1950; 
After-mission report, 35th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 8th Fighter Bomber Group, Mission 35-4, July 20, 1950; After-
mission report, 35th Fighter Bomber Squadron, 8th Fighter Bomber Group, Mission 35-3, Contour Roger,  July 31, 
1950. 
196 “Discovered U.S. Aerial Films for Indiscriminating Attack on Refugees During the Korean War,” Segye Ilbo, Oct 
24, 1999: pg. 2. (“한국전 당시 미전투기 무차별 공격필름 발굴,” 세계일보, Oct. 24, 1999; pg. 2) 
 104 
25 passages in 9 academic works for the background discussions, and archival documents were 
used 39 times, secondary material 21 times and interview testimony of survivors and veterans 20 
times. 
Table 5. Discussions on the Background of No Gun Ri in the Second Period 
Discussions Number of passages and publications Source materials
Status of U.S. troops  Journalistic (19 passages in 10 articles) Academic (9 passages in 5 articles) 
0 A 
2 S 
8 I 
Disastrous Taejon Defeat Journalistic (2 passages in 2 articles) Academic (2 passages in 2 articles) 
1 A 
0 S 
0 I 
Local history of communism 
and battle situation in 
Yongdong 
Journalistic (5 passages in 4 articles) 
 
2 A 
0 S 
0 I 
U.S. troop positions around No 
Gun Ri  
Journalistic (11 passages in 7 articles) 
Academic (7 passages in 4 articles) 
15 A 
13 S 
2 I 
Disorganized 7th Regiment on 
the night before the incident 
Journalistic (5 passages in 5 articles) 
Academic (2 passages in 2 articles) 
5 A 
5 S 
1 I 
Large-scale air attack during 
the Korean War 
Journalistic (16 passages in 8 articles) 
Academic (5 passages in 4 articles) 
16 A 
1 S 
9 I 
Total Journalistic (58 passages in 19 articles) Academic (25 passages in 9 articles) 
39 A 
21 S 
20 I 
(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony) 
 
No Refugees to Cross the Front Line.  
The archival sources that the AP discovered from the National Archives and Records 
Administration (NARA) for refugee policies in the Army were heavily reused by other 
researchers during this time. These documents stated various straightforward expressions of 
harsh refugee policies, such as, “No refugees to cross the front line. Fire [on] everyone trying to 
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cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children” 197; “No repeat no refugees will be 
permitted to cross lines at any time”198; “All civilians seen in this area are to be considered as 
enemy and action taken accordingly”199; “all civilians moving around the combat zone will be 
considered as unfriendly and shot.” 200 The documents are dated from July 24 to 27 which was 
before and during the time of No Gun Ri and issued by the Eighth Army headquarters (the top 
command of the U.S. in Korea) to front-line units, by the 8th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry 
Division, a neighbor regiment, and by the 25th Division. Considering the issue dates and sources, 
most No Gun Ri researchers in this time period including the AP reporters linked these 
documents directly to the incident. Due to the series of refugee policies and the fear about the 
North Korean infiltrators prevalent at the time, Korean refugees were the target for suspected 
North Korean infiltrators. A great number of No Gun Ri researchers noted this confusing 
situation of suspecting refugees and the difficulty of controlling refugee flows. A Washington 
Post reporter discovered another document of July 24 1950, stating “No one desired to shoot 
innocent people, but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white 
clothes of the Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers transporting ammunition and 
heavy weapons in farm wagons and carrying military equipment in packs on their backs. They 
were observed many times changing from uniforms to civilian clothing and back into uniform. 
                                                 
197 Communication Log, the 8th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division, July 24 1950. In Records of U.S. Army 
Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA. (The details of this document are provided in 
Appendix B.2) 
198 Message, EUSAK, CNR: G 20578 KGP, 26 Jul 50, sub: Controlled Movement of All Refugees. In Records of 
U.S. Army Commands, Korean Military Advisory Group, Box 23, RG 338, NARA. (The details of this document 
are provided in Appendix B.2) 
199 Memorandum, Commander, 25th Infantry Division, 27 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-
1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA. (The details of this document 
are provided in Appendix B.2) 
200 Journal, HQ 25th Infantry Division, July 26 1950.  (The details of this document are provided in Appendix B.2) 
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There were so many refugees that it was impossible to screen and search them all.”201 This 
aspect of the No Gun Ri incident, combined with harsh refugee policies, North Korean 
infiltration and suspecting refugees as the enemy was discussed in much research (a total of 38 
passages in 27 journalistic articles and 12 passages in 7 academic publications) and was the 
sentinel discussion exhibiting the predominance of archival documents as supporting materials 
for No Gun Ri arguments. The following table indicates the details of the discussions about the 
numbers of passages in publications and the numbers of source materials that were used. 
Table 6. Discussions of Refugee Problems and Policies in the Second Period 
Discussions Numbers of passages and publications Source materials
Rigid Refugee policies Journalistic (14 passages in 13 articles) Academic (5 passages in 5 articles) 
26 A 
0 S 
5 I 
North Korean Troops’ 
infiltration and U.S.’s 
suspecting refugees 
Journalistic (24 passages in 20 articles) 
Academic (7 passages in 4 articles) 
13 A 
8 S 
10 I 
Total Journalistic (38 passages in 27 articles) Academic (12 passages in 7 articles) 
39 A 
8 S 
15 I 
(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony) 
 
Under the No Gun Ri Railroad Bridge Tunnels 
The reasons for this killing or factors that might have caused this tragedy were what 
many No Gun Ri researchers attempted to address in their publications, including survivors’ 
inquiries. However, the arguments about the reasons for the killing were mainly based on 
researchers’ opinions with vague clues from circumstantial information. Several reasons and 
factors were assumed by No Gun Ri researchers. Very similarly to previous arguments, the 
                                                 
201 War Diary, 25th Infantry Division, 24-30 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries), 1949-1954, 25th Infantry 
Division History Jul 50, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA. (The details of this document are provided in Appendix B.2) 
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factors assumed were the disastrous effect of ill-trained and panicked soldiers and the revenge-
fueled feeling after the Taejon battle in a situation where friend and foe were undistinguishable. 
Also, researchers identified the combination of North Korean spies among refugees and 
troublesome refugee situations might have been a lethal mix. By and large, the complicated 
mixture of fear, feelings for revenge, untested military spirits of ill-trained soldiers, and very 
troublesome refugee situations seemed to culminate at No Gun Ri. The road was blocked with 
countless refugees and it was reported to be very difficult for American soldiers to screen them 
for possible enemy infiltration. Thus, researchers carefully raised a question that in searching for 
a way to solve this problem, the killing might have been one of the easiest ways for U.S. military 
operations. These researchers used archival documents to support their argument that harsh 
refugee policies were the basis for this operation. Some historians argued that there was also 
another factor to view this incident: a racially-based issue. A historian mentioned that “The 
gooks meant not merely the Communists, but all Koreans. Communist atrocities provoked 
callousness in many Americans, fighting a desperate struggle for survival, toward the Asians 
around them, creatures from another planet whose language they could not understand, whose 
customs bewildered them, whose country seemed most vividly represented by the universal 
stench of human excrement manuring the fields.”202 It was in the early 1950s after all, and the 
attitude toward Koreans and other non-Caucasians was less than enlightened as some secondary 
materials proved. 
The details of the incident process were discussed based on interviews with survivors and 
veterans as an absolutely dominating source. The process of evacuation on the previous day and 
the screening of refugees on the railroad tracks on July 26th were all described from the accounts 
                                                 
202 Craig R. Whitney, “No Place for Civilians,” New York Times (Oct. 03, 1999). 
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of survivors. However, the discussion about air strafing onto the railroad tracks where refugees 
rested was supported by some archival evidence. As addressed in an earlier part of the section, 
archival documents had supported that air strikes prevailed over the whole war period, but there 
was no specific record indicating the area, No Gun Ri, on July 26th. Therefore, the discussion 
relied heavily on survivors and veterans’ interviews, including 26 cases of quoting interviews. A 
Washington Post article introduced an intelligence report of the 1st Cavalry Division that refers to 
a P-80 war plane “with allied markings” strafing the railroad in the vicinity of No Gun Ri on the 
morning of July 25th.203 The description in that document does not match with the date of the 
survivors’ allegation, but it still shows vestiges of evidence. Another document describing the 
strafing in fine detail was a North Korean soldier’s diary, stating that “U.S. bombers had 
swooped over Yongdong and turned it into a sea of fire” on July 26th.204  
Survivors and American veterans’ interviews were particularly critical in discussing the 
evolution of the killing at the tunnels since interview accounts were used 71 times while archival 
documents and secondary literature were used only two or three times. American veterans 
explained to No Gun Ri researchers about how they were positioned, how the shooting started or 
what they witnessed when the shooting took place. Survivors also told their own experiences 
during the killing about how their family and relatives were killed, how they became injured, 
how the killing began and lasted, how they tried to stay alive under the dead bodies, etc. Many 
survivors testified to researchers that the majority of the refugees were elderly, women, and 
children, and some veterans even said they were not convinced these people were the enemy. 
                                                 
203 Michael Dobbs, Roberto Suro, “Army Dismissed Massacre Allegation; Koreans Sought Redress for 5 Years; 
Cohen Orders Probe,” The Washington Post (Oct.1,1999). 
204 Bruce Cumings, “Korean My Lai,” The Nation (Oct. 25, 1999). Also available at 
<http://www.thenation.com/doc.mhtml?i=19991025&s=cumings>. (Last accessed on January 20, 2007) 
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Twenty-six journalistic publications discussed the description of the shooting under the tunnels 
in 53 passages, and four academic publications had 24 passages for this discussion. 
Some researchers addressed a question of whether there were any North Korean soldiers 
among the refugees or any gun fire emanating from the tunnels. This discussion was keenly 
contentious and very difficult to conclude because the accounts for both opinions conflicted with 
each other. Some U.S. soldiers noted that they thought they saw gunfire coming from the tunnel. 
These accounts with support of the guerrilla warfare tactics of the general North Korean troops 
were mentioned in No Gun Ri research. However, survivors strongly denied these accounts based 
on the fact that they were searched and the majority was women, children and the elderly. 
Researchers used interviews 29 times for this discussion and no other sources were used in 31 
passages of 11 publications. 
Whether there were orders to shoot those refugees was also a contentious discussion in 
the entire No Gun Ri body of research over the whole time, not limited to this period. Since the 
remaining refugee policy documents and messages in war diaries were from neighboring units or 
from the Army command structure in Korea, and there exists no evidence that the 7th Regiment 
actually received these orders, the documents were used as rather circumstantial implications 
rather than direct orders for No Gun Ri. In some research, veterans testified that they received an 
order such as “nobody comes through, civilians, military, nobody”205 with one veteran even 
recalling the name of a runner who delivered such an order. The interview with a survivor, who 
remembered that his cousin talked with an American soldier who said he was only following an 
order, was used again this time. Oral history testimony was still used heavily for this discussion.  
                                                 
205 Sanghun Choe, Charles J. Hanley, and Martha Mendoza, “War’s Hidden Chapter: Ex-GIs Tell of Killing Korean 
Refugees,” The Associated Press (Sep. 29, 1999). 
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Researchers in eight publications tried to assume the number of casualties. For this 
discussion, a North Korean newspaper source was used since it was written just after the incident 
and reported that there were about 400 bodies piled in the tunnels. This was the only archival 
document for this discussion, cited two times, and the rest of the support was from interview 
testimony of survivors. Some other issues about the post traumatic stress of veterans as well as 
survivors were mentioned in No Gun Ri research that was based mainly on interviews. As shown 
in the following table, the discussions about the specific details on the evolution of the incident 
were seen in a great deal of passages in publications (a total of 246 passages in 42 publications), 
and interviews with survivors and veterans were the foremost sources (used 211 times).  
Table 7. Discussions on the Evolution of the No Gun Ri in the Second Period 
Discussions Numbers of passages and publications Source materials
Factors and reasons that caused 
the killing 
Journalistic (12 passages in 6 articles) 
Academic (9 passages in 5 articles) 
8 A 
2 S 
10 I 
Evacuation and screening of the 
villagers 
Journalistic (8 passages in 7 articles) 
Academic (6 passages in 2 articles) 
2 A 
6 S 
11 I 
Air attacks on the railroad near 
No Gun Ri 
Journalistic (25 passages in 18articles) 
Academic (6 passages in 4 articles) 
3 A 
3 S 
26 I 
Shooting at the No Gun Ri bridge 
tunnels 
Journalistic (53 passages in 26articles) 
Academic (24 passages in 4 articles) 
2 A 
3 S 
71 I 
Suspecting refugees as enemy  Journalistic (23 passages in 9 articles) Academic (9 passages in 2 articles) 
0 A 
0 S 
29 I 
Orders to shoot refugees at 
tunnels 
Journalistic (18 passages in 12articles) 
Academic (12 passages in 6 articles) 
4 A 
0 S 
24 I 
Assuming the number of 
casualties 
Journalistic (7 passages in 6 articles) 
Academic (4 passages in 2 articles) 
2 A 
0 S 
9 I 
Aftermath of the killing 
(survivors and U.S. soldiers) 
Journalistic (13 passages in 8 articles) 
Academic (4 passages in 4 articles) 
0 A 
0 S 
21 I 
Other accounts Journalistic (8 passages in 4 articles) Academic (4 passages in 2 articles) 
2 A 
0 S 
10 I 
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Total Journalistic (162 passages in 37 articles) Academic (84 passages in 5 articles) 
23 A 
14 S 
211 I 
(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony) 
 
About No Gun Ri Research 
In some cases, No Gun Ri researchers discussed their research in detail, including how their 
research was initiated and its development, by which research they were influenced, what 
motivated them to conduct such research, which research methods they used, and how they 
searched related materials and conducted interviews. Researchers oftentimes expressed their 
preference toward giving credibility to a certain material and some barriers that they encountered 
when they performed research. 
Some No Gun Ri researchers, especially in Korea, initiated a discussion about early 
Korean research in their publications to address how the incident was researched prior to the AP 
story. When the AP’s report was published, there were some introspective voices that voiced an 
opinion that this incident became known to the public only by another country’s news agency 
and reflected on the negligence of Korean news agencies. Under this atmosphere, Korean 
researchers addressed early research in a defensive way to prove that there were efforts to 
publicize and research this incident in Korea. The early news reports, which were published in 
local papers and a progressive political magazine, now received new and long overdue attention 
and influenced later research. Thus, the source materials they used at this time also received new 
attention. 
No Gun Ri researchers also mentioned Korean and U.S. governments’ attitude toward the 
event. Both governments were very passive about the investigation when the No Gun Ri story 
was first publicized. The U.S. government repeatedly denied that it found no basis for the guilty 
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allegation and rejected the petitions of the survivors. Similarly, the Korean government also 
reacted very passively toward an investigation because it could harm the traditional friendly 
relationship with the U.S. government. In 1994, when the story was first published as a novel and 
in some newspapers and magazines in Korea, the Korean Ministry of National Defense secretly 
conducted an in-house investigation. This investigation was later revealed in a news report but 
still was not released to the public. Even when the Korean government articulated that it would 
perform an investigation for finding the truth, it emphasized that the investigation would not be 
confused or diluted with American soldiers’ blood that was shed for the freedom of Korea and 
the importance of an alliance with America. 
From an individual level of research, some researchers expressed that their research was 
motivated mainly from journalistic reports about survivors’ petitions and the denials and early 
Korean reports before the AP. Researchers said that they wanted to know more about the truth, 
especially when they found that the U.S. government’s denial was on the basis of “no proof.” 
The researchers mentioned that with only basic research they could find information discrediting 
the U.S. government’s denial. One researcher wrote that he became interested in No Gun Ri 
because of his previous research interest in a similar area. A survivor’s novel on No Gun Ri was 
also mentioned as a motivation by another researcher. 
It was also revealed how No Gun Ri researchers sought their source materials. Some said 
they filed Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests and searched a variety of archives. 
Researchers mentioned that they looked through hundreds of boxes at the National Archives and 
other repositories. They searched archives not only for any related information about No Gun Ri, 
but also further information that could direct researchers to other source materials, such as lists 
of veterans’ names. From the list of veterans identified from archival documents, they conducted 
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interviews. The AP reporters stated that they even reconstructed military map coordinates to 
locate the army units’ movement. In a total of 13 passages in 6 publications, research methods 
were discussed.  
Some research barriers were also identified in No Gun Ri research. Some researchers 
stated that the incident happened too long ago and it was not always easy to find hard evidence 
and to assemble small pieces of information for a big picture of the incident even though there 
remained some. One researcher pointed out a financial problem to continue his work. The 
distance between America and Korea was also a barrier to share and search materials. Korean 
survivors pointed out that the politically repressive climate was the major barrier as they could 
not research and publicize their story earlier. One survivor testified that “We could not utter a 
single word about our family members murdered then, as if it were we who were guilty. If we 
told anyone that they were killed by American troops, then he would suspect that they must have 
been communist collaborators.”206 Given this situation, a survivor decided to publicize the story 
as a form of a novel partly to avoid political attention. Due to this reason, survivors requested 
compensation and an apology to the American government, and the apology implied a particular 
importance to them because their complaints had been seen as pro-communism.  
Research in law fields and journalistic reports about legal issues were prolific in this 
period of time. It seemed partly due to the potential criminal charges of the offending soldiers 
and legal compensation of the survivors. Researchers discussed the Geneva Convention and the 
Hague Convention as the legal basis of judging the incident. A few researchers also mentioned 
the International Humanitarian Law and the Nuremberg Tribunal regulations. Many legal experts 
articulated that the incident was clearly illegal if there was an order to fire on civilians according 
                                                 
206 Wonsup Lee, “Madness at Nogun-ri and Bein Hoa,” Korea Focus 7:6 (Nov/Dec 1999): 112-114. 
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to the above regulations. Some asserted that the presence of a few combatants still could not 
justify the killing of a large number of noncombatants. They also maintained that if the incident 
were considered as a war crime, the statute of limitations would not be applicable and even retro-
applicability of later regulated laws to charge for the war crime would be possible. A uniqueness 
of the incident in a law-related situation was discussed since No Gun Ri happened against an 
ally’s civilians, a situation not addressed or regulated in any war-related laws. One law scholar 
maintained that this could be dealt with on the state or collective level of responsibility, not 
imposing the responsibility on individual soldiers. Law-related issues were discussed in a total of 
33 passages in 15 publications, but these discussions were not supported by many archival 
resources. Laws and regulations in the No Gun Ri case were cited 15 times.  
Noticeably, there were some comments of researchers about which source materials they 
gave more credibility to and why. In many cases, researchers considered oral testimonies of 
survivors and veterans as credible, especially when those testimonies were supported by other 
archival evidence such as military documents or news reports from the time of the war (the latter 
being considered the most credible). North Korean news reports were regarded quite credible by 
many researchers because the contents of these reports were very close to survivors’ accounts 
and other recently disclosed facts. There were some interesting points about the interpretation of 
specific material for understanding the incident. Some researchers interpreted the atrocities of 
North Korean troops, such as using refugees as a shield from a mine field. Such incidents were 
described in official histories of the Korean War as a way to distract from the American soldiers’ 
wrongdoings. Interestingly, the North Korean news reports were inversely regarded by most 
Americans as “a clumsy attempt to divert attention from amply documented communist atrocities 
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against both South Korean civilians and American POWs.”207 Understandably, many researchers 
complained that it was not easy to research because either there was no direct information about 
No Gun Ri in archival documents or no documents remained from the offending army units. 
Interesting archival evidence was Korean victims’ birth/death records. In documents, some 
people were still alive at the point of No Gun Ri research because the whole family was killed at 
No Gun Ri and there were no survivors to file a death record. In death records, one was required 
to put a place of death and in some documents the location was mentioned as “under the No Gun 
Ri railroad bridge.” Some researchers used these death records to prove that the No Gun Ri 
incident really existed. Similarly, the fact that No Gun Ri villagers honored the dead on the same 
day every year was regarded as another evidential aspect. The table below indicates the details of 
discussions about the frequency of source materials in research. 
Table 8. Discussions on the No Gun Ri Research in the Second Period 
Discussions Numbers of passages and publications Source materials
Early Research in Korea Journalistic (2 passages in 2 articles) Academic (4 passages in 3 articles) 
1 A 
11 S 
0 I 
Government’s Attitudes  Journalistic (23 passages in 16 articles) Academic (4 passages in 3 articles) 
2 A 
1 S 
0 I 
Survivors’ efforts and 
research 
Journalistic (24 passages in 16 articles) 
Academic (10 passages in 5 articles) 
2 A 
0 S 
18 I 
Research Motivation Journalistic (7 passages in 5 articles) Academic (2 passages in 2 articles) 
0 A 
0 S 
0 I 
Research Methods Journalistic (9 passages in 5 articles) Academic (4 passages in 1 articles) 
2 A 
0 S 
0 I 
No Gun Ri 
research 
Research Barriers Journalistic (10 passages in 8 articles) Academic (4 passages in 3 articles) 
2 A 
0 S 
9 I 
                                                 
207 Michael Dobbs, “Shoot Them All; Half a century after the Korean War, members of the 7th Cavalry Regiment had 
hoped for recognition; instead they are having to account for what happened at No Gun Ri,” The Washington Post 
(Feb. 06, 2000). 
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Legal Research Legal Research Journalistic (11 passages in 8 articles) Academic (22 passages in 7 articles) 
0 A 
2 S 
1 I 
15 L 
Credibility of Materials in 
Interpreting the Incident 
Journalistic (19 passages in 14articles) 
Academic (9 passages in 5 articles) 
11 A 
3 S 
6 I 
Understanding No Gun Ri 
from various souces 
Journalistic (13 passages in 11 articles) 
Academic (1 passages in 1 articles) 
4 A 
0 S 
0 I 
Understanding 
No Gun Ri 
research 
Other issues Journalistic (15 passages in 13 articles) Academic (4 passages in 2 articles) 
4 A 
0 S 
3 I 
Total  Journalistic (103 passages in 43 articles) Academic (60 passages in 12 articles) 
24 A 
17 S 
20 I 
15 L 
(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony, L: Laws and Regulations) 
Research on No Gun Ri in this time period bears testimony of the great influence that the 
AP’s No Gun Ri story had since later researchers used the archival documents and interviews 
discovered and conducted by the AP. Immediately after this report, additional documents were 
discovered, implying the grand scale of attention this incident drew. Many archival documents 
were used to support background information about circumstances of the battle situation in the 
nearby area, U.S. troops’ disposition, the situation of the Army units stationed at No Gun Ri, and 
refugee policies. Many researchers saw refugee policy documents as the direct cause of the 
tragedy. Details of the evolution of the incident relied heavily on the interviews of survivors and 
American veterans. Obviously, in many cases, it was agreed that when oral history of the 
incident was corroborated with related evidence, archival documents or any other possible 
materials, the oral history was seen as the most credible. 
A total of 366 passages in 113 journalistic publications and 172 passages in 13 academic 
works were devoted to No Gun Ri discussions in this period. Archival documents were used 128 
times for No Gun Ri discussions and secondary materials were used 70 times. Interview 
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testimony with survivors and veterans was used as the overwhelming majority -- 266 times. The 
most used archival document was a Communication Log from the 8th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry 
Division on July 24th 1950, which was used a total of 16 times throughout the publications in this 
period.208 The next most used archival document was a memorandum by the Commander of the 
25th Infantry Division on July 25th 1950.209 The third most used archival document was a 
captured North Korean newspaper article of August 19th 1950.210 For the secondary materials, 
the most used was the official history of Korea, History of the Korean War, by the Korean 
Military Academy in 1987, used 11 times for this period. The 1st Cavalry Division’s history, The 
First Team: The First Cavalry Division In Korea, July 18 1950 -- July 18 1952, was the next 
most used secondary material. A Japanese history of the Korean War was used 6 times and 
ranked third.  
 
Table 9. Most Used Archival and Secondary Materials in the Second Period 
Rank Archival Materials Secondary Materials 
1 
Communication Log, 8th Regiment, 1st 
Cavalry, July 24 1950. In Records of U.S. 
Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 
1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA. 
(16) 
Korean Military Academy, History of the Korean War, 
1986. (11) 
                                                 
208 This document reads “No refugees to cross the front line. Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in 
case of women and children.” 
209 This documents reads, “Korean police have been directed to remove all civilians from the area between the blue 
lines shown on the attached overlay and report the evacuation has been accomplished. All civilians seen in this area 
are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly.” 
210 This document describes that North Korean troops moved into No Gun Ri and found about 400 bodies of elderly, 
young people and children. The stream under the railroad bridge was bloody from the bodies and entrances of the 
bridge tunnels were piled with about 400 dead bodies. 
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2 
Memorandum, Commander, 25th Infantry 
Division, 27 Jul 50. In AG Command 
Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th 
Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, 
Box 3746, RG 407, NARA. (14) 
Choson Inminbo (조선인민보, Korean 
People’s Daily) Aug. 19th 1950. (14) 
First Cavalry Division Association, The First Team: The 
First Cavalry Division In Korea, July 18 1950 -- July 18 
1952, 1994. (8) 
3 
Message, EUSAK, CNR: G 20578 KGP, 
July 26th 1950, sub: Controlled 
Movement of All Refugees. In Records of 
U.S. Army Commands, Korean Military 
Advisory Group, Box 23, RG 338, 
NARA. (8) 
After-mission report, 35th Fighter Bomber 
Squadron, 8th Fighter Bomber Group, 
Mission 35-1, July 20, 1950 (8) 
S-2-3 Journal, 5th Regiment: Ka-Ri, 
Korea, July 25-29, 1950 (8) 
Institute of Military History of Japan, The Korean War, 
1986 (6) 
4 
Journal, HQ 25th Infantry Division, July 
26, 1950. (5) 
Oh, “First Testimony – Massacre of 300 Villagers by 
the American Soldiers in Yong-dong Chung-buk in the 
Korean War,” Monthly Mal, July 1994: 36-45.  (5) 
5 
Map Coordinate (4) 
Petition submitted by Survivors’ 
Organization, December 29th 1997.  (4) 
Chong, Do You Know Our Agony? (Seoul: Tari Media) 
1994. (4) 
Choi and Chong, “A Study on A Massacre of Civilians 
in Young-dong area,  Chung-chong Province in the 
Early Stage of the Korean War (1),” Journal of 
Humanities 17:1 (1999): 245-283.  (4) 
Appleman, South to Naktong, North to Yalu (4) 
Hastings, The Korean War, 1987. (4) 
Choe, Hanley, and Mendoza, “War’s Hidden Chapter: 
Ex-GIs Tell of Killing Korean Refugees,” the 
Associated Press, Sep 29th 1999. (4) 
Choe, Hanley, and Mendoza, “Korean, U.S. Witnesses, 
Backed by Military Records, Say Refugees Were 
Strafed,” the Associated Press, Dec 28th 1999. (4) 
(The number in parenthesis is the number of those materials used.) 
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5.3 MAY 11, 2000 TO JANUARY 12, 2001: Veracity Discussions Concerning News 
Sources 
In May 11th 2000, there was a news article in an online newspaper (Stripes.com) for U.S. 
veterans. This report raised issues based on archival research that some of the sources that the 
AP used for the No Gun Ri report were questioned as to their veracity. This report was relayed 
by a U.S. News and World Report article, questioning the same issues.  Stripes.com was a news 
service for veterans and did not have a wide range audience. Therefore, when the U.S. News and 
World Report’s report was published, it received great attention in the U.S. as well as in Korea. 
Not long after the public’s interest on the veracity of sources on the No Gun Ri story, CBS 
broadcasted archival evidence that substantiated potential air attacks by requests from the Army 
on civilians during the Korean War. Soon after CBS’ broadcasting, the AP reporters again 
revealed additional captured North Korean news reports from August and September 1950, not 
very long after the incident. Some of these newspapers were already published in Korea but were 
now the recipients of U.S. attention. The No Gun Ri was well discussed due to a series of 
archival evidence-associated events during this period of time.  
From July to the end of 2000, news publications from time to time reported upon ongoing 
government investigations and that there were no important issues discussed. However, in 
November two American veterans who testified, under oath and by sworn statements for the 
government’s investigation, said they believed they received an order to shoot refugees at No 
Gun Ri. Their interviews were cited in a great number of news articles and academic publications 
in addition to military records for refugee policies. At the end of the year, government 
investigation reports were about to be published, news reporters showed interest on how the 
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investigation would result and whether and how the U.S. government would compensate the 
survivors of the No Gun Ri killing. 
 During the period of time from May 11, 2000 to January 10, 2001, there were a total of 
112 publications with 98 journalistic articles and 14 academic writings. Of the 98 journalistic 
articles, 54 news reports were published in the U.S. and 44 were published in Korea. Six 
academic publications were from the U.S. among the 14 academic writings and 8 were from 
Korea. 
Table 10. The Number of Publications from May 11, 2000 to January 12, 2001 
 Journalistic products Academic products 
Published in the U.S. 54 6 
Published in Korea 44 8 
Total  98 14 
* The whole list of the research products is provided in the Appendix A. 
As mentioned above, the discussions in this time period are directly related to the emergence of 
new archival evidence in many cases, and archival materials constitute a large portion of the 
entire collection of supporting materials. Still, interviews with survivors and American veterans 
are used many times for the description of the killing. Similar to what was observed in the 
previous timeframe, secondary materials continue to be used mainly in history and legal studies.  
 
Roger’s Memo 
During the time from May 11, 2000 to January 10, 2001, the discussions on the background of 
the No Gun Ri were not much different from the previous discussions. No Gun Ri researchers 
continued to address the fact that U.S. soldiers were not ready for a war due to the lack of proper 
 121 
training and budget cuts in the military, and they used secondary materials for this background 
information. The soldiers of the 7th Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division were not an exception to this 
situation. As a reporter describes, the 7th Regiment - “the storied regiment of George Custer and 
Little Bighorn- were largely untested. Many of the troops were no more than frightened 
teenagers with no combat experience, led by too few battle-tested officers and sergeants.”211 The 
situation was worsened when the regiment “lost 750 Non-commissioned officers to fill-out the 
24th when that division had first been sent from Japan.”212 These soldiers heard circulated rumors 
of guerrilla warfare and feared North Korean soldiers’ infiltration tactics. In addition, North 
Koreans forces were proved more effective than the U.S. from major defeats of Task Force 
Smith in Chukmiryong and the 24th Division in Taejon. The chaotic withdrawal of the 2nd 
Battalion, 7th Regiment on the night of July 25 was addressed by some No Gun Ri researchers 
mainly using secondary literature for their supporting materials.  
 The specific discussion of how and how long the 1st Cavalry Division was positioned in 
Yongdong, including particular locations of each regiment and neighbor divisions, was 
continued not in a way to identify who was at No Gun Ri, but rather in a way to find more 
information about detailed battle lines and smaller units’ positions to picture the incident in 
hopes of clarifying an explanation for reasons or factors that caused the incident. Naturally, for 
this discussion, many archival documents were used (32 uses of archives with 12 cases of 
secondary literature) as supporting materials and among the archival documents, war diaries of 
army units well described their positions and missions. One interesting point to mention is that 
                                                 
211 Joseph L. Galloway, “Doubts about a Korean ‘Massacre’,” U.S. News and World Report, May 12, 2000, on their 
web-site: May 22, 2000 in the magazine. 
212 Christopher D. Booth, “Prosecuting the “Fog of War?”; Examining the Legal Implications of an Alleged 
Massacre of South Korean Civilians by U.S. Forces During the Opening Days of the Korean War in the Village of 
No Gun Ri,” Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law Vol. 33 (Oct. 2000): 943. 
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some archival documents were only used by Korean researchers while not at all by American 
researchers even though the documents are from the American military. Korean researchers used 
a war operations document from the 1st Cavalry Division on July 24, 1950, which detailed 
arranging new positions of the retreating 5th and 8th Regiments and assigning the role of those 
regiments for securing points east and north of Yongdong against enemy penetration. This 
document also assigned the 7th Regiment the preparations against any enemy penetration as 
Division Reserve and for patrolling on high ground.213 This document was used to identify the 
positions of regiments of the 1st Cavalry Division and to understand that the role of the 7th 
Regiment was for Reserve rather than being frontline battle units. It seems that American 
researchers did not fully refer to other No Gun Ri research from Korea. 
As another aspect of circumstantial elements for the incident, the air operations during 
the Korean War were also discussed. In June 2000, CBS correspondent David Martin reported a 
declassified document, termed the “Rogers’ Memo,” dated July 25, 1950, just a day before No 
Gun Ri. This document was created by Col. Turner Rogers and noted: “It is reported that large 
groups of civilians, either composed of or controlled by North Korean soldiers, are infiltrating 
U.S. positions. The army has requested that we strafe all civilian refugee parties that are noted 
approaching our positions. To date we have complied with the army request in this respect. . . . 
Our operation involving the strafing of civilians is sure to receive wide publicity and may cause 
embarrassment to the U.S. Air Force and to the U.S. government in its relations with the United 
Nations.” Then he recommended changing the policy to one where Air Force pilots would not 
attack civilian refugee groups “unless they are definitely known to contain North Korean soldiers 
                                                 
213 The 1st Cavalry Division, Operation Plan Number 10-50, Hwanggan (1088-1483), 1950. 7. 24. 23:15. (The details 
of this document are provided in Appendix B.2) 
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or commit hostile acts.”214 One cannot rush to draw a conclusion directly connecting this 
document to the No Gun Ri incident, but many researchers agreed that the contents reveal 
general aspects of military policy and operations toward Korean refugees in terms of air attacks, 
which in part corroborate survivors’ claims of being attacked by aircraft while staying on 
railroad tracks without posing any hostility. The table below shows how many publications 
discussed the background of the incident along with the source materials used.  A total of 20 
passages in 13 journalistic publications and 44 passages in 10 academic works described 
circumstances around the event and used archival documents 55 times, secondary materials 68 
times and interview testimony of veterans 2 times. 
Table 11. Discussions on the Background of No Gun Ri in the Third Period 
Discussions Numbers of passages and publications Source materials
Status of U.S. Soldiers: ill-
prepared and panicked 
Journalistic (3 passages in 3 articles) 
Academic (11 passages in 4 articles) 
1  A 
35 P 
1  I 
Disastrous Taejon Defeat Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (2 passages in 2 articles) 
0 A 
3 P 
0 I 
Situation of 7th Regiment on the 
night before the incident 
Journalistic (2 passages in 1 article) 
Academic (2 passages in 1 article) 
2 A 
13 P 
0 I 
1st Cavalry Division’s position 
and the battle situation during 
No Gun Ri 
Journalistic (7 passages in 4 articles) 
Academic (18 passages in 9 articles) 
32 A 
12 P 
0 I 
Large scale air attacks during the 
Korean War 
Journalistic (7 passages in 7 articles) 
Academic (11 passages in 7 articles) 
20 A 
5 P 
1 I 
Total Journalistic (20 passages in 13 articles) Academic (44 passages in 10 articles) 
55A 
68 P 
2 I 
(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony) 
 
                                                 
214 Memorandum to General Timberlake, “Policy on Strafing Civilian Refugees,” Colonel T.C. Rogers, 
DCS/Operations, HQ 5AF Advance, 25 Jul 50. (The details of this document are provided in Appendix B.2) 
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Using More Documents than Oral History 
Inevitably, No Gun Ri researchers in this time period still discussed the major elements of the 
incident and explained the evolution of the incident from evacuation to arrival of the North 
Korean troops. The amount of discussion on this specific topic was not as great as that in the 
previous time period. There were a total of 151 passages in journalistic and academic 
publications now for the evolution of No Gun Ri, compared to a previous total of 245 passages. 
However, it is notable that researchers now utilized more archival documents than interviews 
while previously the case of using interviews dominated the investigative efforts. The number of 
archival sources concerning discussions about No Gun Ri increased from 23 occasions in the 
previous time period to 80. The general refugee policy documents which were disclosed by the 
AP reporters in 1999 and the Rogers’ memo were the major documents used here, which can lead 
to the assumption that more researchers attempted to tie the incident to those policy documents 
directly or indirectly. North Korean wartime newspapers in 1950 were also used significantly by 
many researchers. The AP reporters additionally discovered more North Korean documents. Thus, 
No Gun Ri researchers during this time could use a greater variety of archival documents for 
supporting their arguments. 
 To come to the specifics of the discussion, researchers attempted to understand the 
reasons or any factors that could cause or contribute to the killings at No Gun Ri again at this 
time. The reasons or factors that researchers drew to explain the killing did not deviate much 
from the previous time: panicked soldiers’ reactions in a confusing retreat; a result of war 
operations based on refugee policies; and racial attitudes toward Koreans. Some researchers 
argued that such rigid refugee policies toward all Koreans to be treated as enemies would not 
have been issued if it were for the civilians in Europe. Air attacks on Korean refugees at No Gun 
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Ri were also a part of discussions for the evolution of No Gun Ri. Many researchers used Rogers’ 
memo to address air strafing at No Gun Ri. They agreed that the document provides at least 
circumstantial information that could have led to the incident, while others argued that there was 
no further information to tie the memo to the incident. 
 Similar to previous research, the details of the shooting under the No Gun Ri railroad 
bridge tunnels were discussed mainly based on interviews of survivors and veterans who either 
participated in or witnessed the event. Their testimonies were still in the same vein of the 
previous research. However, this time some veterans testified that the shooting was only brief 
and lasted for a short time. These veterans were interviewed for reports that questioned the 
veracity of news sources for the AP, and these reports underscored that the shooting was not as 
large in scale and intentional or deliberate as survivors alleged, rather implying that there was 
hostile gunfire from the refugees. The discussion regarding the veracity of the news sources will 
be discussed in a later section of this chapter. During a journal article interview, one of the 
members of the outside advisory group for the U.S. government investigative team mentioned 
that the U.S. team agreed that the killing was not deliberate and was instead incidental and a 
mistaken reaction to a panicked retreat. This was also used by No Gun Ri researchers, some in 
criticism and some in favor.  
 Whether there were any North Korean infiltrators among the No Gun Ri refugees was one 
of the most arguable discussions for No Gun Ri. Survivors asserted that they were screened and 
there were no North Korean infiltrators among them while veterans were divided in their 
accounts. Some veterans said they were not convinced the group was the enemy while some said 
they assumed there were North Korean soldiers amongst refugees or later found North Korean 
rifles or soldiers’ dead bodies. Researchers took whichever testimony substantiated their own 
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arguments, but without any more archival evidence or other corroborating evidence it will be 
difficult to draw a clear line on this discussion. Another controversial issue was whether there 
was an order to shoot the refugees under the tunnels, which was the major discussion in this time 
period. Refugee policy documents215 dated one or two days before No Gun Ri were primary 
archival sources for this argument, and were repeatedly used 29 out of 31 times. Researchers 
agreed that those documents provided certain guidelines for U.S. soldiers’ treatment of refugees 
in the least even though they were not direct orders. Some researchers stated that soldiers might 
have assumed that “do not allow refugees to cross line” as firing upon them if they do cross. 
Interviews with veterans were divided into two groups: “orders were issued” and “no order 
given”. Later in the process of the U.S. government’s investigation, two veterans said there were 
orders from higher officers in a sworn testimony (Lawrence Levine and James Crume), which 
fueled the controversy even more.  
 North Korean news reports and military documents from 1950 were the main archival 
sources for the discussion of assuming the number of the killed and injured at No Gun Ri. Those 
North Korean materials were captured by the U.S. troops during wartime and later microfilmed 
and housed in one Korean repository, and one of the news reports was first found by a survivor’s 
family and introduced in his publication. During this timeframe, more North Korean news 
reports and military documents were discovered and used as a whole.216 The authors of the news 
                                                 
215 Those documents are the 8th Cavalry Regiment’s communication log stating “No refugees to cross the front line. 
Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use discretion in case of women and children”; a message sent from the Eighth 
Army Headquarters, titled “Controlled Movement of All Refugees,” saying “No repeat no refugees will be permitted 
to cross lines at any time.”; a memo from the 25th Infantry Division commander, saying “All civilians seen in this 
area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly.”; a 25th Infantry Division headquarter journal, 
saying “all civilians moving around in combat zone will be considered as unfriendly and shot.” (The details of these 
documents are provided in Appendix B.2) 
216 Kim Chae-Uk, Military Affairs Committee, Choe Chong-Hak, OIC, Cultural Section, Headquarters First Army 
Camp, “Cultivation of Hatred to Obtain Revenge,” to All Units Under this Command, Aug. 2, 1950; Kim Chae-Uk, 
Military Affairs Committee, Choe Chong-Hak, OIC, Cultural Section, Headquarters First Army Camp, “Precautions 
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reports came to No Gun Ri immediately after U.S. troops withdrew on July 29th, 1950 and 
reported what they saw and heard from the survivors. They described how many dead bodies 
were piled up in the tunnels and the accounts from the survivors of how the killing occurred. 
Many researchers used such materials to approximate the number of the casualties at No Gun Ri, 
in all 17 cases of using archival evidence. The confiscated North Korean military documents 
were translated and circulated within 40 units of the U.S. Army, according to a document 
attached to one of the North Korean documents.  The fact that No Gun Ri was known to the 
Army from the time of the war was mentioned by two researchers. Detailed information about 
how many passages in how many articles there were for discussion and how many supporting 
materials were used among three types of sources are shown in the Table below.  
Table 12. Discussions on the Evolution of the No Gun Ri in the Third Period 
Discussion Numbers of passages and publications Source materials
Factors and reasons that caused 
the Killing 
Journalistic (4 passages in 4 articles) 
Academic (8 passages in 5 articles) 
3 A 
4 P 
1 I 
Evacuation and screening of the 
villagers 
Journalistic (2 passages in 1 article) 
Academic (12 passages in 7 articles) 
3 A 
11 P 
7 I 
Air attacks on the railroad near 
No Gun Ri 
Journalistic (3 passages in 3 articles) 
Academic (10 passages in 8 articles) 
12 A 
4 P 
4 I 
Shooting at the No Gun Ri 
Bridge tunnels 
Journalistic (21 passages in 14 articles) 
Academic (9 passages in 5 articles) 
0 A 
4 P 
13 I 
Suspecting refugees as enemy  Journalistic (5 passages in 5 articles) Academic (6 passages in 5 articles) 
1 A 
4 P 
4 I 
Orders to shoot refugees at 
tunnels 
Journalistic (37 passages in 23 articles) 
Academic (11 passages in 8 articles) 
31 A 
4 P 
20 I 
                                                                                                                                                             
To the Troops,” Aug. 8, 1950; Chon Uk (전욱) , an article in Choson Inminbo (조선인민보, Korean People’s Daily) 
(Aug. 10, 1950); Chon Uk(전욱), an article in Choson Inminbo, Aug. 19, 1950; Yi Tae-jun (이태준), “To the 
Frontlines,” Rodong Sinmun (노동신문, Newspaper of the Workers) (Aug. 5, 1950); Pak Ung-gol (박웅걸), “Diary 
from a frontline: from Yongdong to Kimchon,” Minju Choson (민주조선, Democratic Korea) (Sep. 7, 1950). 
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Assuming the number of 
casualties 
Journalistic (6 passages in 6 articles) 
Academic (10 passages in 6 articles) 
17 A 
6 P 
1 I 
Other accounts Journalistic (8 passages in 6 articles) Academic (4 passages in 3 articles) 
13 A 
0 P 
3 I 
Total Journalistic (81 passages in 37 articles) Academic (70 passages in 12 articles) 
80 A 
37 P 
51 I 
(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony) 
 
Killing 25 Civilians to Every Enemy Soldier 
Refugee policies during the Korean War were discussed in this period in a similar manner 
as before, using the existing policy documents. One notable example was an air-dispersed leaflet 
that read, “Movement of refugees is forbidden. Return to your homes or move off roads to the 
hills and remain there. Any persons or columns moving toward the United Nations Forces will be 
fired on. Commanding General UN Forces.”217 These leaflets were used in January 1951 when 
Chinese troops occupying Seoul were moving southward. This document, which was not directly 
related to No Gun Ri, was used in the discussion for a general policy toward Korean refugees by 
No Gun Ri researchers. The problems of controlling refugees and North Korean troops’ 
infiltration tactics were also addressed, citing some secondary materials including Appleman’s 
official history of the Korean War, South To Naktong, North To Yalu. Son-ju Pang, a Korean-
American historian, introduced a letter by an AP correspondent in the Korean War which 
depicted the emotional scenes of the war. He said, “The most horrifying part of this last advance 
has been the hundreds of refugees killed by our strafing. . . women and children, mostly. . . .  I 
have seen a lot of war but this has been one of the most horrifying spectacles of all. The air force 
                                                 
217 Recited from Son-ju Pang, “No Gun Ri Incident Seen from North Korean Materials from the Korean War,” 
Korean Studies Quarterly 79 (Summer 2000): 41. (방선주, “한국전쟁당시 북한자료로 본 노근리사건,” 정신문화연구 79: 
41). 
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says it is necessary: enemy troops infiltrate refugee columns. Sometimes they do. That I grant. 
But I would estimate that when we strafe refugee columns on the road (as opposed to tactical air 
strikes on designated enemy targets superintended by a forward air controller), I would estimate 
we kill 25 civilians to every enemy soldier. Is it worthwhile?”218 Some news reports in 1950 
were used to describe the situation of suspecting refugees for North Korean guerrillas. According 
to those news reports, it seems that suspecting refugees as harborers of infiltrators was a well-
known aspect of war from that time. The following table presents the number of passages that 
discussed this issue with the number of used source materials.  
Table 13. Discussions of Refugee Problems and Policies in the Third Period 
Discussion Numbers of passages and publications Source materials
Rigid Refugee policies Journalistic (3 passages in 3 articles) Academic (7 passages in 5 articles) 
22 A 
0 S 
0 I 
North Korean Troops’ 
infiltration tactic and U.S.’s 
suspecting refugees 
Journalistic (2 passages in 2 articles) 
Academic (5 passages in 3 articles) 
8 A 
8 S 
1 I 
Total Journalistic (5 passages in 5 articles) Academic (12 passages in 5 articles) 
30 A 
8 S 
1 I 
(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony) 
 
He Was Not at No Gun Ri 
The foremost discussion in this period was about questioning the veracity of some news sources. 
Three veterans among those who were interviewed by the AP were later questioned about their 
participation in or witnessing of the incident by other news reporters based on their military 
records. Ed Offley from Stripe.com and Joseph Galloway from U.S. News and World Report 
introduced some morning reports and military personnel records for those veterans. The newly 
                                                 
218 S. M. Swinton Collection (AP correspondent), Box 1, Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan. 
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disclosed documents indicated one of the veterans, Edward Daily, was not a machine gunner of 
the 7th Regiment, but instead a mechanic from the 27th Ordnance Maintenance Group who just 
arrived at Pohang from Japan at the time of No Gun Ri.219 Two other veterans, Delos Flint and 
Eugene Hesselman, were concerned that they might have not been at No Gun Ri because 
morning reports and a war diary note they were sent to a rear hospital due to an injury on the first 
day of No Gun Ri.  
Later, it was revealed that Daily even fabricated his military records, pretending to hold 
medals for valor and combat actions, to have been in a prisoner of war held by North Korean 
troops, and an important person in the 7th Regiment War Veterans Association. The 
discrepancies of the other two veterans were even more difficult to conclude. A war diary says 
Flint was sent to a hospital on July 25th,220 and in a morning report he was allegedly sent on July 
26th.221 Some researchers confirmed that morning reports tend to be more accurate than war 
diaries because the former is created daily from the front and the latter is written later at the 
regimental level. According to another morning report, Hesselman was wounded and transferred 
to a medical unit on July 26th – not detailing when on 26th he was sent - leaving a possibility that 
he might have seen the killing.222 Daily later accepted the accounts that he provided to the AP 
could have been heard secondhand, and he could not dispute the archival evidence. The other 
two veterans did not agree to follow-up interviews by other researchers. This discussion was the 
most vigorous among all other discussions for No Gun Ri, and a total of 133 passages in 40 
publications with 52 uses of military records were devoted to this discussion. 
                                                 
219 Morning Report Mar. 24, 1951 of 7th Cavalry Regiment; Morning Report Mar. 22, 1951 of 27th Ordnance 
Maintenance Company. (The details of this document are provided in Appendix B.2) 
220 War Diary of 7th Cavalry Regiment, July 25 1950. 
221 Morning Report July 27, 1950 of 7th Cavalry Regiment. 
222 Morning Report July 27, 1950 of 7th Cavalry Regiment. 
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Along with the discussion questioning the reliability of these veterans’ account, an issue 
of the journalistic misuse of certain sources was also raised. Stripes.com and U.S. News and 
World Report reporters also had interviews with other veterans from the list of the AP’s 
interviewees and some of them said their accounts were truncated or quoted in the wrong context.  
However, the AP, in defense, noted that the important question was What Happened at No Gun 
Ri? and their original report was dependent on distant records and showed all the ambiguities 
that would arise from unclear information from records and interviews. Another interesting 
discussion to highlight was that a few Korean academic publications were still using those 
veterans’ accounts that were questionable. There was no further explanation provided, but it 
could be assumed that usually academic work takes more time to publish and such publications 
might have been written before the controversy over the veracity of some sources. 
Even though the controversy over the interviewees’ veracity was being questioned, the 
consensus of researchers in this period seem to accept that No Gun Ri stands as it was, because 
these veterans were not the only sources for the AP, and thus discrediting some sources did not 
entirely discredit the incident itself. The central element of the AP story - that American troops 
fired on refugees - was confirmed by other researchers including the U.S. government’s 
investigation team. The Pulitzer Committee reaffirmed its award to the AP regardless of the 
controversy over the sources.  
The legal efforts to lodge petitions and the research by survivors to publicize their story 
were again mentioned by some No Gun Ri researchers, as in previous research. More specific 
comments on researchers’ individual efforts for their research were also stated. A researcher 
expressed that the novel on No Gun Ri motivated him to begin his research, and another wrote 
that she began her research to clarify the ambiguity over the existence of No Gun Ri with special 
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interest over the controversies rampant at this time. Researchers also mentioned searching 
archives and conducting interviews as their major research methods, and some related that they 
double-checked the news reports in 1950 in addition to scrutinizing their search of archives. No 
Gun Ri researchers continued to have difficulty finding hard evidence of the killing, and 
survivors’ struggles in the past under the postwar repressive climate were still mentioned as 
research barriers. 
Research by governments was vividly addressed by No Gun Ri researchers as the 
completion of the investigation drew to a close. Some of the conclusions of both governments’ 
investigations were released to the press and many journalists reported further implications of the 
incident along with their conclusions. The existence of the incident and the general outline of 
events that led to the incident were confirmed by both governments. However, some major issues 
about the incident were still very contentious and an agreement could not be reached between the 
two governments. The U.S. government came to the conclusion that American soldiers killed an 
unspecified number of Korean refugees near No Gun Ri, but found no definitive evidence they 
fired under orders. The Korean government insisted that there was sufficient evidence that such 
orders were issued and at least 248 refugees were killed, wounded or missing. Other issues like 
compensation for the survivors and a formal apology were not easily addressed either. Finally, 
the governments prepared a statement of mutual understanding on the incident – but only on 
those issues agreed to by both governments. A member of the outside advisory group for the U.S. 
team, former Representative Pete McCloskey, strongly disagreed with the U.S. conclusion that 
there was no evidence of orders to fire on refugees and also denounced the Pentagon’s over 
reliance on documents and not enough on the testimony of veterans. Also, the survivors’ 
organization criticized that “There’s only one truth but they’re trying to make it into two.” A 
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spokesman of the organization said if the investigation reports did not reflect the whole truth, 
they would launch a joint investigation team of domestic and international human rights groups 
and scholars. The governments’ investigations were already generating controversy even before 
the publication of their reports. The extent and depth of the research process and methods of both 
governments were briefly identified by news reporters.  
No Gun Ri researchers provided a discussion about using source materials and their 
credibility. While many researchers afforded more credibility to archival documents, others 
insisted written records could also be unreliable particularly in the case of the early weeks of the 
Korean War. The captured North Korean documents and newspapers were regarded as especially 
credible because the contents were in accordance with recently known facts of the incident and 
survivors’ accounts. Some other researchers stated they considered the oral history of survivors 
and veterans more credible, but the possibility of misleading oral histories was also raised. The 
fact that appropriate military records did not survive, including the entries in the official log of 
the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Regiment for the period from July 26th through July 28th was 
mentioned by a No Gun Ri researcher.  
There was another discussion about recordkeeping-related issues regarding No Gun Ri 
research. This could be a partial reason why critical military records did not survive or how the 
fabrication of an ex-soldier’s military career was possible. Many 7th Regiment records were 
destroyed in a fire in Tokyo in the early 50s, and again in 1973 with 80 percent of individual files 
for soldiers in the National Personnel Records Center in St. Louis destroyed due to a major fire. 
The National Personnel Records Center invited veterans to help reconstruct their records by 
providing copies of letters from the military. Edward Daily was one who did so enthusiastically 
and in this process he was able to manipulate his military career by providing fabricated letters 
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about his awards and military careers. It was later known that the letters from the 1950s at the 
time of the Korean War that he had provided to St. Louis Record Center contained a zip code, 
which began to be utilized in 1963. In such letters, his military rank was a lieutenant rather than 
his actual rank of corporal, and it was mentioned that he received medals for valors for combat 
actions while in fact he only received some medals as an ordnance mechanic for maintenance 
work. He was captured by the North Korean troops and was a prisoner of war in those letters, 
and those that he manipulated. He created a brand new military career through this chance of 
fabrication of his military records. 
Legal research during this time was not much different from previous ones; however 
there was much more in this timeframe. The Geneva Convention, the Hague Convention, and the 
International Humanitarian Law were still the most quoted regulations for the basis of a legal 
remedy for this incident. Researchers again identified that the incident was clearly illegal 
according to not only those aforementioned regulations but also Korean and American legal 
systems. Various methods for legal remedies were discussed and specific issues of criminal 
charges for offending soldiers and the statute of limitations were addressed. There were some 
legal barriers identified even with the Geneva Convention but the researchers provided other 
ways to deal with the incident based on a great deal of secondary materials. For the specific 
numbers of passages and the frequency of using source materials for each discussion, see the 
following table. 
 
Table 14. Discussions on the No Gun Ri Research in the Third Period 
Discussion Numbers of passages and publications Source materials
No Gun Ri 
Research Veracity of Sources 
Journalistic (127 passages in 36 articles) 
Academic (6 passages in 4 articles) 
52 A 
1 S 
35 I 
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Survivors’ efforts and 
research Academic (7 passages in 5 articles) 
0 A 
5 S 
1 I 
Research Motivation Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (1 passage in 1 article) 
0 A 
0 S 
0 I 
Research Methods Journalistic (3 passages in 2 articles) Academic (4 passages in 1 article) 
0 A 
0 S 
0 I 
Research Barriers Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (6 passages in 4 articles) 
0 A 
3 S 
0 I 
Previous Attitude and 
Research 
Journalistic (3 passages in 3 articles) 
Academic (3 passages in 3 articles) 
0 A 
0 S 
0 I 
Government 
Investigation of the 
U.S. and Korea 
Journalistic (55 passages in 23 articles) 
Academic (2 passages in 2 articles) 
1 A 
1 S 
0 I 
Government 
Research 
Government 
Investigation Process 
and Methods 
Journalistic (9 passages in 6 articles) 
Academic (3 passages in 3 articles) 
2 A 
0 S 
0 I 
Other issues to 
understand No 
Gun Ri 
Research 
Credibility of Materials 
in Interpreting the 
Incident 
Journalistic (26 passages in 18 articles) 
Academic (4 passages in 4 articles) 
29 A 
2 S 
0 I 
Legal Research Legal Research Journalistic (14 passages in 10 articles) Academic (46 passages in 6 articles) 
1 A 
30 S 
22 I 
37 L 
Other issues  Journalistic (2 passages in 2 articles) Academic (7 passages in 5 articles) 
2 A 
9 S 
0 I 
Total  Journalistic (241 passages in 66 articles) Academic (89 passages in 10 articles) 
87 A 
51 S 
58 I 
37 L 
(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony, L: Laws and Regulations) 
No Gun Ri researchers at this time were exposed to prolific archival evidence. Many new 
archival documents emerged and they influenced the discussion of No Gun Ri. One piece of 
obvious evidence for the role of archival documents on No Gun Ri discussions was the 
controversy concerning the veracity of some of the veterans’ accounts. Discovery of some 
documents led to No Gun Ri discussions, and the discussions disputing some source materials led 
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to the discovery of even more military documents. In many cases, the use of archival documents 
for supporting materials was witnessed more often than other types of sources in this period. The 
discussions that archival materials were used as a major source were for background information 
about U.S. troop position in Yongdong and air bombardment; discussions about orders to fire on 
refugees and refugee policies of the U.S. Army; veracity discussions on some veterans’ accounts; 
and credibility of confiscated North Korean documents. Overall, the use of archival documents 
was superior to the secondary materials or interviews by more than double in number. This 
situation was reversed from the previous timeframe. The fact that the more documents emerged – 
and the less oral testimony was used - was increased in this period. 
A total of 347 passages in 98 journalistic publications and 215 passages in 14 academic 
writings discussed No Gun Ri-related issues in this period.  Archival documents were used 250 
times, secondary materials were used 162 times, and interviews were used 112 times. As seen 
before, the Communication Log from the 8th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division on July 24th 
1950 was used the most (21 times total) times by researchers. The Rogers’ memo was used the 
second most frequently and explained the general situation of air attacks as well as No Gun Ri 
survivors’ allegations of air strafing while on the railroad. The third most used archival 
documents were North Korean newspapers of 1950. Among these three most used documents, 
two of them were from the previous time period, showing their impregnable position in No Gun 
Ri research. The most used secondary material was the AP’s original report by three reporters, 
Sanghun Choe, Charles Hanley, and Martha Mendoza. Even though there are veracity disputes 
for some of their interview sources, the report was the most used in this period, a total of 16 
times. The second most used literature was Clay Blair’s The Forgotten War in 1987. A legal 
research by three Korean researchers tied with Blair’s book for the second in rank. This literature 
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was used only within Korea, but still ranked as second. The following table highlights source 
materials ranked highly in this time period. 
Table 15. Most Used Archival and Secondary Materials in the Third Period 
Rank Archival Materials Secondary Materials 
1 
Communication Log, 8th Regiment of 
the 1st Cavalry Division, July 24 1950. 
In Records of U.S. Army Commands, 
Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, 
RG 338, NARA. (21) 
Choe Sang-Hun Charles J. Hanley and Martha 
Mendoza, “War’s Hidden Chapter: Ex-GIs Tell of 
Killing Korean Refugees,” Associated Press Sep. 29th 
1999. (16) 
2 
Memorandum to General Timberlake, 
“Policy on Strafing Civilian Refugees,” 
Colonel T.C. Rogers, DCS/Operations, HQ 
5AF Advance, 25 Jul 50.  (20) 
Lee, Chae-gon et al, “International Legal Regulation 
for the Protection of Civilians in  
Armed conflict with Special Emphasis on the case of 
No GunRi Bridge in the Korean War” Chungnam 
Law Study 10:1 1999: 111-136. (이재곤, 정구도, 
오윤석, “전시 민간인 보호를 위한 국제법적 규제: 
한국전쟁 시 소위 ‘충북,영동군 황간면 노근리 민간인 
살상사건’과 관련하여” 충남대 법학연구 10:1 1999: 
111-136.) (9) 
Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in Korea 
1950-1953 (NY: Times Books) 1987. (9) 
3 
Chun Uk, an article from Choson 
Inminbo (Korean People’s Daily), Aug. 
19th 1950. (13) 
Donald Knox, The Korean War: Pusan to Chosin: an 
Oral History, (San Diego: Harcourt, Brace, 
Jovanovich) 1985. (8) 
Michael Dobbs, Roberto Suro, “Army Dismissed 
Massacre Allegation; Koreans Sought Redress for 5 
Years; Cohen Orders Probe,” The Washington Post, 
Oct 1st 1999: A01. (8) 
4 
Memorandum, Commander, 25th 
Infantry Division, 27 Jul 50. In AG 
Command Reports (War Diaries) 1949-
1954, 25th Infantry Division History 
Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 407, 
NARA.  (12) 
Korean Military Academy, History of the Korean 
War, 1986. (5) 
5 
Message, EUSAK, CNR: G 20578 
KGP, July 26 1950, sub: Controlled 
Movement of All Refugees. In Records 
of U.S. Army Commands, Korean 
Military Advisory Group, Box 23, RG 
338, NARA. (11) 
 
(The number in parenthesis is the number of those materials used.) 
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5.4 AFTER JANUARY 11, 2001: Governments’ Investigation Reports 
Finally, in January 2001, government investigative reports from the U.S. and Korea were 
published in an atmosphere of great interest generated by the public as well as survivors’ group. 
Both governments established an investigative team and published the results respectively based 
on their positions and viewpoints. At the same time, they arranged mutually agreed-upon 
statements on some major issues of the incident and published the “Statement of Mutual 
Understanding Between the United States and the Republic of Korea on the No Gun Ri 
Investigations.” In the statement, the basic aspect of the incident was understood by both 
governments, but still many controversial issues failed to be agreed upon, especially issues 
directly related to the number of casualties at No Gun Ri and the existence of orders issued from 
the chain of command.  
The investigation reports of the U.S. and Korea reflected various aspects of the incident, 
not only for the results of their fact-finding efforts but also for other potential legal and political 
implications of the incident in their mind. The Report of the No Gun Ri Review of the U.S. team 
employed very passive viewpoints of the incident in which the U.S. government imposed the 
responsibility of the incident on the confusing war situation and the unreadiness of the U.S. 
troops for war, making it an unfortunate but largely unavoidable accident. This report’s narrowest 
interpretation of source materials and the most conservative standpoint were the major targets of 
the critiques later on by journalists and academic researchers as well as the survivors. This report 
was followed by President Clinton’s statement on the No Gun Ri killing using the term of 
“regret” rather than “apology” in a way to avoid a legal burden. He said that “I deeply regret that 
Korean civilians lost their lives at No Gun Ri in late July, 1950.” acknowledging that U.S. troops 
had participated in the No Gun Ri killing, but still did not forget to also mention that “American 
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and Korean veterans fought shoulder to shoulder in the harshest of conditions for the cause of 
freedom, and they prevailed.”223  
The U.S. government refused any compensation to the survivors on an individual level. 
Instead, it would build a memorial and establish a scholarship fund which later caused a strong 
reaction of refusal from the survivors. Survivors insisted that the U.S. government tried to shirk 
its responsibility of the incident by making a memorial and scholarship honoring all war victims 
during the Korean War, not particularly for No Gun Ri victims.  The Korean government’s report, 
Report of the No Gun Ri Investigation (노근리 사건 조사결과 보고서), had much more liberal 
viewpoints on the incident than its counterpart and recognized a large part of what survivors had 
alleged but was not able to clarify all the unclear parts of the incident. Still the survivors were not 
satisfied with their own government’s report and asserted it failed to investigate their allegations, 
had critical limitations about acquiring essential evidence and simply followed the lead of the 
U.S. government in terms of the archival materials and veterans’ interviews. 
Even though the critiques on the governmental reports were harsh, they were evaluated to 
contribute revelations of a great amount of military documents and other source materials that 
could be used for further research. Since the publications of the governments’ investigations, the 
source materials that No Gun Ri researchers used were abundant in quantity and rich in quality. 
During this period of time, publications of journalistic and academic works were copious - 
reaching more than two hundred journal articles and more than forty academic publications 
including many monographs. However, the journalistic interest on No Gun Ri began to diminish 
in the U.S. after the termination of the U.S. government’s investigation while the Korean press 
began another way of reporting it, such as publishing a series of survivors’ stories. Academic 
                                                 
223 President Clinton Statement on No Gun Ri, January 11 2001,  
<http://seoul.usembassy.gov/clinton_statement.html.> (last accessed Feb. 25th 2007). 
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writings about No Gun Ri still continued to be published more than ever in both countries from 
various perspectives including historical, military, legal and political. 
 Following the termination of government research, there was a dispute between two 
researchers on the No Gun Ri incident. Robert Bateman, then a history educator at West Point, 
and Charles Hanley, one of the AP team members, debated No Gun Ri. The argument began from 
the veracity controversy over Edward Daily and later expanded to the general aspects over the 
incident. Robert Bateman was an acquaintance of Daily, and himself a soldier of the 7th 
Regiment. When the AP published the No Gun Ri story, he felt something about Daily did not 
make sense. As a historian, Bateman began his own research using the FOIA (Freedom of 
Information Act) and found that Daily was not at No Gun Ri at the time of the incident, and he 
provided this information to journalists who he knew and who were veterans of the 7th Regiment. 
These journalists reported the questions about Daily in Stripes.com and U.S. News and World 
Report. Bateman and Hanley were at first not disputing the other’s argument, but rather sharing 
each other’s opinions and giving advice on the Daily discussion as researchers on the same topic. 
Later, Bateman himself worked on a book about No Gun Ri and in the process of publishing this 
book, Hanley found that Bateman’s book reflected the most conservative interpretation of No 
Gun Ri and disputed the work of the AP as a gross example of journalistic misconduct.  Hanley 
sent a letter to the future publisher of the book with hopes of revealing his side of the story; it 
then devolved into a battle between the two.  
 In 2004 and 2005, Korean governmental efforts to compensate the survivors and victims’ 
families materialized. Special legislation for the No Gun Ri investigation and compensation was 
enacted and the Korean government finally opened a way to address survivors’ demands. The 
excavations of remains at No Gun Ri and compensation payments are planned for 2007 
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according to this legislation. Other various approaches to No Gun Ri besides research in this 
period were attempted including publications of cartoons and children’s books on this story and 
filmmaking in Korea. 
 In 2006, the AP reported another piece of archival evidence which had been previously 
used in a historical study and ignited yet another round of discussion on No Gun Ri, mainly in 
Korea. The document was written by John J. Muccio, U.S. Ambassador to Korea, saying that 
there was a meeting among the highest officials of the U.S. Army in Korea to discuss refugee 
problems in the Korean War and during those talks the use of lethal forces to control refugees in 
order to end the threat of North Korean infiltration was discussed. According to the No Gun Ri 
Review, the meeting, however, was held to find a way to protect refugees as well as U.S. troops. 
This letter at least implied that the top officials of the U.S troops had an understanding of using 
fire force for refugee control. The survivors petitioned a further investigation, but the U.S. 
government refused.  
 A total of 212 journalistic reports and 42 academic works were published in this period, 
which is more than double the amount compared to other periods of time. Among them were 29 
news articles published in the U.S. and 183 in Korea; 11 academic works produced in the U.S. 
and 31 in Korea. Many previous researchers published more lengthy works during this time such 
as books or as a chapter in an edited collection.  
Table 16. The Number of Publications after January 2001 
 Journalistic products Academic products 
Published in the U.S. 29 11 
Published in Korea 183 31 
Total 212 42 
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To Whom (or what) Does the Responsibility of No Gun Ri Go? 
In this period, the discussion on the background of the incident was to primarily see what 
potentially or directly caused the incident as a whole, not simply for shooting at the tunnels. Both 
governments’ reports, the No Gun Ri Review and the Report of the No Gun Ri Investigation, 
assigned an especially significant amount of their pages to understanding all the surroundings of 
No Gun Ri: the confusing war situation, U.S. troops readiness, 1st Cavalry Divisions and other 
close units’ positions, North Korean troops’ positions and their strength, and details of the 
specific activities of smaller units in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The U.S. report especially 
emphasized the confusing situation related to refugee problems, North Korean infiltration tactics, 
the condition of the U.S. troops as not fully ready and effective for the war, and green recruits 
among the soldiers untested in battle as major factors of the No Gun Ri massacre. A journalist 
stated that the Army report did not seek to assign blame to any officials or soldiers, and instead 
“the 192-page report describes a period of disarray, poor leadership and confused troops in the 
early deployment of U.S. Army divisions in the Korean War, and says the passage of 50 years 
‘greatly reduces the possibility that we will ever know all of the facts’ of No Gun Ri.”224 Ill-
preparedness, lack of proper training and equipment, and little battle experience were identified 
as major characteristics with the support of various archival documents and secondary literature. 
Circulating rumors of North Korean infiltration was easily spread throughout the soldiers and 
instilled fear in them. The North Korean war strength was well above that of U.S. troops and 
initially the U.S. top officials poorly misjudged their strength. War diaries and intelligence 
reports were used significantly for archival evidence, and secondary materials of history books 
and articles were practically the major source for this discussion (used 66 times in 39 
                                                 
224 Charles J. Hanley, “Investigation leaves key question unanswered,” The Associated Press (January 11th 2001). 
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publications).  
 Particular positions of U.S. troops in the vicinity of No Gun Ri were also fruitfully 
discussed along with the battle line situation around the incident. The discussion began from the 
Taejon battle in which U.S. troops received considerable damage to their manpower and 
ammunition. The chaotic withdrawal situation of the 7th Regiment on the night of July 25th again 
was discussed as a way to see the real situation of the unit. The 7th Cavalry Regiment conducted 
a disorganized and undisciplined withdrawal from a position east of Yongdong to No Gun Ri 
without specific orders but believing they were being enveloped. This unit spent the next day, 
which was the first day of shooting the refugees at No Gun Ri, recovering abandoned soldiers 
and equipment. These facts were again well discussed in detail due to the comprehensive 
investigation of both governments.  
Both government reports maintained that the 1st Cavalry Division constantly had contact 
with the enemy during No Gun Ri and described that the situation at No Gun Ri was intense 
between the enemy and U.S. troops. The No Gun Ri Review used military records, particularly 
war diaries, stating “The records indicate by this time that the 7th Cavalry had been told that 
there were no friendly forces to the west and south of No Gun Ri (i.e. back toward 
Yongdong).”225 However, it was also noted by many other researchers as well as the Review 
team that the 7th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division was not in immediate contact with the 
enemy and the battle lines were formed several miles from No Gun Ri in the direction to North 
and West toward Yongdong until July 29th, when the 1st Cavalry Division retreated and the North 
Korean troops advanced. The No Gun Ri Review asserted that “To eliminate the growing threat 
of envelopment, the 7th Cavalry received orders at 8:30 PM on July 28 to withdraw to the 
                                                 
225 Department of the Army Inspector General, Report of the No Gun Ri Review, January 2001. Also available at 
<http://www.army.mil/nogunri>  (last accessed on Feb. 21st 2007). 
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southeast at first light on July 29.” Some researchers also noted a relatively quiet battle situation 
of the 7th Regiment during this time, using a war diary of the July 27th, as follows: “Now, on July 
27, the two battalions were receiving sporadic long-distance artillery and mortar fire from the 
North Koreans, but the regiment generally reported ‘all quiet on both battalion fronts.’ ”226 
Another researcher viewed that the enemy contact and probes in the neighboring area of No Gun 
Ri kept the civilians trapped inside the tunnels over the four day period.227 Researchers cited 
Army intelligence reports to determine the North Korean front line. The intelligence reports 
placed North Korean troops four miles up the road from No Gun Ri at midnight on July 26th and 
showed that the North Korean troops moved forward only less than two miles toward No Gun Ri 
on July 28.228  The general consensus of Korean researchers was that there was pressure from 
NKPA and possible danger from indigenous guerillas but there was no engagement with enemy 
directly in No Gun Ri during the four day period of the killing. Therefore, they discussed that the 
No Gun Ri killing was not an unavoidable accident which happened as collateral damage in the 
middle of battle taking place, but rather No Gun Ri occurred as a result of rigid refugee policies 
that were issued just before the incident from various levels of army command.  
In seeking the cause of the killing, No Gun Ri researchers also addressed the potential 
reason and factors that would have affected or resulted in the killing in the same vein as 
addressing the war situation and American positions around No Gun Ri. Major factors identified 
in previous periods were again discussed by researchers in this period in a similar manner: fear 
of North Korean infiltration, refugee policies, revengeful feelings toward all Korean people after 
the Taejon defeat and racial attitudes to Asians.  
                                                 
226 Charles J. Hanley, Sang-hun Choe, and Martha Mendoza, The Bridge at No Gun Ri (NY: Henry Holt, 2001), 141. 
227 Dale C. Kuehl, What happened at No Gun Ri? The Challenge of Civilians on the Battlefield (The U.S. Army 
Command and General Staff College, Master of Military Art and Science, Military History, 2003), 85-6. 
228 Hanley, Choe, and Mendoza, The Bridge at No Gun Ri, 43. 
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In this period, the discussion about the background of No Gun Ri was based on a variety 
of source materials including various archival materials as well as secondary historical works. 
Due to governmental investigation, especially that of the U.S., a great amount of military 
documents and archival evidence was identified and released, and later used by other researchers. 
The number of archival materials used for the discussions of the background of No Gun Ri in this 
period was 226 times with secondary materials used 197 times. In relation to other periods of 
time, interview testimony of survivors and veterans was not used as much as other source 
materials. The elevated frequency of citing source materials is partly due to the significant 
increase of publications in this period - significantly more than those in other times. Another 
interesting aspect is that the number of passages for the background discussions in journalistic 
publications is a lot less than academic publications, indicating that academic works were the 
major players in No Gun Ri research this time. The following table shows the specific numbers 
of passages which discussed particular issues in the background of the incident and the numbers 
of source materials used in those discussions. 
Table 17. Discussions on the Background of No Gun Ri in the Fourth Period 
 Discussions Numbers of passages and publications Source materials
Status of U.S. Soldiers: ill-
prepared and panicked / 
blindness about war reality and 
North Korean forces 
Journalistic (12 passages in 12 articles) 
Academic (95 passages in 27 articles) 
49 A 
66 S 
19 I 
Disastrous Taejon Defeat Journalistic (0 passage in 0 article) Academic (12 passages in 12 articles) 
2 A 
9 S 
0 I 
War situation in Yongdong 
area around No Gun Ri/ U.S. 
positions and enemy contacts 
Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) 
Academic (83 passages in 24 articles) 
133 A 
87 S 
30 I 
Withdrawal of 7th Regiment on 
the night before the incident 
Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) 
Academic (19 passages in 9 articles) 
31 A 
18 S 
25 I 
Background 
Local history of communism Journalistic (0 passages in 0 articles) Academic (5 passages in 2 articles) 
2 A 
5 S 
0 I 
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Racial Attitudes Journalistic (3 passages in 3 articles) Academic (12 passages in 9 articles) 
9 A 
11 S 
2 I 
Factors/ 
Reasons for 
No Gun Ri 
killing North Korean infiltration/  
Revengeful feelings 
Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) 
Academic (10 passages in 5 articles) 
0 A 
1 S 
0 I 
 
Total Journalistic (18 passages in 16 articles) Academic (236 passages in 32 articles) 
226 A 
197 S 
76 I 
(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony) 
 
Muccio Letter 
Discussions on the general refugee policies over the whole war period were more vigorous than 
ever in this period of time. This is due to more discoveries of archival documents that contained 
the rigid refugee control policies during the whole war period.  The AP research team later 
published a book, The Bridge at No Gun Ri, based on the expansion of their original research. In 
this book, they introduced numerous documents of rigid refugee policies and standing orders to 
fire, issued generally over the whole war period. Some of those documents described outright 
expressions such as “refugees on this side of the north firing line are fair game,”229 “orders all 
the refugees to be fired on,”230 or “any refugees approaching our defense position will be 
considered to be En[emy] and will be disper[sed] by all available fires including art[illery].”231 
The rigid and harsh refugee control policy was found not only in the documents of the Army. 
Some documents mentioned that the Navy received information that refugees in a group of more 
than eight to ten were to be considered troops and to be attacked232 or giving complete authority 
“to stop all civilian traffic” which indicated the responsibility of firing or bombing refugees 
                                                 
229 The 61 Field Artillery Battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division, Journal,  Aug 29th, 1950. 
230 The Field Artillery Command of the 1st Cavalry Division, Journal, Aug 29th 1950. 
231 The 35th Regiment of the 25th Infantry Division, War Diary, Aug 17th 1950. 
232 U.S.S. Valley Forge (CV-45), The Report of Operation for the U.S. Navy Carrier Valley Forge for 16 July to 31 
July 1950, Aug. 9th 1950.  
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rested with all corps of units of the Eighth Army in Korea.233  In one document, some writers of 
declarations in Army records for destroying villages were even asked to use qualifying adjectives 
to avoid embarrassment of the Air Force and Navy. Researchers pointed out that “The 
devastation prompted the Army’s public relations office in Washington to contact Tokyo about 
‘rumors that there is promiscuous bombing in Korea.’ The declassified record shows the 
Pentagon strongly recommended that the command stop the reporting of villages bombed in its 
communiqués, and instead called them ‘military targets.’ ”234 These archival documents of rigid 
policies of refugee controls and air attacks on refugees in large scale and sometimes of 
indiscriminate bombardment became major sources for this discussion, in addition to Roger’s 
memo and other previously discovered materials.  
Also, there was a letter introduced in this time which was written by John J. Muccio, then 
U.S. Ambassador of Korea, to Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State, indicating that a meeting 
of top officials of the U.S. in Korea agreed on a rigid refugee policy which implied using lethal 
forces on refugees if they approached U.S. lines.235 This document became crucial evidence for 
the general refugee discussions, especially because the No Gun Ri Review described how refugee 
control had been established as forbidding them to cross battle lines and paradoxically noting 
that such a rule was for the protection of refugees as well as the U.S troops. Also, the No Gun Ri 
review constantly insisted that the Army records of refugee policies did not mean to authorize the 
use of deadly forces against refugees crossing the lines, but rather it was the misinterpretation of 
battlefront soldiers to use their weapons for refugee control. However, from this document, No 
                                                 
233 Message, from Headquarters of the Eighth United States Army Korea, Office of the Adjutant General to X Corps, 
C/S ROKA, IX Corps, I Corps, Jan. 3rd, 1951 
234 Hanley, Choe, and Mendoza, The Bridge at No Gun Ri, 164. 
235 American Embassador John Muccio’s Letter to Assistant Secretary of States Dean Rusk, 26 July 1950, Box 4266, 
Central Decimal Files 1950–54, Record Group 59, National Archives, College Park, MD.
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Gun Ri researchers then learned that top officials of the U.S. Army already had a general 
understanding of using lethal forces to control refugees. The No Gun Ri Review team maintained 
no documents on refugee control policies remained in the 2nd Battalion of the 7th Regiment, and 
therefore that no evidence existed that soldiers in that unit received such an order; instead, it 
assumed the incident happened due to North Korean infiltration and South Korean refugee 
problems in addition to the ill-preparedness of the U.S. troops. The Muccio letter was first 
introduced to No Gun Ri researchers in 2005 by a historian in a diplomatic history journal. Only 
after the AP reported this discovery of the document in 2006, however, did many other 
journalists and researchers begin to have interest and further report it.  
 As exemplified here, the new emergence of archival documents undeniably led to 
vigorous discussions in research. New documents resulted in even more usage of previously used 
military records such as the refugee policy issued by the Eighth Army of Korea born of the 
meeting at Taegu on July 25th 1950.236  Archival materials were used 377 times in a total of 206 
passages in 61 publications. Secondary materials were used a relatively small amount for the 
refugee policy-related discussions.  
 
Table 18. . Discussions of Refugee Problems and Policies in the Fourth Period 
Discussion Numbers of passages and publications Source materials
Rigid Refugee Policies Journalistic (36 passages in 31 articles) Academic (73 passages in 20 articles) 
206 A 
24 S 
1 I 
North Korean Troops’ 
Infiltration and U.S. 
suspicions about refugees 
Journalistic (3 passages in 3 articles) 
Academic (55 passages in 21 articles) 
86 A 
2 S 
41 I 
Large Scale Air 
Bombardment 
Journalistic (0 passages in 0 articles) 
Academic (39 passages in 17 articles) 
85 A 
25 S 
3 I 
                                                 
236 Message, EUSAK, CNR: G 20578 KGP, 26 Jul 50, sub: Controlled Movement of All Refugees. In Records of 
U.S. Army Commands, Korean Military Advisory Group, Box 23, RG 338, NARA. 
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Total Journalistic (39 passages in 31 articles) Academic (167 passages in 30 articles) 
377 A 
51 S 
45 I 
(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony) 
 
U.S. Soldiers Killed or Injured an Unconfirmed Number of Korean Refugees 
No Gun Ri discussions on the evolution of the incidents were very prolific due to both 
governments’ investigation reports. Both governments announced that they had conducted 
extensive research on the incident reviewing more than a million pages of archival documents, 
conducting interviews with almost 200 veterans and 75 survivors, and examining all possible 
forensic evidence. These two governments conducted No Gun Ri investigations and published 
their reports respectively. However, they published cooperatively the “Statement of Mutual 
Understanding Between the United States and the Republic of Korea on the No Gun Ri 
Investigations” based on the facts that they both agreed on. In the statement, they concluded, 
In the desperate opening weeks of defensive combat in the 
Korean War, U.S. soldiers killed or injured an unconfirmed 
number of Korean refugees in the last week of July 1950 during a 
withdrawal under pressure in the vicinity of No Gun Ri. The 
diligent and conscientious bilateral efforts of both countries in this 
review represent a significant contribution to the maintenance of 
the vital and long-standing ROK-U.S. alliance. Bearing in mind the 
long-lasting sorrow of victims as well as the sacrifice of U.S. 
soldiers during the Korean War, the ROK and U.S. teams firmly 
believe that this investigation on an incident that occurred during 
the Korean War will not only help maintain a more stable ROK-
U.S. alliance but also is an example of two nations working 
together to realize the value of democracy and recognize the 
importance of human rights.  
Even with abundant information and source materials discovered and examined by both 
 150 
countries’ investigation teams, they were only able to draw an unclear conclusion that 
“unconfirmed number of Korean refugees” were killed or injured by U.S. soldiers in the last 
week of July 1950 in No Gun Ri. However, their extensive research certainly contributed to No 
Gun Ri history in terms of discovering the tremendous number of archival documents and other 
evidence. The amount and frequency of source materials used in this period of time for the 
details of the killing are large in extent compared to the previous periods. Therefore, the 
discussions in this period were supported by a variety of evidence and deepened the 
understanding of the knowledge of No Gun Ri.  
 The evacuation and screening of the refugees at No Gun Ri were discussed by No Gun Ri 
researchers, and the major sources for their arguments were interview testimony with survivors 
and veterans. The fact that U.S. soldiers evacuated and escorted refugees from nearby villages 
(Im Gye Ri and Chu Gok Ri) and whether these solders forcefully moved the refugees with their 
weapons were carefully addressed by government investigators. The Korean team stated that U.S. 
soldiers might have coerced refugees when they refused to evacuate. The Korean team gave the 
most credit to survivors’ oral testimony for supporting this conclusion based on the fact that 
some of veterans’ interviews were coincident with that of survivors on this issue.237 The U.S. 
team concluded in a different way that they “cannot rule out the possibility that U.S. soldiers told 
the villagers at Im Gae Ri to evacuate the village” even though there was no reason for soldiers 
to travel a few miles off their pathway to evacuate civilians in a quick withdrawal. Also, it stated 
that soldiers based on the interviews of veterans never used deadly force while evacuating 
civilians.238 But other researchers asserted the 5th Cavalry Regiment was not in a fast-paced 
retreat on July 25 but instead that they established defensive positions in the vicinity of Im Gae 
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Ri. There were no specific documents discovered with information about this evacuation 
operation, and consequently researchers relied more on oral history regarding this issue. Some 
remaining documents only stated that a large group of refugees was found east, north, and south 
of Yongdong.239 From these documents, researchers assumed that they might have evacuated and 
attempted to control refugees’ movement due to the possibility of being used as enemy 
infiltration.  
 The discussions about air attacks on July 26th before the killing were supported by newly 
available archival documents. No Gun Ri researchers used After Mission Reports of the 5th Air 
Force on July 26th and 27th.240 These documents did not mention anything about strafing refugees 
on railroad tracks, but the locations that they indicated were strafed were very close to No Gun Ri 
- including an unidentified target - and the result was “good.” The time indicated in the 
remaining documents did not exactly accord with the description of the survivors. However, 
aircraft conducted their missions many times a day in this period of time and researchers 
expanded their reasoning about the air strafing at No Gun Ri from these documents.  
 When the refugees arrived near No Gun Ri, soldiers approached them and forced them to 
relocate to the railroad to secure the road for U.S. supply transits. Soldiers screened the 
belongings of the refugees. The testimony of survivors that they saw some soldiers talking on a 
radio and leaving before strafing from aircraft was another major discussion. The survivors 
assumed that American soldiers called on an attack to the refugees by radio. The U.S. and 
Korean investigation teams found it very difficult to request an air attack from the ground 
directly to the pilots of aircraft due to the technology and equipment available during wartime. It 
was said that it is not impossible to do so, but it took too much time to be done as survivors 
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described. The U.S. team also supposed that if there were an air attack, it would have been an 
accidental air strike caused by the misidentification of targets and not a pre-planned strike. 
However, it was revealed by the Roger’s memo that ground forces often requested air strikes by 
the Air Force to fire on civilians and the Air Force complied. There was no evidence whether Air 
Force pilots strafed civilians at No Gun Ri following the Roger’s memo, but many survivors’ 
testimonies were consistent on this issue. In this sense, a military historian proposed a scenario to 
explain the relationship with radio communication and air attacks that survivors witnessed. 
Koreans rest on the railroad embankment while the soldiers 
check their belongings and an officer or NCO, using an SC-300 
radio, requests instructions on what to do with the refugees. 
The officer received orders to keep the civilians there; they 
were not to pass through friendly lines. These instructions are 
consistent with the new refugee policy just then promulgated. After 
all of the withdrawing vehicles pass through the roadblock, these 
soldiers return to their units. 
About this time, the 8th CAV calls in an air strike 
previously planned to support the withdrawal from the forward 
positions. Before the air attack, the regiment calls for white 
phosphorous rounds from the division artillery to mark the target 
for the aircraft. Tragically, the artillery lands short among the 
refugees on the railroad embankment. The F-80s, flying too fast to 
accurately determine the target, identifies the smoke and engage 
the civilians.241
 Many No Gun Ri researchers tried to address what caused the shooting by the U.S. 
soldiers. Both government investigation reports blamed the confusing war situation and the lack 
of leadership and proper training of the soldiers for this matter. Whether there was any hostile 
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fire from the refugees was clearly conflicted between survivors and veterans’ testimony. Vague 
evidence included the 2nd Battalion’s war diary, stating that “Mortar fire and patrols eliminated 
the threat of guerrilla activities from nearby villages.” One explanation identified by a military 
historian was that there were guerillas among the refugees at No Gun Ri. He used a captured 
North Korean document which described that Yongdong area was “liberated” during the time of 
No Gun Ri. From this source, he assumed that there would have been many North Korean 
soldiers around in this area. He also used a piece of evidence from the Korean War history book 
by Bruce Cumings on the local history of communism. Therefore, he guessed that among 
refugees there must have been some communist sympathizers. He took as evidence the fact that 
there were Russian-made bullets discovered at the scene and army documents reported that a 
Japanese rifle and a Russian submachine gun were submitted to the higher commander.242 
However, this was disputed by a later researcher who claimed that indigenous guerillas played no 
major role at No Gun Ri and that it was not a hotbed for communists before the war or a 
stronghold of guerilla bands. He argued that the substance of guerilla activities was not to fire on 
the main defensive positions, and the entry on the Regimental S 4 log for July 27th that was used 
for proof about the submission of the enemy weapons merely stated that soldiers turned in two 
enemy weapons and did not state where they captured them.243  
 The description of the details about the shooting under the tunnels was primarily on the 
basis of survivors’ testimony in this time period, too. Both governments’ investigation reports 
cited a great deal of oral history of survivors and veterans, and they provided abundant sources 
for descriptions of the shooting. The interviews of survivors and veterans for the discussions 
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about the shooting were cited more than 400 times by No Gun Ri researchers.  This discussion 
was also supported by forensic analysis of bullet marks and shells that were embedded in the 
tunnels. The Korean investigation team provided information about this forensic data analysis 
which showed that the majority of bullet shells were U.S.-made but several Russian-made bullets 
were also discovered. Some researchers explained that these Russian bullets could have come 
from other battles during the later period of the Korean War. 
 Whether the firing on refugees was conducted following an order from higher officers 
was another contentious discussion in this period because it determines the legal responsibility 
and grounds for compensation. The U.S. and Korean investigation reports said the investigators 
found no evidence of direct ‘kill’ orders issued at No Gun Ri. The U.S. report said the previously 
discovered documents of a “fire everyone” order in neighboring units were only a “guideline” to 
keep refugees from the U.S. lines. They mentioned that they did not find any similar entries in 
the 7th Regiment records so they could not be sure if the regiment had received the same message, 
while Korean investigators did not rule out the possibility of the order issuance. A U.S. report 
said the soldiers might have interpreted such an order on their own regarding these guidelines of 
not allowing refugees to cross lines and to fire on them if they do, or it might have been initially 
misinterpreted by a liaison officer who delivered the message.244
 Additional archival documents were used by No Gun Ri researchers other than previously 
discovered materials about the issuance of orders. One is a letter by a veteran who helped a 
seriously injured Korean boy at No Gun Ri during the killing. George Early, a veteran of the 7th 
Regiment, found that a survivor’s description about how he was injured and helped by a U.S. 
soldier exactly matched what he experienced himself at No Gun Ri. While he was responding to 
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an interview with the British Broadcasting Company for a special documentary program on No 
Gun Ri, he had a chance to look at the survivor’s interview and convinced himself that the 
survivor might have been the boy he helped.  He sent a letter to this survivor with sympathy, and 
this letter contained information about the potential of order issuance. The letter read that “He 
was going to execute me, for refusing to shoot at civilians, with a machine gun, one night.” This 
letter was not used by American researchers at all, but it was cited many times by Korean 
researchers in their works. Muccio’s letter was also used for the argument that the rigid refugee 
policy was discussed among the top officers of the U.S. Army. It is notable that the actions of the 
7th Cavalry were consistent with the policy. Interviews were still used with a significant weight 
for this discussion, especially interview testimony by veterans.  
 The No Gun Ri investigation team of the U.S. did not determine how many refugees were 
killed and only stated that an “unknown number” of Koreans were killed and injured. However, 
it did mention that it was far less likely than survivors alleged. The Korean team tried several 
methods to extrapolate the number of casualties using all archival and secondary source 
materials based on the genealogical information prepared by the local government and the list of 
graves for those killed and buried, and concluded that 248 people died or were injured or ended 
missing at No Gun Ri. Major archival evidence used for this discussion was captured North 
Korean newspapers and military documents which were created in early August 1950, right after 
the incident. These captured North Korean documents, part of which was already discovered 
earlier, had the after-scene description including how many bodies were there. Researchers also 
pointed out once again that the U.S. military knew of the No Gun Ri incident because in these 
documents there was a notice to be circulated to 40 army units. A team of researchers stated that 
“In an internal communication dated August 2, North Korean officers reported the discovery of 
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‘barbaric’ killings of civilians by American troops around Yongdong, including many found dead 
in a nearby tunnel. That document was seized by U.S. troops, translated by Army intelligence 
and distributed within the 1st Cavalry Division command on August 17 and at Eighth Army 
headquarters and Tokyo’s Far East Command by August 22. The declassified record gives no 
indication of any follow-up investigation.”245
 Copious source materials that were discovered and assembled by government researchers 
permitted No Gun Ri researchers to address more substantial discussions on the details of the 
incident. Still there are many unanswered aspects of the incident, but those source materials 
definitely contributed to building the knowledge of No Gun Ri history. Archival documents were 
cited a total of 409 times, secondary materials were cited 244 times, and the interviews were the 
most highly-used at 1,224 times, for the discussion of the evolution of the No Gun Ri killing 
during this time.  
Table 19. Discussions on the Evolution of the No Gun Ri in the Fourth Period 
Discussion Numbers of passages and publications Source materials
Evacuation Journalistic (2 passages in 2 articles) Academic (62 passages in 23 articles) 
20 A 
39 S 
175 I 
Screening Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (30 passages in 16 articles) 
3 A 
11 S 
107 I 
Air attacks on the railroad near 
No Gun Ri 
Journalistic (15 passages in 13 articles) 
Academic (87 passages in 27 articles) 
126 A 
99 S 
288 I 
Suspecting refugees as enemy Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (35 passages in 17 articles) 
6 A 
10 S 
45 I 
Shooting at the No Gun Ri 
Bridge tunnels 
Journalistic (13 passages in 11articles) 
Academic (113 passages in 27 articles) 
31 A 
32 S 
410 I 
Orders to shoot refugees at 
tunnels 
Journalistic (44 passages in 36articles) 
Academic (94 passages in 28 articles) 
157 A 
36 S 
118 I 
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Assuming the number of 
casualties 
Journalistic (9 passages in 9 articles) 
Academic (45 passages in 24 articles) 
49 A 
17 S 
30 I 
Other accounts Journalistic (2 passages in 2 articles) Academic (18 passages in 9 articles) 
17 A 
0 S 
51 I 
Total Journalistic (87 passages in 51articles) Academic (484 passages in 33 articles) 
409 A 
244 P 
1224 I 
(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony) 
 
Judicial Prosecution of the U.S. Veterans Cannot Be Excluded 
In this period, many No Gun Ri researchers stated that their motivation of No Gun Ri research is 
from their previous interest in a similar topic. Some researchers conducted their research based 
on their earlier projects, and a historian wrote an article as an extension of his dissertation 
research. Still, many noted that they were motivated by survivors and their families to conduct 
research. The methods of how No Gun Ri researchers gained information for their research were 
identified as: searching archives, filing Freedom of Information Act requests, interviews with 
survivors and veterans, checking news reports at the time of war, being exposed to information 
by other researchers (especially survivors and their families), and reading secondary literature. 
Survivors’ efforts to publicize their stories were also mentioned by researchers during this period 
of time.  
Research barriers detected in the No Gun Ri publications included financial problems, the 
paucity of hard evidence, a suppressive climate of Korean politics, and culture and language 
differences as well as political and legal difference in these two countries. As an example of not 
recognizing a cultural difference, one researcher was not aware that the way to write a person’s 
name in Korea (placing a given name after a family name) is different from that of the western 
style and continued to use the last syllable of the given name of a survivor as the family name 
throughout his book. Another interesting aspect in research barriers was the sensitivity of the 
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incident. This was a politically and diplomatically sensitive topic for news agencies; so when 
some journalists tried to publish their research, their supervisors would not accept them. Another 
barrier identified during this time was the different processes of the government investigation in 
the two countries. The U.S. and Korea teams could not reach an agreement to form a joint 
investigation team which the Korean government initially requested and decided to run two 
investigation teams as a bilateral coordinating group. Many No Gun Ri researchers saw that this 
way of investigation had many limitations in efficiency, in fully sharing evidence and 
information from each side. This way of investigation prevented one party from conducting their 
own interviews and reviewing the documents of its counterpart. Also, these investigation teams 
did not have any judiciary authority to solve the problems with compensation, to make the 
process of fact-finding more responsible, and to consider the blanket immunity of veterans who 
testified as No Gun Ri researchers pointed out.  
 The research process that government investigation teams took was announced to be very 
extensive with the review of more than a million pages of military documents and interviews 
with a number of veterans and survivors. There were some critiques on the acquisition of 
evidence in the investigation process: that each team only depended on the materials and 
transcripts the other party provided, and some suspicion that document sharing was not fully 
performed was recognized. The Korea investigative team was particularly criticized for relying 
solely on the documents that the U.S. government provided, without question. A team of 
researchers wrote that “Despite the Korean investigator’s request, the American investigators did 
not share with their Korean counterparts the mission reports of the U.S. Air Force’s 35th Fighter-
Bomber Squadron; nor did they discuss the documents’ contents in the U.S. report. The 35th 
Squadron documents showed that apparent civilian groups were targeted during this period; 
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noted pilots’ concerns that they were killing refugees; and reported three air attacks in the No 
Gun Ri area on July 26-27, 1950.”246
 Government investigation reports received critiques not only on their research process 
but also on their interpretation and presentation of evidence. Many researchers supposed the U.S. 
investigation team was very cautious about taking legal responsibility and too passive about 
making a precedent for other similar incidents. Therefore, their interpretation of evidence was 
very strict: if a document did not specifically contain the terms “No Gun Ri” or “fire on 
refugees,” they did not take it into consideration as evidence of this incident.  A historian 
criticized that “The Pentagon inquiry had not been able to find any direct evidence of orders to 
fire on civilians. The AP team had found several such orders in their archival searches, but the 
Pentagon used a narrow definition that would have required such an order to say, in effect, ‘See 
those innocent civilians over there? Shoot them.’ ”247 Some Korean researchers criticized that the 
U.S. investigators were using two different criteria of weighing evidence and that they did not 
take the narrowest interpretation in, for example, blaming the North Korean infiltration. They 
said government investigators discussed the threat of North Korean infiltration among refugees 
but failed to link it to No Gun Ri by not providing any hard evidence of finding infiltrators 
among the No Gun Ri refugees. It was also indicated that the U.S. team depended heavily on 
military documents for their arguments and interpreted that if they did not find any related 
documents on a certain fact, they regarded it as not having happened. The team did not place 
much weight on oral history even though it conducted interviews with almost two hundred 
veterans and reviewed transcripts of all interviews with survivors. In fact, it did not use 
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survivors’ interview transcripts as a whole due to the ambiguity, they said, of the criteria of 
conducting the interviews.  
 Many Korean researchers, however, called attention to the fact that veterans’ interviews 
might have been affected by Army Secretary Louis Calder’s advice on their legal rights. In early 
2000, he advised veterans of “their rights if they make testimony that could put them in criminal 
jeopardy,”248 and he announced that he did not want to use different criteria for this case as with 
other war-related incidents. Obviously, this advice seemed to influence veterans’ interviews and 
those who had actively testified to the AP reporters either did not respond to the team’s phone 
calls, or vaguely described passive versions of the story. In fact, the Korean report mentioned 
that one of the veterans actually stated that “nobody will give clear testimony about it because of 
the statement of Louis Caldera, the U.S. Secretary of the Army.”249
 Other legal issues related to the incident were discussed in a similar manner in previous 
research. The Geneva Convention and the Hague Convention were still the most frequently 
mentioned to explain the legal process of the incident. This time around legal remedy for the 
survivors and victims’ families was discussed more often. After special legislation for the No 
Gun Ri investigation and compensation were enacted in Korea in 2004, the Korean press 
reported these law-related issues and the further implications. According to this legislation, 
another extensive investigation of No Gun Ri, including the excavation of remains and 
compensation from the Korean government, would be possible to implement. In 2007, the 
Korean government plans to launch a further investigation of No Gun Ri and will begin to pay 
the survivors and victims’ family compensation. 
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 The veracity discussions of interview sources were still mentioned by researchers in this 
period of time.  The U.S. team expressed concern that Edward Daily, who made a falsified 
statement about No Gun Ri, might have influenced other veterans’ recollection of the event after 
speaking with them. The veracity of other interviewees, Eugene Hesselman and Delos Flint, who 
may not have been at No Gun Ri since military records showed they were injured on the previous 
day or the first day of the incident and sent to the rear, were also discussed at this time. It was 
still not proven with certainty whether they were present at No Gun Ri. But many researchers 
used their testimony about the killing for their research, indicating the researchers seemed to 
grant the content of their testimony to be reliable as a source.  
In this sense, the credibility of the military records was argued in conjunction with the 
controversy over the veracity of sources that had been raised in previous research. Some No Gun 
Ri researchers argued that a certain type of military documents could be more reliable than other 
types of documents. Once the veracity discussion began (based on a war diary of July 26th stating 
that Flint was injured and sent to the rear on July 25), the AP reporters cited a morning report of 
July 27th that said he was sent off July 26th, the first day of the killing. The AP team therefore 
asserted that he was at No Gun Ri based on this morning report because morning reports are 
created on a daily basis and a regimental diary is created after the fact (a day, a week, or 
sometimes weeks after the fact). A military historian pointed out that the situation of the 2nd 
Battalion of the 7th Regiment was confusing from the previous night of unorganized retreat and 
“only limited and incomplete reports were ever sent in that day.”250 He continued to mention that 
Flint was off the roster for this company as of the morning report of the 26th, interpreted from the 
military terminology of “RA[regular army] 6250045 [identification number] Pvt [private in rank], 
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Dy [duty] to 15th Med Clr Bn [15th Medical Clearing Battalion] WIA [Wound in Action] Rockin-
Ri [No Gun Ri] off 26 Jul 50.”251 Another military historian, however, maintains that morning 
reports created in a confusing situation also could not be relied upon as fact. He mentioned that 
“An Eighth Army after action report on administrative matters revealed that units often made up 
these reports weeks, sometimes months later trying to reconstruct events from notebooks and 
memory. Furthermore, an examination of the F Company morning report for 27 July gives 
further indications that the battalion may have reconstructed these reports at a later date. One 
report stated that on 26 July the company ‘moved fr[om] Rokin-Ri assembled near Yongdong 
encountered enemy 1 EM MIA.’ The same report said the company returned to No Gun Ri on the 
27th. These entries were clearly one day off. Therefore, although records indicate Hesselman and 
Flint were not at No Gun Ri, the possibility exists that they were there, and one should weigh 
their testimony with the appropriate grain of salt.”252
 Another discussion notable to archival researchers was the fact that critical documents 
from the 7th Regiment were not found at their assigned place at the National Archives. The 7th 
Cavalry Regiment communication logs and other documents were missing from the record boxes, 
including the log that might have contained evidence of any orders or standing instructions from 
above and on the spot communications within the chain of command. This was discussed more 
vigorously when the Korean investigation team cited an interview transcript that a veteran 
remembered he saw a report that said they fired on three hundred refugees who came along the 
road.  He also stated that he remembered this because he typed it in a document a day later. 
Based on this information, some researchers showed suspicion that those documents could have 
been intentionally hidden. However, the U.S. investigative team did not mention anything related 
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with this matter in their report nor in any later statements. 
 Some researchers, including the U.S. investigation team, did not place much weight on 
oral history due to the possible fallibility of human memory, while others, including the Korean 
team, considered the collective memory of survivors more credible than recollections of 
individual veterans. A researcher gave no credibility to Korean accounts because a multi-million 
dollar compensation would be a significant incentive to modify and exaggerate testimony and 
saw collective memory as a way of forming folklore which was not trustworthy as evidence.253 
On the contrary, other researchers regarded Koreans’ accounts as very accurate because their 
collective and repetitive recollection of the event gave them more chances to think about and 
remember. In fact, the Korean team noted that the contents of their accounts are consistent for the 
whole time from the earliest petition some of the survivors filed in 1960s. The following table 
shows how many No Gun Ri researchers talked about their research and source materials in 
detail.  
 
Table 20. Discussions on the No Gun Ri Research in the Fourth Period 
Discussion Numbers of passages and publications Source materials
Research Motivation Journalistic (1 passage in 1 article) Academic (4 passages in 3 articles) 
0 A 
0 S 
0 I 
Research Methods Journalistic (14 passages in 12 articles) Academic (40 passages in 8 articles) 
0 A 
6 S 
0 I 
Survivors’ efforts and 
research 
Journalistic (8 passages in 7 articles) 
Academic (22 passages in 13 articles) 
1 A 
3 S 
0 I 
No Gun Ri 
Research 
Research Barriers Journalistic (3 passages in 2 articles) Academic (38 passages in 16 articles) 
0 A 
8 S 
1 I 
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Veracity of Sources Journalistic (11 passages in 9 articles) Academic (43 passages in 15 articles) 
12 A 
46 S 
17 I 
Previous Attitude and 
Research  
Journalistic (6 passages in 4 articles) 
Academic (9 passages in 7 articles) 
0 A 
2 S 
0 I Government 
Research Research Process of Government 
Investigation of the U.S. 
and Korea 
Journalistic (92 passages in 66 articles) 
Academic (77 passages in 21 articles) 
4 A 
14 S 
12 I 
Legal 
Research Legal Research 
Journalistic (21 passages in 16 articles) 
Academic (124 passages in 18 articles) 
14 A 
76 S 
1 I 
50 L 
Credibility of Materials 
in Interpreting the 
Incident 
Journalistic (13 passages in 10 articles) 
Academic (87 passages in 22 articles) 
62 A 
26 S 
4 I 
Other issues 
to understand 
No Gun Ri 
Research Other Evidence Journalistic (5 passages in 5 articles) Academic (20 passages in 6 articles) 
9 A 
0 S 
0 I 
Other issues  Journalistic (5 passages in 5 articles) Academic (15 passages in 12 articles) 
13 A 
22 S 
0 I 
Total  Journalistic (179 passages in 102 articles) Academic (479 passages in 37 articles) 
115 A 
203 S 
35 I 
50 L 
(A: Archival materials, S: Secondary Literature, I: Interview Testimony) 
 As addressed, this period of time witnessed tremendous source materials, and No Gun Ri 
researchers were exposed to this source for their own research. The results of the government 
investigation reports of the two countries did not satisfy many researchers, but these reports still 
contributed in a way that could save a great deal of time and effort that researchers would 
otherwise have expended searching for such evidence. The amount of publications on No Gun Ri 
research, especially academic publications, was significantly larger than those in other periods of 
time, and thus the discussions on the specifics of No Gun Ri and its research deepened. The 
number of passages of No Gun Ri discussion in journalistic publications in this period was 323, 
and the number of passages in academic publications was 1,366. Archival materials were used 
1,127 times in those discussions, secondary materials were used 695 times, and interviews were 
utilized 1,380 times. 
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 Since the amount of publications in this period is larger than those in other periods of time, 
the numbers of source materials is consequently higher. Further, the investigation of the U.S. and 
Korean governments contributed to expose more documents that No Gun Ri researchers could 
review for their own work. In this period, it was shown that some newly available archival 
documents played a major role in No Gun Ri discussions, and those new documents brought more 
attention to the previously known materials. Therefore, the most highly cited archival materials 
overlap with those from the previous time frame. In this sense, these highly ranked archival 
documents can be seen as the most critical archival evidence for No Gun Ri’s history. The 
Communication Log from the 8th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division on July 24th 1950254 was 
used the most (69 times total), the Rogers’ memo was ranked second with it being used 67 times. 
The third most used archival document was the message from the Eighth Army on the U.S., sent to 
the front line units and based on the results of the meeting at Taegu with the highest officials of the 
Army, on July 25th 1950. The fifth most used material was the war diary of a neighboring Division, 
which cited that civilians in the war zone should be “considered as unfriendly and shot.” The first 
and second most used secondary materials were, not surprisingly, the investigation reports of both 
governments. The next most used was the U.S. official history of the Korean War, South to 
Naktong, North to Yalu, by Roy E. Appleman. The original AP story of No Gun Ri and early 
survivors’ publications were ranked fourth and fifth in usage respectively. 
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Table 21. Most Used Archival and Secondary Materials in the Fourth Period 
Rank Archival Materials Secondary Materials 
1 
Communication Log, the 8th Regiment of 
the 1st Cavalry Division, July 24 1950. In 
Records of U.S. Army Commands, 
Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, 
RG 338. (69)  
Korean Ministry of National Defense, 
Report of the No Gun Ri investigation, 
January 2001. (110) 
2 
Memorandum to General Timberlake, 
“Policy on Strafing Civilian Refugees,” 
Colonel T.C. Rogers, DCS/Operations, 
HQ 5AF Advance, 25 Jul 50.  (67)  
Department of the Army Inspector General, 
No Gun Ri Review, January 2001. (98) 
3 
Message, EUSAK, July 26th 1950, sub: 
Controlled Movement of All Refugees. 
(56) 
Roy E. Appleman, South to Naktong, North 
to Yalu (27) 
4 
Memorandum, Commander, 25th Infantry 
Division, 27 Jul 50. In AG Command 
Reports (War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th 
Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 
429, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA. (39) 
Choe, Hanley, and Mendoza, “War’s 
Hidden Chapter: Ex-GIs Tell of Killing 
Korean Refugees,” the Associated Press, 
Sep 29th 1999. (23) 
Lee, Chong, and Oh, “International Legal 
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(The number in parenthesis is the number of those materials used.) 
Conclusion 
Over the whole period, there are a total of 432 journalistic articles and 71 academic 
publications on No Gun Ri research analyzed in this study. In those publications, 1096 passages 
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in journalistic publications and 1780 passages in academic works were devoted to specific No 
Gun Ri discussions. For such discussions, archival documents were used 1514 times, secondary 
materials 942 times and interview testimonies of survivors and veterans 1788 times. As seen 
from these numbers, archival documents were used more often than secondary literature for No 
Gun Ri discussions. The number of passages on No Gun Ri discussions in publications and the 
number of source materials used for such discussions is as shown in the following table (Table 
22). In the first period before the AP’s publication of the No Gun Ri story (before September 
1999), there were 60 passages in 9 journalistic articles and 27 passages in 2 academic works. In 
those publications, archival materials were used 9 times, secondary literature 15 times, and 
interview testimonies of survivors 30 times, for specific No Gun Ri discussions. In the second 
period, from the AP’s publication about the No Gun Ri story to the veracity discussions 
concerning some veterans’ testimony (September 1999 to May 2000), 366 passages in 113 
journalistic articles and 172 passages in 13 academic works were discussed, and 128 archival 
documents, 70 secondary materials and 266 interview testimonies from survivors and veterans 
were used. In the third period, after the controversy over some veterans’ testimony to the 
publication of Korean and U.S. governments’ investigation reports (May 2000 to January 2001), 
347 passages in 98 journalistic articles and 215 passages in 14 academic publications were 
devoted to No Gun Ri discssions and these publications utilized archival materials 250 times, 
secondary literature 162 times, and interview testimonies 112 times. In the last period, after the 
governments’ investigation reports (after January 2001 to 2006), there were 323 passages in 212 
journalistic articles and 1366 passages in 42 academic publications on No Gun Ri research 
(including two government reports), archival documents were used 1127 times, secondary 
materials 695 times, and interviews 1380 times.  
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The portion for secondary materials for the whole period is relatively small - equivalent 
to 22.2% - while archival documents and oral testimonies of survivors and veterans reached 
35.67% and 42.13% respectively. The superficial dependency on archival documents in the No 
Gun Ri discussion is seen in the increasing frequency of use, from 16.67% in the first period to 
27.57% in the second period, 47.71% in the third period and 35.2% in the last period. Meanwhile, 
the researchers’ tendency to use the interviews with survivors and veterans decreased over time 
(from 55.56% in the first period to 57.32%  in the second period, 21.37% in the third period, and 
43.1% in the fourth period); however, the usage of such sources still occupied a significant 
portion for a considerable period of time. In the second period, when the controversy over the 
veracity of some veterans’ interview testimonies was raised, the number of archival documents in 
No Gun Ri discussions outpaced interview testimonies by more than double.  
Table 22. Total Number of No Gun Ri publications and Used Source Materials 
 No Gun Ri publication 
Frequency of source materials used 
for No Gun Ri discussions 
 Journalistic Academic Archives
Secondary 
Materials Interview
period 1 
60 passages  
in 9 publications 
27 passages  
in 2 publications 
9 
(16.67%)
15 
(27.78%) 
30 
(55.56%)
period 2 
366 passages  
in 113 publications 
172 passages  
in 13 publications 
128 
(27.59%)
70 
(15.09%) 
266 
(57.33%)
period 3 
347 passages  
in 98 publications 
215 passages  
in 14 publications 
250 
(47.71%)
162 
(30.92%) 
112 
(21.37%)
period 4 
323 passages  
in 212 publications 
1366 passages  
in 42 publications 
1127 
(35.20%)
695  
(21.71 %) 
1380 
(43.10%)
Total 
1096 passages 
 
1780 passages 
 
1514 
(35.67%)
942 
(22.20%) 
1788 
(42.13%) 
  
Overall, archival documents were extremely important to No Gun Ri researchers for 
specific information on locations, time, dates, and names, as these documents were used for 
maximum credibility. Circumstantial information in archival documents was used with different 
weights by different researchers. Especially, refugee policy and air strike policy-related 
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documents were interpreted differently and given different credibility by researchers. Many 
researchers viewed them as the most important background evidence that would have caused the 
atrocity while some conservative researchers, including the U.S. government’s investigation 
team, did not consider them as critical evidence for No Gun Ri. There were some cases where the 
interpretation of certain military documents was the major controversy in No Gun Ri research, 
such as checking the veracity of Edward Daily’s testimony and on the information in Roger’s 
memo about the air strafing at No Gun Ri. The Korean and the U.S. government investigation 
reports contributed to the archival evidence that would benefit future research on No Gun Ri. By 
and large, archival documents were the most fundamental source materials along with survivors’ 
and veterans’ interview, working together as warp and weft in the fabric of No Gun Ri research. 
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6.0  THE NO GUN RI INCIDENT: HISTORICAL PERCEPTION 
The document does not open itself nor speaks for itself, but only by inference from its semantic 
genealogy. It does not speak for itself neither because it merely echoes what the researcher 
whispers, it only tells what the researcher wants the document to tell him or her.255
Official records are indispensable for fixing dates and time of major events and troop movements. 
But anyone familiar with the way the records of combat units during battle are made up will 
know that they seldom tell the essential facts of what happened, and how, and why. They are 
often the products of indifferent clerks transcribing, at places remote from the scene of action, a 
minimum of messages for something – anything – that will satisfy the official requirement for a 
report. Those who know the most about an action or an event seldom take the time to tell, or 
write, about it. They are too tired, or too nearly dead, or they are dead.256
 
This chapter presents the findings of the interviews conducted by this researcher with No Gun Ri 
researchers. These interviews were conducted to better understand how the previous researchers 
actually performed No Gun Ri research in terms of using archives and archival materials and to 
comprehend the perception of the researchers in using such materials. There were a total of 
eleven researchers who participated in the interviews for this research. Six people published their 
research products in the U.S., four people published in Korea, and one person published in both 
countries.  All of them published either multiple articles or lengthy works such as monographs 
and theses. The fullness of their responses varied from two-page written answers, including a 
short paragraph for each question, to two-hour long interviews in person. Among them are four 
journalists, four historians (including one military historian), one military officer, one law scholar, 
                                                 
255 Eric Ketelaar, “Tacit Narratives: The Meanings of Archives,” Archival Science 1 (2001): 139. (131-141) 
256 Roy, G. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu (Center of Military History, United States Army; 
Washington D.C., 1992): x.  
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and one survivor’s family member. All interviews were transcribed and Korean interviews were 
translated into English after transcription by this researcher. 
6.1 RESEARCH PROCESS IN TERMS OF USING ARCHIVES 
Most No Gun Ri researchers responded that they used archival materials in their research. 
However, not all of them actually went to archives to search for materials. Many of them said 
they used materials that were available to them online or made available by other researchers. 
For these No Gun Ri researchers, one source for reviewing actual documents was the Internet, 
through the web sites of a news agency, the Associated Press, and of Henry Holt, the publisher of 
Bridge at No Gun Ri, the book by the AP team. When the first AP report was published, the AP 
maintained a web site for the images and contents of archival documents that had been used for 
their research. Subsequently, these materials were transferred to the Henry Holt web site with 
additional documents that were later discovered and used for the book. The publisher displayed 
major documents related to No Gun Ri and the general refugee policies during the Korean War 
on its web site. For foreign researchers who could not come to the U.S., such a display facilitated 
viewing the critical documents through the click of a computer mouse.  This unique situation of 
publicizing those documents promoted the use of them by No Gun Ri researchers to a higher 
level. They did not have to make the effort of going to an archives to search for evidence. As 
some researchers in the archival field anticipated, the potential of digital reproduction of archival 
materials was practically utilized in the case of No Gun Ri. 257
                                                 
257  Wendy Duff, Barbara Craig, and Joan Cherry, “Historians’ Use of Archival Sources: Promises and Pitfalls of the 
Digital Age,” Public Historian 26:2 (Spring 2004): 22.  
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 In many cases, No Gun Ri researchers initially turned to the topic of No Gun Ri as their 
research project when they encountered or were provided related source materials. On the matter 
of broader, shared, or similar interests, they decided to research No Gun Ri when they obtained 
important source materials.  
I started my research with general interest. Usually, journalists have wide interests rather 
than deep knowledge, unlike academic researchers. Based on a general interest, we 
journalists start our research for journalism when we encounter some evidence, 
documents, cases, or any motivation about an event. So to speak, it’s a process to obtain 
materials and confirm those materials and supplement those materials. For example, if 
there is a document, we search for other sources to confirm and supplement the document. 
For me, Sanghun [an AP reporter] and the survivors’ organization were two major 
sources for my research. (Interview #7) 
One researcher discovered a very important archival document about No Gun Ri while he was 
working on another, larger project. When he later realized the importance of the document, he 
began to work on an article incorporating No Gun Ri and this document. Even though the 
importance of the document was only later recognized, the document was the initial impetus for 
his research on No Gun Ri. 
Just in doing the research for the dissertation, which we can go into more detail, I came 
across the Muccio letter which is particularly important for No Gun Ri. And I came 
across it in 1998. It was even before the No Gun Ri story came out. . . I found the 
document, and I was just looking for anything that has to do with civilian casualty, 
anything talking about targeting or killing civilians, killing refugees, anything like that. I 
found this particular letter in the State Department records. I just photocopied it, put it in 
my file, put it away and I didn’t realize that I had this important letter until I went back to 
write my dissertation several years later and realized that this document was quite 
important particularly in the light of the Pentagon report that was released in 2001. 
Because they focused so much on this meeting on July 25 that dealt with the refugee 
control policy, which this Muccio letter is essentially another account of what went on in 
that meeting. So I guess it was somewhat fortuitous that I ended up uncovering anything 
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that was relevant to No Gun Ri. I hadn’t set out to study No Gun Ri specifically. When I 
went into this project, I knew nothing about No Gun Ri because the AP story hadn’t been 
released yet. It was only later on that I realized the importance of the document that I 
found. (Interview #5) 
 In the same vein, no matter what the initial purpose was for a No Gun Ri researcher, 
archival documents served as a medium of encouragement for researchers on this topic. In the 
case of survivor researchers, the initial purpose of collecting archival materials was to provide 
journalists reliable evidence in order to promote publicity of the incident. Then they were 
motivated to further research on their own from the accumulation of collected archival materials.  
So to speak, my father collects archival materials to write his book, and I collect 
materials to publish the story. But while collecting materials to search for new evidence 
to provide to journalists, I realized I had enough materials to write a research paper 
myself. (Interview #4) 
The survivors’ efforts finally resulted in more publications on this topic. Their efforts would not 
be the only reason for other researchers to be motivated to perform more No Gun Ri research; 
however, it surely was one of the major catalysts and major sources for related evidence.  
I wanted to write some opinion articles about where legal responsibility lay, how this 
incident needs to be handled legitimately and so on. I started to publish some opinion 
articles in newspapers. Then, I had a chance to meet Kudo Chung, the spokesman of the 
survivors’ organization, and he encouraged me to research more of the legal aspects. He 
provided me with much material. I didn’t search for materials myself. Rather, what I did 
was evaluate those materials and interpret them in legal terms. (Interview #2) 
Quick recognition that the U.S. government’s response to the survivors’ previous 
petitions was not truthful – a conclusion arrived at from a simple search of source materials -- 
also led some journalists to conduct further research. These journalists very easily found a piece 
of evidence that discredited the U.S. government’s denial of the U.S. troops’ staying at No Gun 
Ri at the time of the incident. This finding provided the impetus for them to work on this subject 
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as journalists.  
The next step we took, the first archival step, so to speak, was Randy Herschaft [the AP’s 
investigative researcher] checking the US army’s official history of the Korean War. And 
he checked that because the U.S. military rejected the No Gun Ri survivors’ claim for 
compensation in early 1998. When they rejected it, they said there was no evidence that 
the 1st Cavalry Division was in the area. And so the first step Randy took was to check on 
that fact. And the U.S. Army’s official history, which was actually available online on the 
Internet, showed the 1st Cavalry Division was indeed in that area, in that general area, at 
that time. It of course didn’t say anything about No Gun Ri, but simply said this was the 
area of operation. So once we saw that, then we knew that we had to take further action 
because, in fact, the U.S. military had used an untruth to defend and reject this claim. 
And we saw what they said was not true and so as journalists we felt obliged to check 
further. (Interview #6) 
Having suspicions regarding the insincere attitude of the U.S. government due to the revelation 
of discrepancies in response to the survivors, the journalists performed further archival research 
for any related evidence on No Gun Ri, and finally found some strong refugee policy memos that 
supported survivors’ allegations.  This whole process spurred them to research further for future 
publication of an investigative report. This was done despite the objections from the supervisors 
in their news agency about such publication.258  
In general, No Gun Ri researchers had previous research interests on similar topics and, 
due to those interests, the incident caught their attention. One journalist said he had reported the 
crimes that American soldiers had committed in Korea for several years before even knowing of 
No Gun Ri. When he first encountered the novel that a survivor’s family wrote, he wanted to 
know more about the incident and finally conducted formal research as an extension of his 
interests. As mentioned earlier, another historian responded that his No Gun Ri research stemmed 
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from his larger project, a dissertation about collateral damages and the refugee policy during and 
after World War II.  
 My article on No Gun Ri ended up coming [out] well. The article itself is not simply 
about No Gun Ri. It was more about the refugee policy throughout the Korean War in the 
U.S. military and how they dealt with the Korean refugees in the war. So, it’s trying to 
both introduce this new evidence about No Gun Ri but also trying to place the killings at 
No Gun Ri into a broader context of how the U.S. military had problems handling 
refugees throughout the War. But the article actually came out of my dissertation research 
as a graduate student. I’ve written a dissertation - which actually will now be published as 
a book (by Routledge Press) – and that larger project was about the American attitude 
toward the civilian casualties, collateral damage, and mass destruction of warfare. 
(Interview #5) 
As exemplified by a researcher (Interview #7), the process - “with general interests on this event, 
I began my research by obtaining some materials and proceeded in confirming those materials 
and enlarging the range and depth of data collection to report it” - seems to be the general 
protocol for the research process of No Gun Ri researchers. 
Archival documents were actively sought out by No Gun Ri researchers in various ways. 
Researchers checked archival holdings not only for direct and/or indirect information of No Gun 
Ri, but also for searching the names of the veterans they would have needed for interviews; these 
became one of the major supporting sources for their future arguments. Further, after U.S. and 
Korean governments finished their investigations, these researchers returned to the National 
Archives to corroborate the materials that the Pentagon used. Some researchers mentioned filing 
FOIA requests for military documents and for the transcripts of the veterans’ interviews 
conducted by the Pentagon. 
In the meantime there was a whole separate avenue of archival work that Randy got 
involved in. That was primarily in St. Louis. That was when we determined that there 
were four battalions of interest. Then Randy submitted a Freedom of Information Act 
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request to the St. Louis National Personnel Records Center. And he went out there and he 
got the rosters with the list[s] of names of soldiers for those four battalions. So with that, 
we were able to start hunting for the men. So we could interview them and ask them, “Do 
you remember something like this?” (Interview #6) 
Then the U.S. Army conducted its investigation 14 months later from 1999 in 2001. 
When they completed their investigation, the Inspector General of the U.S. Army, all of 
their files, except for their interview transcripts, but all of their archival files, everything 
that they found in the archives, and had made copies of, were put back in the archives as 
a new unit, as a new section in the archives, as now the U.S. Army’s Investigation of No 
Gun Ri.  So, all of their source documents were suddenly available to us. And Randy 
went down there to see what we might find in their investigation. And what he found was 
about fifteen new documents that we have not seen before because we didn’t have as 
many people working on this as the Pentagon did. (Interview #6) 
Another thing comes to my mind is the FOIA request that we did. The survivors’ 
organization has a counsel team for the defense. This counsel team filed FOIA requests 
for some documents and the interview transcripts which were produced in the process of 
the Department of Defense’s investigation. They requested FOIA twice, and at the first 
request the Department of Defense provided some transcripts. But they denied the second 
request. (Interview #4) 
However, not all No Gun Ri researchers were eager to obtain new archival evidence for 
their research. Some researchers were rather more passive in searching archives and mainly 
depended on materials easily available to them. An interviewee said exerting more effort to 
discover new archival materials was beyond the scope of his research.  
Later I learned some more information about the location of some documents by Sanghun 
Choe and Kudo Chung, but I was not able to look them up myself; information not only 
about the No Gun Ri massacre, but also about many other similar mass killings. But I 
couldn’t do all these things. I can evaluate materials from the standpoint of law, but I 
simply can’t put forth too much effort to explore them. I don’t think that’s my job to do. I 
only wanted to expose the fact that it is extremely important to address the responsibility 
of a country for war crimes in the research of law. (Interview #2) 
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This participant emphasized that the collaborative work with researchers in other related areas as 
an effort for interdisciplinary research should be considered in this matter. Overall, even though 
researchers did not go to an archive themselves for actively searching of new materials, they 
were still checking and citing archival materials which were available to them. A journalist said 
he depended on 80-90% of archival documents among all his sources (Interview #7) while others 
said they simply relied on the book by the AP team or materials from the U.S. government report 
(Interviews #10 and #11).  
 While researching No Gun Ri, interviewees shared difficulties on the process of their 
research. One of the difficulties was related to accountability issues in documenting the incident. 
Among the military documents housed in the NARA, it was reported that certain documents of 
the Army unit responsible for No Gun Ri were missing from record boxes while all other units’ 
documents remained. Those missing documents were simply recognized as such by researchers 
at first, but after the U.S. government finished their investigation, researchers realized that there 
was a chance those documents might have been intentionally removed. Therefore, some 
researchers doubted the accountability of the Pentagon investigation and archival documentation 
of this event.  
The missing log was the most likely document to say something about No Gun Ri. In fact, 
quite recently, it’s a year and half to two years ago now, it was much later, even a couple 
of years after the book was published, that we found the person who was a clerk at the 7th 
Cavalry Regiment. He said that he told the Pentagon investigator and he told us that he 
remembered getting a message from lower units saying they had opened fire on 300 
refugees. It was at this time. It had to be No Gun Ri. And he made an entry in the log of 
that. This is the log that’s missing. So we know that that log did talk about No Gun Ri. 
But as I say, it’s missing. Otherwise, there is no other archival reference to No Gun Ri, at 
least not in any explicit way, any clear way. (Interview #6) 
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Some researchers mentioned declassification and restriction of certain documents as 
another research barrier they encountered. The Korean War began in 1950 and the records 
created at this time would have already been declassified for research use. However, No Gun Ri 
researchers found that there were still many documents restricted. 
You know, the Korean War documents were primarily declassified at the beginning of 
the 1970s and into the 1990s. But there is still some classified material. To give you an 
example, the one Randy remembered specifically was communications between the 
Defense Department at the Pentagon and the Far East Command in Tokyo. A lot of the 
wired traffic, a lot of the communication remains classified. We are trying to get it 
unclassified because obviously we are interested in whether there’s some reference to No 
Gun Ri in some message. So that’s one example. (Interview #6) 
With the military stuff, I often found that a lot of it was still restricted. There wasn’t any 
clear indication in the finding aids that it was restricted. So you have to request the boxes 
and often they wouldn’t come. (Interview #5) 
Researching anything about the U.S. government, its military, State Department, 
economic advisers, etc. can be very frustrating because of the shifting norms of 
classification.  I am grateful to the National Security Archives for their constant 
monitoring of the declassification process and filing of FOIA requests. (Interview #11) 
Other than this suspicion of missing documents and declassification, No Gun Ri researchers 
identified that the rejection of FOIA requests was also a research barrier. Even in those cases 
where documents were released as a result of an FOIA request, much important information was 
blacked out due to the Privacy Act. (Interviews #3, #4, #6)  
Also, some practical issues in using archives were mentioned as hindrances. Researchers 
often encountered difficulties related to the poor maintenance of archives and documents. Some 
said materials in the archives were not well organized, and one researcher said that sometimes 
the physical condition of materials made them illegible. (Interviews #3, #4, #5, #6) A researcher 
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also complained about the procedure of using documents in the archives in terms of making a 
photocopy.  
If you had worked at the National Archives, you would have known how difficult it can 
be, painstaking. If you are going through a lot of materials, and you have to make a lot of 
copies, it’s very difficult because you have to get each page authorized. And you can only 
basically copy one page at a time, sort of thing. So it’s very arduous work by Randy. 
(Interview #6) 
More practical problems that No Gun Ri researchers encountered included financial problems, 
language issues, and the inability of traveling abroad. Some researchers stated that the cost for 
FOIA requests was too much for an individual researcher and were too time-consuming. 
(Interviews #4, #6) One historian said that he had to move to Washington D.C. because traveling 
to the NARA several times was not enough for his research – he even had to apply for grant 
money for this purpose. (Interview #5) Many Korean researchers mentioned that they were not 
able to travel to the U.S. for research due to financial problems as well as a shortage of time. 
(Interviews #3, #7, #9)   
6.2 IDENTIFYING, LOCATING, AND SEARCHING ARCHIVES 
The findings from the interviews with No Gun Ri researchers indicate major researchers used 
archival materials from a great number of different archives. The archives they utilized for 
searching materials included the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), the 
National Personnel Records Center, the United Nations Archives, Records Service Centers in 
various locations, the Truman Library, the Army War College, the Air Force Historical Research 
Agency, the National Assembly Library in Korea, the North Korean Collection (북한자료실) in 
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the Ministry of Unification, the Military and Defense Research Center (국방군사연구소) in 
Korea, and several major university libraries in Korea where some diplomatic documents had 
been deposited. The materials No Gun Ri researchers reviewed for their research contain various 
types of military documents, military photographs, captured North Korean military documents, 
wartime news reports, official Army history, war correspondents’ personal records, some 
veterans’ medical records (with their permission), United Nations’ documents, the Foreign 
Relations of the United States, diplomatic documents, and even military weather reports. These 
researchers conducted very active searches in seeking archival materials. This included traveling 
to various archives destinations (and even moving to Washington D.C. for many months), filing 
FOIA requests, and asking for others’ assistance. In one example, a Korean researcher could not 
travel to an archive location abroad, so he deployed acquaintances to retrieve the archival 
materials.  
I sent all of these materials to Taekgon [a journalist] in Washington D.C and wrote a 
letter to him. I couldn’t afford to go to the U.S. myself to search for materials, so I asked 
him to search for materials there for me. In the letter, I gave him some information about 
when it happened and which units of American soldiers were involved. So with this 
information, he went to the National Archives many times and searched. When he 
returned to Korea, he gave me about 40-50 kinds of archival documents. Those 
documents included about 100 pages of communication logs, some of which were later 
used by the AP for their publication. (Interview #4) 
However, not all of the researchers were active and aggressive in seeking new evidence 
in archives. As addressed earlier, many researchers passively used only archival materials readily 
available to them. Many participants noted being provided archival materials as well as other 
source materials by survivors. As a tool to gain public attention of the No Gun Ri story, 
survivors’ organizations provided the materials and oral history that they had collected and 
accumulated for more than fifty years. No Gun Ri researchers’ appetite for this information was 
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satiated not only by the materials from survivors, but also from other research colleagues. 
Interestingly, the findings of the interviews with No Gun Ri researchers revealed that even 
journalists, who generally had been seen as very competitive in acquiring evidence exclusively, 
shared their archival materials with other journalists. The AP reporters gave their newly-
discovered evidence to journalists in other news agencies who had similar viewpoints of the 
incident, for further research; likewise, journalists of the U.S. News and World Report and 
Stripes.com shared materials compiled by a fellow researcher who had similar arguments on 
certain aspects of the No Gun Ri incident.259 Faced with two conflicting opinions of No Gun Ri, 
the survivors’ side and the U.S government’s side, researchers seemed to help each other within 
the boundaries of similar opinions. Also, public interest seemed to precede institutional interest 
in the case of No Gun Ri as journalists shared their primary materials when they could not 
continue further research due to objections from superiors for reasons of sensitivity and 
controversy. A journalist mentioned that the leadership of his news agency did not want to get 
involved in a controversial matter with their publication and thus it was very difficult for him to 
finally get his research published and, furthermore, follow-up publications were impossible as 
additional research was equally impossible. (Interview #6) Thus, he shared the newly-discovered 
documents with other journalists. 
For me, Sanghun and the survivors’ organization were two major sources for my research. 
It was very hard for me to go to the U.S. to collect materials and confirm them. . . The AP 
team wanted to write more on No Gun Ri, but the AP had an organizational problem in 
doing so. So they had to give up these uncovered documents for their future publications. 
In this situation, Sanghun wanted us to work on more journalism with these documents. 
He explained each document to me regarding how they should be interpreted and what 
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they would mean in relation to the No Gun Ri incident. So to speak, I ended up gathering 
news from another journalist. (Interview #7) 
The source material provider, a survivor’s family, also mentioned that he was helped by another 
researcher in locating related materials.  
I respect her highly in this sense because most journalists wrote articles only with what I 
had provided them, but she tried to obtain more materials by herself and even requested 
the Ministry of National Defense for related materials. Anyway, I knew of this research 
center due to her and went there for more materials. (Interview #4) 
 Those who actually went to an archives for new evidence mentioned that they began their 
research “from scratch” with no previous knowledge of the event. These researchers said that 
they had some help in searching archives and other materials from librarians or archivists.  
How I located that material was I was at the National Archives II, and I was looking at 
lots of different collections, like I said, looking for information about American attitudes 
towards civilian casualties, any government documents that talked about these kinds of 
issues and I found the Muccio letter and the State Department documents in their central 
decimal files. They have one decimal that was devoted to Korea and I was introduced to 
this material through an archivist at the National Archives. He told me about the central 
decimal file. (Interview #5) 
 As I said, I was told by a librarian in the National Assembly Library [in Korea]. I first 
looked for books, and then looked for journal or newspaper articles. But I couldn’t find 
much. I asked a librarian, and she told me that much of material in the 50s, especially 
newspapers, had been microfilmed. She also suggested that I might find something about 
the incident from the North Korean Collection in the Ministry of Unification. (Interview 
#4) 
Having done extensive research in the past I knew that (for a historian anyway) knowing 
the subject-matter experts among the archivists is invaluable. Fortunately I knew both the 
head of military archives at NARA (who also happened to be the President of the Society 
for Military History that year), Dr. Nenninger, from my earlier research into the interwar 
period (between WWI and WWII), and through him I got to know the lead archivist on 
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Korea. These connections helped guide me to not just the “normal” sources, but provided 
astute recommendations for supplementary research. (Interview #1) 
As for more concrete methods taken by No Gun Ri researchers to procure relevant materials, the 
researchers agreed that they sought potentially relevant materials from the citations of other, 
previously published works.  
Regarding the use of archives, I do remember that I was quite clueless about the whole 
process. Largely [I] started by looking for citations and other works and trying to track 
down archival collections that other people previously used that I felt relevant to the 
project. And that was actually probably the most fruitful approach that I took in finding 
relevant collections. (Interview #5) 
After the AP published their journalism, there were so many publications - in Korea as 
well as in the U.S. - I read them all. And I found clues from them to search for further 
materials. Among the publications about No Gun Ri, there was an article by Sonju Pang, 
a Korean-American historian. She published this article in one of the Korean history 
journals and used some archival materials that were in the U.S. I wanted to look at those 
materials, so I asked Manyol Lee, a history professor, to get them for me when he went to 
the U.S. on a business trip. He brought me some materials that were related directly or 
indirectly to No Gun Ri. Those were the materials that I used for my next publication. 
(Interview #4) 
 Using published reference tools or finding aids at archives was also identified as a 
searching and locating method for materials. A team of journalists considered finding aids as 
helpful, possibly due to the fact that they had an investigative researcher in their team whose job 
was searching materials and researching in archives. (Interview #6) However, a historian 
confessed that he felt published reference tools were not very useful and the situation of the 
finding aids was no better than reference tools.  
The other thing that I did before actually getting to the archives was looking at the 
National Archives Guide to Federal records which was published. I found it pretty 
frustrating to use because they talk about these record groups but it’s very hard to 
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correlate the record groups in this published guide with the actual shelf locations in the 
National Archives. So even with that help of an archivist at the National Archives, it’s 
very difficult to get from the Federal records to specific record groups. . . . The finding 
aid situation is kind of haphazard. What I found to be the most useful approach for 
finding material was once I actually got to the archives and was doing research myself, 
spending a lot of time with unpublished work, none of stuff was digitized as far as I know 
and certainly wasn’t when I was doing my research years ago. They have a room in the 
National Archives II which was filled with binders that have these very rough finding 
aids, and if you flip through the finding aids, you find record groups that look like they 
might be relevant to what you were working on. And they have information there in the 
shelf location, so you can fill out the slip and you can actually get access to the archival 
material. (Interview #5) 
 One interesting point discovered from the interviews with No Gun Ri researchers was that 
they wanted archivists to do more proactive outreach to advertise their holdings, such as more 
specified reference tools and digitized finding aids and/or actual documents. Many researchers 
expressed that if there would have been any publication or advertisement about archival holdings 
on this specific subject, it would have been a great help to the researchers.  
There is a project in progress in NARA for releasing documents related to war crimes. I 
heard that they are now publishing a book about documents for Japanese war crimes 
during World War II. I think they need to do something like this for the Korean War. 
(Interview #2) 
In 2003, the National Archives published a book, called “National Archives records 
relating to the Korean War.” So all of the Korean War documents, different record groups 
and what they all include are all in this book. It’s like a 250 page book which I wish we 
had had in 1998 when we started working on the journalism because what Randy had to 
do was to go through the finding aids folders which were not very organized. Now this 
book puts it all together in one volume with an index and all sorts of things. (Interview 
#6) 
One of these researchers mentioned the advantage of using Internet databases for their research 
in searching for veterans who might remember No Gun Ri. 
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With this list of names, first we went to something called Korean War Casualty Database 
on the Internet which is maintained by a Korean War Veterans group. It lists all of the 
men who were killed in Korea. So we could eliminate those names and didn’t bother 
wasting time trying to find those names. Then Randy also went to the Social Security 
Administration death records on the Internet where we can find out if somebody has died. 
So we could eliminate those because most of the men we are talking about would be in 
their late sixties or early seventies. So many of them have died. And then Randy and 
Martha, primarily Randy, looked for unusual names. That way we were more likely to 
find him quickly. And Randy had other methods to narrow it down.  He could figure out 
the ages of people in this way and that way. That was the key to get those rosters. 
(Interview #6) 
Helen Tibbo addressed the importance of the archivists’ more active approach to archives users 
using the Internet, stating that “Archivists professionwide not only need to mount more finding 
aids and other instructive material so that their Web sites become reliable sources of extensive 
information, they also need to advertise the presence of this information to their user 
community . . . if all repositories in academic institutions actively advertised their Web sites and 
their features to the historians and other user groups on campus, much would be gained.”260 This 
account seems to be true at least for the No Gun Ri case.  
6.3 CREDIBILITY OF SOURCE MATERIALS 
In the interviews, the credibility that No Gun Ri researchers actually gave to archival materials 
was not as much as they mentioned in their publications. Only one researcher expressed absolute 
credibility with regard to military archives. 
                                                 
260 Helen R. Tibbo, “Primarily History in America: How U.S. Historians Search for Primary Materials at the Dawn 
of the Digital Age,” American Archivist 66 (Spring/Summer 2003): 29.  
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Amongst many resources, I believe that the primary materials have the most credibility 
since they capture the most facts and truth of each account. The military records and 
official documents recording the facts about each operation can be reliable materials. 
(Interview #10) 
However, many other researchers noted that they trusted only hard facts and information 
fragments of the event in archival documents. Vague descriptions about the surroundings of the 
incident were a matter of interpretation depending on researcher’s individual arguments, 
especially for the No Gun Ri case where there exist two conflicting versions of the story. In this 
situation, researchers tried to find absolute facts that could be trusted by anyone.  
I didn’t trust the documents 100%. Because those documents were created by American 
soldiers, and I thought that those documents could not be ensured for 100% objectivity. 
Nevertheless, there are facts in those documents. Of course there is a possibility that 
those facts would be distorted. But still those facts are fragments of the incident. I tried to 
use these facts expressed in documents. I believe when these facts are related to each 
other logically and reinterpreted as a whole, one can use them for journalism. (Interview 
#7) 
When you answer a question of “Were the American troops there?” then a document is 
sufficient evidence for this. But when you answer questions like “Were there any military 
operation in the given area?”, “How was the range of military operation?”, “Did the 
American soldiers kill civilians in the area?” something like this, documents would not be 
able to directly answer them. (Interview #2) 
The military documents were very often not trustworthy in many ways, not even aside 
from No Gun Ri, as military documents are often [manipulated by] officers who are 
trying to make themselves and their units look good because they know these documents 
will be read by their superiors. So they are not the most reliable thing except for such 
things as map coordinates, reporting where they are, and such things as morning reports, 
reporting casualties. When you get into hard factual things like that, they are reliable. 
(Interview #6) 
A journalist mentioned that he trusted some documents only when they had plain expressions on 
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the matter of harming refugees since these expressions would be unlikely to emphasize or 
exaggerate the event; they would likely be the minimal expression for an atrocity. 
I should say the military documents became extremely important at a certain point when 
we found them finally being candidly truthful like when they say “shoot all refugees” 
which was put in one document we turned up eventually, just as flared up “shoot all 
refugees who come near or across the river.” So when you have something like that, it 
becomes extremely important, and carries a lot of weight. But otherwise, generally they 
weren’t totally reliable. (Interview #6)  
 Some researchers mentioned general characteristics of archival documents as the reason 
why they could not grant full credibility to the information therein. An archival document would 
reflect the opinion of its creator or reflect the bias of the creator as experienced during the 
creation of the document, and therefore was often considered not very objective even though it 
was expected to be so. Some documents regarding refugees as combatants were especially 
problematic in this sense because such references could be the result of intentional 
misunderstanding, cultural differences or even ignorance about local people. (Interview #3) 
 Many researchers agreed on the fact that No Gun Ri was the result of a series of negative 
deeds committed by American soldiers, so there could have been some effort to hide any direct 
expression of the event, if not active embellishment or encoding within the documents. Also, the 
confusion surrounding the war situation would not have allowed a record creator to record an 
event in detail. These suspicions were stronger among the Korean researchers, but some 
American researchers shared the same opinion. 
 There are a couple of references that looked like euphemisms. There was a reference to 
“clearing out”, I can’t remember the precise wording now, something about clearing out 
guerrilla strongholds. And we suspect this was their cover-up, their whitewash of what 
happened at No Gun Ri. (Interview #6) 
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Somewhat obviously, I could not trust entirely the documents in the archives with regard 
to the events themselves, because in that case those creating the original documents were 
themselves the ones who had the most reason to hide (in theory) any malfeasance. 
(Interview #1) 
In the military, in common sense, if they committed a war crime, I guess they wouldn’t 
record it as it is. I think they would use a different expression, or an encoded expression 
to decorate or hide what really happened. In a case where encoded or euphemized 
military terms were in question, oral testimonies by veterans or survivors would be 
extremely important. (Interview #2) 
There are so many unclear parts to this event when you only see it through documents. 
The combat situation at that time, which was very complicated and very tense, might 
have caused this unclear recording of the event in the war documents. (Interview #3) 
Very interestingly, the majority of researchers who participated in the interviews answered that 
they gave the same or more credibility to oral history as opposed to actual research.  A 
publication analysis showed that the flow of discussions on No Gun Ri was inspired and 
encouraged mainly by the new emergence of archival materials and not very often according to 
different accounts of interviewees. No Gun Ri researchers regarded archival documents as 
secondary supporting materials to those of survivors’ and veterans’ oral histories. This perception 
is in the same vein as the fact mentioned above: that No Gun Ri was an incident by American 
troops and therefore it would not have been actively documented in American military 
documents. A researcher said that “They may have recorded what happened partly, but it must 
have been very hard to document it truthfully with their conscience. So, in my experience, 
archival documents are crucial for research in history or in international law, but I don’t think 
they are more important than oral history in this case.”(Interview #4) In fact, researchers 
searched archival evidence to substantiate survivors’ allegations, rather than searching 
substantiating survivors’ accounts to confirm archival evidence. Researchers clearly noted that 
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they considered oral history the most reliable when it was backed by substantiating archival 
evidence. (Interview #9) 
But as I say, the interviews were the key and the way we have described it is that the 
whole No Gun Ri story rests on three pillars. One is the Korean survivors and what they 
have to say. Then the soldiers we found. We now say we have at least twenty six soldiers 
who have told us about No Gun Ri. And the fact that those two corroborated each other 
because many of the details were describing the same things. Things like the fact that 
soldiers remembered that the people under the bridge were crying out for water, using the 
Japanese word for water. Some of the soldiers understood Japanese. Little details like that 
matched on two sides of world. That was extremely important. The documents, the 
archives were probably the least important of the three pillars because they did not talk 
about No Gun Ri. But they provided the context. And add it to the credibility. Because we 
found all these orders to shoot refugees. So obviously this would’ve happened. They 
ordered to shoot refugees all over the warfront. And the archival work added to the 
credibility in other ways as well because we could show that these men were there. We 
have the rosters, we have the morning reports that say “No Gun Ri” on them, so that 
establishes the credibility of the men even further. And remember as I said in the 
beginning, we couldn’t have gotten the interviews without archives. (Interview #6) 
When I interviewed the survivors, I heard similar stories from those who went through 
the event themselves. I felt that there would not be more vivid records than the survivors’ 
collective memory itself . . . I tried to do my best to cross-check the testimony to get 
common facts. I found that they described the event in very great detail and most parts of 
the contents of the individual interviews were similar to one another. I actually met 
people who were injured from the massacre. Many families in the given area shared the 
same anniversary date for death of their family members for the last 50 years. And it is 
true that many people disappeared since the massacre. Those facts from the testimony are 
the most important elements to prove the massacre which the archival records couldn’t 
prove. (Interview #9) 
There was one researcher among those interviewed for this study who did not put much 
weight on survivors’ oral histories. His opinion about oral history was that survivors’ and 
veterans’ accounts were collected about fifty years after the fact and therefore could be seen as 
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doubtful sources for his research. He articulated that “There are lots of things they don’t 
remember, there are lots of things that they are confused about, there are lots of reasons which 
contradict themselves just in the course of an interview.” (Interview #5) 
 Even though many researchers considered oral history as the major source for their 
arguments and regarded archival documents only as a supporting source for oral history, a 
majority of researchers noted that archival documents played a major role in the building of their 
arguments. Some researchers seemed to think that citing more documents in their research would 
be a way to ensure the objectivity and to strengthen their arguments.  Some mentioned their 
research was influenced overall by archival materials (Interviews #1, #9), and some mentioned 
that in certain controversial discussions in their research, such as the veracity of veterans’ oral 
testimony or the existence of orders issued by a higher commander, archival evidence was 
extensively used: 
 But in regards to how much I relied on documents, I can say it was absolute. In 
journalism, oral testimony is regarded as very important, but when oral testimony is 
supported by documents, the truthfulness or the effectiveness can be ensured at maximum. 
Especially in a case like No Gun Ri where there are conflicting opinions between Korean 
victims and American soldiers, it would be very weak for one party to refute only with 
oral testimony to the opposing party. (Interview #7) 
I think archival documents influenced every part and bit of my argument. I used all 
documents that I could ever access or obtain. I cross-checked the documents with other 
possible evidence to support my arguments. Even though there were some documents 
that could not be cross-checked, they still implied the importance. . . Anyway, my basic 
concept is that the more documents I used, the more I would be able to add to the value of 
my research. More evidence would help to provide the objectivity of the research in core 
contents.  (Interview #4) 
The discovery that the veteran, Edward Daily, was a complete fraud came to me purely 
through a combination of my own understanding of infantry tactics and war, and my 
ability to read the military documents in the archives with an infantryman’s eye. These 
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made me suspicious. But the archives themselves provided me with the ability to prove 
that Ed Daily was not who he said he was, but was instead a complete fraud, because his 
claims about his own personal history should have been replicated in dozens of places in 
the archival records…and wasn’t, thereby demonstrating that he was lying. (Interview 
#1) 
Obviously, most of the No Gun Ri researchers who responded were significantly influenced by 
archival documents, and the role those materials played, directly or indirectly, was invaluable to 
their research. They mentioned that they used all possible archival documents for their arguments. 
They also noted that when new archival evidence emerged, most researchers mentioned that their 
arguments, viewpoints and conclusions were not changed; instead, they became clearer, 
solidified and were reconfirmed. The researchers also commented that the No Gun Ri incident 
could be comprehended against a bigger picture due to further discovery of documents. 
(Interviews #8, #9, #10) 
Well, I described earlier how in 2001 we, Randy, discovered all these kill orders, at least 
15. We now say a total of 19. I guess 15 or 16 of those were discovered by Randy at that 
point. So are our views changed because of that? We knew that it was even more of a 
widespread phenomenon that refugees were being shot all over the place. Our other point 
is that our views were changed because the Pentagon did its investigation and 
interviewed many soldiers, many veterans, and many we did not talk to in a very difficult 
way. It’s been a very slow process, not nearly complete, but we have gotten access to 
some of these transcripts of the Pentagon interviews. The Pentagon simply lied in its 
investigative report about what it was told by many of the veterans. The Pentagon said 
none of the pilots that they interviewed said they had orders to shoot refugees, to strafe 
refugees, but that was not true. We have the transcript of one pilot who told them that, but 
they covered these things up. Since we’ve been able to obtain these transcripts from, 
mostly from, the year 2000, that has changed our view and solidified the whole picture 
for us. (Interview #6) 
At first, my father figured out that it was the 1st Cavalry Division involved in the 
massacre. And then it was me who figured out more concrete information in the 1st 
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Division, such as which regiment and battalion was at No Gun Ri. Then the AP team 
made it more concrete about which individual soldiers were there with the documents 
uncovered from the National Archives. There were no changes in the viewpoint of our 
arguments. The emergence of new archival documents provided more concrete and 
detailed information and refined my research.  (Interview #4) 
When we first published the No Gun Ri article, we didn’t have that many documents. We 
found them later on. And these documents allowed us to see the No Gun Ri massacre in a 
bigger picture. We’ve learned that the No Gun Ri massacre was not the only incident of 
the kind in the Korean War. And it provided us an opportunity to see the No Gun Ri 
incident with the perspectives of the American methods in fighting wars and the 
American mentality in fighting wars. (Interview #3) 
Finding that researchers were influenced by archival documents does not seem to be 
surprising. However, archival documents were not the only supporting materials they used, nor 
were they a major source. Many researchers indicated their attitude toward archival documents 
was neutral and required the reading and referencing of all possible sources to finally draw a 
conclusion. (Interview #11) In this process, the ability to interpret materials for their arguments 
became of importance in No Gun Ri research. With the  No Gun Ri incident, when two, major, 
conflicting opinions existed, researchers attempted to identify more evidence from the archival 
documents and oral histories to bolster their personal point of view.  Therefore, the interpretation 
of documents became a key issue, allowing one document’s use in different contexts for each 
researcher’s argument. Also, the dependence solely on archival evidence influenced the 
interpretation of the incident. In the course of interpreting the incident and developing the 
discussions on No Gun Ri, often a new understanding of a document was raised and new 
attention to a document was paid.  
However, the Korean side felt differently. The Korean government felt that they couldn’t 
promptly draw a conclusion only because there is no document saying so. The Pentagon 
insists that there was no order from a higher officer because there was no document 
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saying so, and there were no veterans stating that there was a massacre there. The Korean 
government has taken a different stance. They have taken into account the testimonies of 
some veterans who said that there was such an order from a higher officer. They have 
also taken into the account the testimonies of the survivors. They said that they cannot 
deny the fact of the event solely based on the non-existence of the relevant documents. I 
think the Korean government is taking the right position. In this case, archival documents 
play a very important role to both parties. Both sides are using different interpretations of 
archival documents to promote their conclusions. Sometimes to further their argument 
they don’t publish certain documents or even refuse to shed any light on the existence of 
contradictory documents. I even think that they would choose interviewees who can give 
them a story more favorable towards their argument. (Interview #3) 
Even when there was no new discovery of or within archival documents, there were cases when 
researchers placed new attention to already-known materials. In such cases, social interests and 
government attitudes toward the compensation of survivors influenced the research focus and, 
through this process, archival documents played a new role in research. A researcher phrased his 
experience of having new understanding of documents in No Gun Ri research: 
After these episodes, I wrote my articles focusing on whether this massacre was 
accidentally initiated by the lowest level of soldiers or through the refugee policy ordered 
from the highest commander of the 8th Army in Korea. I used the same documents but 
this time I used them with a different focus. Early’s letter read that his commander 
threatened to shoot him if he refused to shoot the refugees. In my earlier articles, I used 
some documents among the 25 to support my focus on the gaps between the Pentagon 
report and the truth of the massacre detailed in the documents that I had. Now this time I 
wrote my articles about the existence of the commander’s order to shoot the refugees 
using other documents among the 25 which didn’t have great influence in my early 
articles. So I think there was no emergence of additional documents, but as time goes by, 
some existing documents, which were not meaningful at a certain time, became 
meaningful at another time with a new focus and renewed interest about the massacre in 
my research. (Interview #7) 
 Regarding No Gun Ri research in general, archival documents were not the most important 
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materials on which researchers built their arguments. However, researchers needed these 
documents to support their arguments, which they said were based basically on the oral history 
of the survivors and veterans.  In other words, archival documents were used as a method of 
propping up their argument’s objective. Researchers gave archival documents covering the No 
Gun Ri incident a level of credibility similar to or less than that given to oral history, but they did 
not deny the importance of using archival documents in their research and the importance of 
such documents as supplementary evidence for confirming and cross-checking the oral histories 
they used. Thus, there was a discrepancy in the researchers’ perceptions between the actual usage 
of archival documents in the research process and the recognition of its credibility. 
6.4 RESEARCHERS’ PERCEPTION OF USING ARCHIVES  
Several researchers did not seem to be very aware of the existence of archives, especially 
researchers in fields other than history. Basically, they did not have much of an idea about 
archives and the using of primary documents even though they used archival materials directly or 
indirectly in their research. Some Korean researchers said they did not know about the existence 
of the national archives in Korea (the National Archives and Records Service) when they first 
began their research. In fact, the National Archives and Records Service was still a small, yet 
fast-growing institute when the No Gun Ri story first broke in Korea. Under such circumstances, 
it is very likely these researchers did not have many ideas on the concept of “archives,” or their 
idea of “archives” may have been slightly different from that of archivists due to their lack of 
awareness. 
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Actually, I didn’t know much about the National Archives of Korea. I was not aware that 
they would have many materials about the event. If I had searched that place, then I 
might have been able to find something, but I didn’t. I went to the National Assembly 
Library instead, wishing to obtain some materials from there. (Interview #4) 
I didn’t have any idea about the National Archives in mind when I did my research. 
(Interview #2) 
I knew that the AP team had spent more than a year and a half or two years collecting 
data and interviewing survivors before they published their reports. Compared to that, I 
didn’t spend so much time in interviewing the survivors. But I had interviews with some. 
I don’t know if you call this type of oral history an archival material in a broader 
definition, but I used them. In general, most parts of my journalism very much relied on 
archival documents. (Interview #7) 
One researcher who did extensive archival research also seemed to be subtly confused in using 
the term “archival materials” since he referred to old newspaper articles and personal papers as 
historical materials while differentiating them from archival materials.  
And of course, on the other side, you asked about historical materials, naturally there are 
many books including the official history of the U.S. Army and the Korean Military. 
Sang-hun checked the Korean history. We checked many many old newspaper files from 
that time, and periodicals and magazines because we wanted to make sure nobody had 
reported it at that time. We even went to various universities, either went there or they 
cooperated with us, we checked on a journalist who left personal papers at universities. 
These journalists we know were in the area at that time. And we wanted to make sure 
their notebooks didn’t include something about No Gun Ri, so we got to hold their 
personal papers. You know, universities Xeroxed pages from those notebooks. (Interview 
#6) 
 No Gun Ri researchers responded that they were shared with archival documents, first by 
survivors’ organization and later by researchers who had similar viewpoints. Some researchers 
mentioned sharing information not only with fellow researchers but also with the general 
readership. While they said they benefited from the Internet and various databases, they further 
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stated they could now take advantage of this network technology to get closer to their general 
readership as well as other researchers with tangible evidence. 
And additionally, the Internet databases were very important in searching for the names 
today. We probably would not have been able to do the No Gun Ri journalism without the 
Internet. If this had come up 10 years earlier, we may have not been able to do it because 
we wouldn’t have been able to find so many men so quickly. So we could make all these 
calls - dozens of dozens of them. I think we ended up talking with more than 200 soldiers, 
so we wouldn’t have been able to do that so quickly. Just a random point, one is that with 
the Internet today, what the AP was able to do with the journalism when we published the 
journalism - it went into the newspaper in the traditional way - but we also constructed a 
very elaborate online presentation that gave people the documents. So they can see the 
documents themselves. So the archives were brought directly to the media audience and 
that adds tremendous credibility to the journalism. They could even hear the video 
interviews with the soldier and such. (Interview #6) 
In conclusion, the findings of the interviews with No Gun Ri researchers on their 
perception of using archives and assigning credibility to source materials indicate several 
important aspects. First and foremost, researchers did not trust archival documents as fully as 
they described the documents in their publications. They only exhibited partial trust in the 
contents of documents – only for obvious facts and clear evidence of certain activities from 
documents -- as addressed in the previous section. The way they formed their conclusions, which 
were very understandable, is a methodical process of collecting all possible evidence, including 
archival documents, oral history and even forensic evidence.   
The second clearly identified finding is that No Gun Ri researchers depended more on 
oral history for the comprehension of the event as a whole. They gave more credibility to oral 
history, especially the collective memory of survivors, for the whole picture of the incident, and 
attempted to place the oral history at the center of their arguments. They then attempted to find 
substantiating, supplementary evidence from archival documents.  
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The third important finding was that not all No Gun Ri researchers actively searched 
archival documents. There was only a small group of researchers who explored and discovered 
archival evidence, and others then used those already-discovered documents. This became 
especially possible and more encouraging to researchers because these materials were made 
available on the web - not just the contents but the entire image of them. Later researchers, 
therefore, had the privilege of using them without expending any particular efforts on a trip to an 
archive. Although digitizing archival materials in general involves a great number of 
maintenance problems of various forms, it surely is a great method to promote the usage of 
archival holdings by researchers, at least it was so in the No Gun Ri case.  
Another finding from the experiences of No Gun Ri researchers is that most who 
responded used archival materials not just for a specific description for the incident, but also for 
looking at general information surrounding the No Gun Ri incident. They visited a great number 
of archives and checked various types of materials to search for any hints on the incident. For 
example, archival documents were used as a tool to seek the names of veterans who participated 
or witnessed the incident, for later interviews by researchers. Archival documents were also 
sought to find any evidence on general policies toward refugees during the general period of the 
Korean War. This phenomenon was quite frequently seen in historical research and was already 
exemplified in another user study in the archival field, as follows: “The historians to whom we 
talked expressed interest not only in the information that was directly related to their topic but 
also in any information that tangentially threw light on it. These historians wanted to know about 
the people, organizations, events, and the general background of their topic because they do not 
merely seek information, they interpret it. No interpretation is possible without a solid 
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appreciation for the meaning of, or the reasons why, records were created.”261
The findings from the interviews with No Gun Ri researchers revealed one last and very 
important point. Since the incident happened, the survivors and victims have collected and 
collated an oral history and their own collective memory. Through this process, they accumulated 
their own archives on this event, including their petition letters and denial responses, an oral 
history of the villagers, and photographs from the early 1960s. One survivor’s family conducted 
extensive research on No Gun Ri under the rigid and repressive social and political atmosphere in 
Korea, without much knowledge regarding searching archives and other materials. Over time, he 
wrote novels about the event, collected an oral history, and compiled lists of the victims and 
other damages. Based on his efforts and other survivors’ collaboration, the No Gun Ri story 
finally received long overdue publicity in Korea and in the U.S.  
Korean people do not value recording culture very strongly. It was not like this until 100 
years ago. However, my father was very keen to record what he went through. From 1960, 
he has accumulated records on his own about the No Gun Ri massacre. He did spot 
investigations in 1960 and even took pictures of the bridge tunnels which had tons of 
bullet marks. . . He wrote down everything about what he discovered or what he went 
through to seek the truth about No Gun Ri. He preserved all the documents he created and 
receipts for legal claims for disclosure of the incident. He created his own document for 
the incident summary and details of damages and casualties. He collected his villagers’ 
testimonies and all other documents. He preserved them for more than 43 years. I think 
his book, my research and our claims were possible thanks to his great effort to document 
all these activities. There is no one else who did this job of documenting No Gun Ri 
incident among other survivors. (Interview #4) 
The survivors’ efforts to publicize their story extended to collecting more substantiating material 
and making available these materials to researchers. From understanding the survivors’ efforts, 
                                                 
261 Wendy M. Duff and Catherine A. Johnson, “Accidentally Found on Purpose: Information-Seeking Behavior of 
Historians in Archives,” Library Quarterly 72:4 (2002): 487.  
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archivists may be able to learn a way to promote the usage of archives and provide outreach to 
their patrons and potential researchers of their invaluable holdings.  
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7.0  IMPLICATIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 
The preceding two chapters described the role of archival documents in the No Gun Ri research 
and the historical perceptions of the No Gun Ri researchers about using archival materials for 
their research. These chapters were designed to find the answers to the research questions 
proposed earlier in this study:  
1. As seen in the No Gun Ri massacre research, how do researchers use archival 
materials? 
2. Has the research of the No Gun Ri massacre changed in light of an expansion of 
available archival resources? 
3. What does the use of archival materials in the building of knowledge about the No Gun 
Ri massacre reveal about the actual state of researchers’ archival use in conducting 
research on recent history? 
The first question was specifically addressed in Chapter Five, in the analysis of No Gun Ri 
publications, and the third question was dealt with in Chapter Six regarding interview results 
with No Gun Ri researchers. The second question was answered generally throughout the entire 
data analysis process of publications and No Gun Ri researchers’ interviews. In Chapter Five, a 
total of 503 publications (including journalistic articles and academic materials) were analyzed to 
determine any correlation between archival documents and No Gun Ri discussions. Those 
publications were collected from the United States and Korea and dated from 1994 to 2006. 
Chapter six consisted of the analysis of the interviews with some of the major No Gun Ri 
researchers.  Eleven researchers were interviewed by this author with nine open-ended questions 
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regarding their research process and their perception of using archives. This chapter now builds 
upon the analysis of the preceding two chapters. The research results are presented as responding 
to the research questions to address how each question was answered and what were the major 
findings of this study.  
7.1 FINDINGS OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Research Question 1: As seen in the No Gun Ri massacre research, how do researchers use 
archival materials? 
In general, the No Gun Ri researchers used archival materials. Some researchers sought 
out archival evidence more vigorously than others, but basically most of the researchers 
referenced, used, and/or cited (or recited) archival materials. The methods regarding how they 
approached those materials were not particularly different from those for usual historical 
research. Many of them began their search of relevant sources by tracing the citations of their 
colleagues’ publications. No Gun Ri researchers used published reference books as search tools 
for further information. They went to archives and looked up finding aids. They also filed FOIA 
(Freedom of Information Act) requests and sometimes even deployed their acquaintances to 
obtain archival documents abroad. 
There were a total of 432 journalistic articles and 71 academic publications on No Gun Ri 
research analyzed in this study. In those publications, 1,096 passages in journalistic articles and 
1,780 passages in academic works were devoted to No Gun Ri discussions for the overall time 
period of 1994 to 2006. Within such discussions, archival documents were used 1,514 times, 
secondary materials 942 times and interview testimonies of survivors and veterans 1,788 times. 
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As seen from these numbers, archival documents were used almost as significantly as oral 
histories for No Gun Ri discussions. The proportion of secondary materials used was relatively 
small - equivalent to 22.2% - while archival documents and oral testimonies of survivors and 
veterans reached 35.67% and 42.13%, respectively. The dependency of archival documents 
regarding No Gun Ri discussion, as seen from the frequency of use, increased from 16.67% in 
the first period (before September 1999) to 27.57% in the second period (September 1999 to 
May 2000), 47.71% in the third period (May 2000 to January 2001), and 35.2% in the last period 
(January 2001 to 2006). Meanwhile, the researchers’ tendency to use interview testimonies of 
survivors and veterans as a supporting source generally decreased over time (from 55.56% in the 
first period to 57.32% in the second period, 21.37% in the third period, and 43.1% in the fourth 
period); however, usage still occupied a significant portion for a considerable period of time. In 
the second period, when the controversy over the veracity of some veterans’ interview 
testimonies was raised, (which was one of the top discussions in this period), archival evidence 
was used as a major source to prove the truthfulness/untruthfulness of these veterans’ testimonies. 
In addition, there sometimes were controversies over the military documents related to these 
veterans on how to interpret them for this discussion. Therefore, the usage of archival documents 
in No Gun Ri discussions in this period seemed to significantly outnumber interview testimonies.  
Overall, archival documents were extremely important for No Gun Ri research, including 
factual information about locations, time, dates, and names, as archival documents were used to 
establish maximum credibility. Circumstantial information in archival documents was used with 
differing weights by different researchers but still used extensively throughout No Gun Ri 
research. Refugee policy and air strike policy-related documents provided for divergent 
interpretation by researchers. Most No Gun Ri researchers viewed them as the most important 
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background evidence for the atrocity while some conservative researchers, including the U.S. 
government’s investigation team, did not consider them as providing evidence for No Gun Ri.  
There were a variety of researcher groups involved in understanding and comprehending 
No Gun Ri. However, all of these researchers were not keen to access archival evidence on No 
Gun Ri. Some researchers were more eager to obtain crucial evidence than others. This 
phenomenon is probably repeated in any historical research. In the No Gun Ri case, some 
researchers’ vigorous efforts to unearth important evidence practically benefited the work of 
other colleagues.  No Gun Ri survivors and their families accumulated and constructed related 
evidence and the collective memory in oral histories and made available the results to journalists 
in Korea for the purpose of getting publicity on such an event. Many Korean journalists, 
including one of the AP reporters, received related materials from the survivors and used such 
materials for their basic research.  
Once the AP reporters published their No Gun Ri articles, they shared military documents 
and other materials, which they discovered during the process of their research, with readers and 
other researchers through the Internet by posting such documents and materials on their websites. 
Journalists from U.S. News and World Report also shared the documents they used for their 
arguments on the web. With the convenience of easy distribution and access of information via 
the Internet, many researchers were able to use already-discovered documents that just happened 
to be available to them without any effort expended for extensive archival search. The 
information shared on the web and provided by survivors invited more researchers from various 
fields to this subject. In fact, No Gun Ri attracted researchers with a variety of expertise in areas 
such as law, sociology, political science, media studies, and the military as well as general 
journalism. Researchers other than those who had a history background do not seem to have had 
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much experience using archives and not all researchers seem to have had enough resources to 
travel abroad for archival searching, but they still could use archival materials for their research 
due to the active information sharing in this subject.  
The researchers of No Gun Ri used archival materials in their publications with special 
emphasis, and research publications which contained substantiating archival evidence seemed to 
be more influential on later research. Early research depended heavily on oral testimonies of 
survivors because there were only a few archival documents discovered at that time. This small 
amount of archival documents provided the uniqueness to research and such documents were 
given more credibility and emphasis. Korean researchers, specially, gave special emphasis to 
archival documents since archival documents found in American archives were very rare at that 
time since the No Gun Ri incident was still relatively unknown. 
Later, after the first AP’s article was published, the incident gained sensational attention 
both nationally and internationally partly because it introduced some important documentary 
evidence on the incident. Following this publication controversies and discussions also emerged 
and were argued along the same lines, particularly with the expansion of newly-discovered 
archival documents and new attention to existing materials. In many cases, archival documents 
were the catalysts for discussions on the subject and the impetus for further research. No Gun Ri 
researchers used archival materials more often, with credibility, to prove circumstantial facts and 
fragments surrounding the incident. For example, in the discussions of specific facts - such as 
identifying the participating army unit involved in the killing, actual frontlines at that time, 
general refugee policies and air bombardment policies issued before and during the incident - 
archival materials were used as major supporting material. In some cases, military documents 
themselves were targets of controversy in terms of how to interpret them. 
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There were no noticeable differences in using archival documents between Korean 
researchers and American researchers. American researchers did have more access to the 
archives in the U.S. and in fact, they had the opportunity to discover more documents on No Gun 
Ri. However, the images and contents of documents on the Internet and information sharing 
among researchers made it easy for Korean researchers to review such documents as well. Even 
though Korean researchers were not able to expand the archival evidence on the event, they still 
had tried to visit archives and records centers in Korea to search for documentation. In terms of 
discovering archival evidence, Korean researchers had only limited outcomes, but in the use of 
them there were no big differences between the researchers. 
 
Research Question 2: Has the research of the No Gun Ri massacre changed in light of an 
expansion of available archival resources? 
The analysis of the relationship between the No Gun Ri discussions and the emergence of 
archival materials in publications explicitly displayed that archival documents definitely 
influenced research on No Gun Ri. The No Gun Ri discussions emerged and developed along 
with the expansion of new and available archival documents or new recognition of already-
known documents. When a new archival document was discovered, researchers’ interest on No 
Gun Ri was heightened and subsequent new documents further inspired research on specific 
aspects suggested by those documents. Edward Daily-related military documents, the Roger’s 
memo and Muccio’s letter were clear examples of such cases. 
Archival evidence was the main source for generating controversy, as especially seen in 
the controversy over the veracity of the interview testimony of Edward Daily. Daily finally 
accepted that he could not dispute the archival evidence and said what he had originally testified 
 206 
might have been heard secondhand and was not his direct experience. As another example, 
refugee-related policy and air strike policy documents provided the contextual information on the 
incident to No Gun Ri researchers. As more researchers became involved in this project, more 
policy documents were discovered, and it was finally understood that harsh refugee-related 
policies were issued for the whole war period. The exodus of refugees nationwide was very 
troublesome throughout the war in Korea, and No Gun Ri was merely one more place that saw 
the same problem.262 These circumstances offered the researchers a clearer understanding of the 
incident, from a bigger picture, as articulated by the researchers in the interviews with this author.  
A pattern generally seen from the earliest research to the most recent, and as explored 
supporting source materials on the No Gun Ri research diverged and increased, No Gun Ri 
discussions became more specific and focused. At first, survivors’ oral history was the most used 
source for researchers, but as more archival evidence was discovered, it was used more often 
than other source materials. Early research concentrated on the discussions of the general 
descriptions of how the incident happened, but later discussions were developed on more focused 
issues, such as which army unit participated, the veracity of some veterans’ interview testimony, 
various approaches to understand the actual war situations in the broader area, how refugee 
policies worked on lower army unites, the relations between the ground force and the air force in 
war operations, reasonable inference for the number of victims, other possible causes for the 
atrocity, and the interpretation of certain military records. On these focused and detailed 
discussions, archival materials were more influential than other source materials. 
However, the level of archival materials’ influence seemed to be different between that 
shown from actual research and that perceived by researchers. Many No Gun Ri researchers in 
                                                 
262 In fact, after No Gun Ri was publicized, there were many other similar incidents (more than 60) that were alleged 
to have happened in Korea. 
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interviews with this author confessed that they did not consider archival documents more 
important than the oral histories of survivors and veterans. They considered oral history as the 
most important source for building their arguments and tried to use archival materials as 
supplementary evidence to support the oral histories. Even though their perception on archival 
documents was not exactly in accordance with what they expressed in their research, the impact 
of the archival sources cannot be overlooked. Obviously, No Gun Ri researchers cited archival 
materials a great number of times in their publications. Archival materials definitely played an 
important role in the No Gun Ri research as it was a device to draw researcher’s attention, as an 
impetus for further research, and as evidence for specific discussions on the event. 
In this sense, archival sources became an important foundation on which to build and 
influence the public knowledge of No Gun Ri. In the whole of No Gun Ri’s public knowledge 
building process, archival documents certainly played a role to lead, expand, and refine 
discussions and, in a larger sense, archival documents played a role in establishing the No Gun Ri 
history and its public memory, particularly as one of the major sources for related and 
collaborative evidence. Even before No Gun Ri became known to the general public, survivors 
had accumulated their own archives and used the information therein to bolster their allegations. 
They also provided the archives to other researchers, and these archives thus became the basis of 
materials for the early research on No Gun Ri. Later, researchers discovered more archival 
documents and shared them with other researchers and the general readership, with additional 
information such as video clips of the interviews with survivors, veterans, and other experts in 
law and the military, through the Internet. Such information, by and large, became the 
fundamental building blocks of No Gun Ri’s history, embracing all the supporting source 
materials thereby creating the controversies and promoting the discussions in research. As a 
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whole, the public memory of No Gun Ri has been built based on the discovery of related archival 
materials, the accumulation of survivors’ and veterans’ collective memories and their own 
archives, and through the sharing of such information.  
The expectation that archival materials should imply “the truthfulness” of a certain event 
actually did not seem to exist in researchers’ minds regarding the No Gun Ri case. The 
importance of interpretation of archival documents for No Gun Ri research was one of the issues 
that researchers mentioned. Even though they gave significant credibility to archival materials 
for specific discussions, researchers still warned that archival documents could be very 
subjective and biased. Especially since No Gun Ri was a wrongdoing perpetrated by American 
soldiers, many researchers saw that honest and accurate military records may not have been 
created by those same soldiers. Therefore, the paradigm of truthfulness as a component of an 
archival record was not applicable in No Gun Ri research.  In this sense, the concept of “record” 
could be revisited through the process of No Gun Ri research. As Brien Brothman suggested 
while considering the weak sense of record, other interpretive contexts – economic, institutional, 
political, sociological, philosophical, psychological, cultural, historical and so on - around a 
record would “determine the nature of those very documents that have served to entrench the 
primacy of juridical conceptions of record and record making in the first place,”263 and this 
concept of record works better in the case of No Gun Ri research.   
The interpretation of and the contentions over the records were two of the many 
contributing elements of No Gun Ri research particularly in the process of seeking the truth of 
the incident. In this process, there were disputes among researchers about the untruthfulness or 
insufficiency of evidence in documents and there also was a different recognition (of weight) of 
                                                 
263 Brien Brothman, “Afterglow: Conceptions of Record and Evidence in Archival Discourse,” Archival Science 2 
(2002): 321. 
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certain documents by different researchers. Many controversies and discussions over the details 
of No Gun Ri were raised, argued, and developed due to different interpretations of some 
archival documents, especially military records, among researchers. Depending on the point of 
view on the incident, some documents were considered more important than others and 
interpreted differently. As a quick example, many researchers considered a document from a 
neighboring regiment that read “No Refugee to cross the frontline. Fire everyone trying to cross 
lines” as important evidence to provide a context around No Gun Ri, but the U.S. government’s 
investigative team did not take that observation into account for No Gun Ri based on the fact that 
the document did not come from the same army unit as that accused of perpetrating the crime. 
Due to the ambiguous aspects of the incident, interpretation of documents had a great impact on 
No Gun Ri discussion. 
 
Research Question 3: What does the use of archival materials in the building of knowledge 
about the No Gun Ri massacre reveal about the actual state of researchers’ archival use in 
conducting research on recent history? 
The methods that No Gun Ri researchers utilized for using archives and conducting their 
research did not seem to be very different from any other historical research. Similar to other 
existing archival user studies, No Gun Ri researchers used informal sources more often than 
formal sources to seek relevant materials. This is especially due to the efforts of the survivors’ 
organization and some journalists in sharing related materials. This finding is in accordance with 
earlier user studies conducted in the archival field with other subject groups of users such as 
genealogists and historians.  It was noted that these groups “relied more heavily on colleagues 
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and an informal network than on archivists.”264  
No Gun Ri researchers developed strong networks of source information sharing with 
other researchers who shared a similar viewpoint about the incident. They provided their own 
information to colleague and researchers and in some cases, they seemed to have prioritized the 
public interest or the honor for their own military group over the institutional interest in terms of 
sharing information. When the AP reporters encountered a problem with publishing further 
research, they shared their own discovered archival documents with some Korean journalists. A 
military historian shared what he discovered from military documents from the standpoint of 
American veterans with other journalists who shared the same understanding about the event and 
who themselves were veterans of this army unit. Therefore, informal networking for information 
was vividly seen in No Gun Ri research.  
This pattern of the use of archival materials for No Gun Ri research suggests one very 
important concern to archivists. As mentioned, in the process of No Gun Ri research, it was 
survivors and journalists who approached other researchers with related archival materials as a 
way to expand social awareness of the event and to advertise the story. The majority of other 
researchers were passively provided such materials. These passionate, initial researchers 
discovered, advertised, and brought the archival materials to their colleagues. Therefore, the 
delivery of archival materials to potential archives users was not carried out by archivists or any 
information professionals in the No Gun Ri case. However, No Gun Ri researchers admitted and 
agreed in the interviews with this author that they still wished archives had provided a more 
proactive outreach to let researchers know about their archival holdings and wished archival 
searching tools were more efficient both in format and in content. 
                                                 
264 Wendy M. Duff and Catherine A. Johnson, “Where Is the List with All the Names? Information-Seeking 
Behavior of Genealogists,” American Archivist 66 (Spring/Summer 2003): 93-94. 
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One phenomenon identified as a result of this study was that digitizing archival 
documents and making them available online greatly promoted researchers’use of them. It was 
the result of a few news agencies’ endeavors in the No Gun Ri case that placed the images and 
contents of related archival documents on the web; this in turn resulted in greater efficiency in 
research by other colleagues who were not able to travel abroad to search materials or who were 
not familiar with archives.  In fact, the archival community has discussed more active approaches 
to their patrons by utilizing digital technology of their holdings for some time. However, it was 
shown in the case of No Gun Ri that archivists and the archival community were still not very 
proactive in promoting and making available archival materials to researchers. Rather, it was 
journalists who did the work that archivists should have considered. Various proactive services 
made available to archival users will definitely bring more users to archives. As Helen Tibbo 
maintains, making archives’ web sites more reliable sources of extensive information will 
promote the use of archives (and it was proven true in the No Gun Ri case). She also addresses 
the importance of advertising the presence of this information to the user community as a 
proactive approach to patrons; in other words, it is time to think about creating such an archival 
database.265  
Another interesting finding is that the active archival users in No Gun Ri research were 
not typical archives users. The general public (survivors and family) and journalists were some 
of the most frequent archives-goers in addition to historians (including military historians). 
These researchers were the heaviest contributors to the discovery of new archival documents and 
expanded interests in such materials among other researchers. Even though one law scholar did 
not discover any critical documents, he mentioned that he went to search for the United Nations 
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the Digital Age,” American Archivist 66 (Spring/Summer 2003): 29. 
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documents and other diplomatic documents in some archival collections himself. Additionally, 
when a researcher needed to seek critical archival documents, he showed such an active interest 
that he actually moved to the Washington D.C. area for many months to conduct such a search. 
Another researcher deployed his acquaintances to archives abroad when he was not able to travel 
for further archival searching.  
No Gun Ri researchers also wished to have topically-prepared information reference 
materials about archival holdings. With regard to library materials, there have been various 
published subject-reference tools dealing with many different approaches to subjects. Library 
reference tools now include a great many different databases for a variety of topical indexes and 
catalogues. If there was a reference tool for Korean War records covering various record formats 
from multiple archives, it would have been a great source for No Gun Ri researchers. The 
Foreign Relations of the United States was used for No Gun Ri research, but more specific 
subject coverage might have been a better source for researchers. Even with regards to a 
representative reference tool of archives, finding aids, some researchers mentioned difficulty or 
unfamiliarity using them. One way to solve this problem would be a more proactive archival user 
education program. Another possible approach could be to develop archival description and 
descriptive standards as a way to provide contexts and processes surrounding records with a 
value-driven selection of facts that could display a story on record contents, as asserted by 
Wendy Duff and Verne Harris.266 This approach would have been more helpful for the No Gun 
Ri research, if it had been materialized in archives. 
                                                 
266 Wendy Duff and Verne Harris, “Stories and Names: Archival Description as Narrating Records and Constructing 
Meanings,” Archival Science 2:3-4 (2002): 263-285. 
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7.2 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY AND FURTHER RESEARCH DIRECTION 
Limitations 
During the process of this study, the author encountered unexpected limitations which were not 
identified at the beginning. The following are the limitations and how they affected this study. 
Interviewees sometimes talked in general about their experience of using archives and 
archival materials. Some No Gun Ri researchers conducted their No Gun Ri research as a part of 
bigger research projects. When No Gun Ri research appeared as a part of an article, a book, or 
other work, the researchers tend to talk about their experiences in archives in general, not just 
about No Gun Ri in particular. Therefore, interview results, in part, describe a more 
comprehensive experience of using archives than as a specific case of No Gun Ri research.  No 
specific patterns on general archival searching compared to that of No Gun Ri searching were 
identified, but these researchers used broader terms and tended to mention a generalized idea 
about archives. 
American news articles were retrieved from the LexisNexis database (LexisNexis 
Academic) for the publication analysis in this study; this database also includes news transcripts. 
Oftentimes some of the news transcripts were not actually chosen to be published in an actual 
newspaper. Therefore, the news articles analyzed here might have included some news 
transcripts that would not have been read by readers; however, these situations occurred mostly 
with short, fact-describing news articles, rather than lengthy, research-oriented articles. The 
author assumes, therefore, the influence of this limitation to this study is extremely small.  
Government researchers were not always easy to identify. In the case of the U.S. 
government’s investigation report of the incident, there was no mention about who the actual 
researchers were. The names identified in the report were only the higher ranking officers who 
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were in charge of this case, such as the Secretary of the Army and the Inspector General, and 
those who were in the outside advisory group. There was a similar situation with the case of the 
Korean report, but this author could determine that some of the top officials of the investigation 
published articles later in journals about the incident and the process of the government 
investigation. However, it was again not easy to identify their contact information or receive a 
response from them. Therefore, the author was only able to conduct interviews with journalists, 
historians, a survivor’s family member, and academic researchers in other areas, excluding 
government investigators in both countries.  
 
Further Research Direction  
In the phase of ending the study, it was understood that the findings of this study only confirmed 
that more research needs to be done to understand about archives’ users from their research point 
of view and how archival services can satisfy their needs. A topical approach to archives users 
will allow one to observe who the active archival users are (who have not been previously 
identified as typical archives users from usual user studies), how they locate/approach/use 
archival materials and how archival holdings influence their research. In the No Gun Ri case, 
there were many different groups of researchers other than historians who went to archives to 
search for materials. It was identified that No Gun Ri researchers exhibited very positive attitudes 
in searching for archival evidence. Archival materials considerably influenced discussions on the 
incident throughout the most publications. These are valuable findings about archives users from 
the No Gun Ri study, but the need still exists for more topical user studies to identify 
generalizable findings from empirical situations of the actual users and the actual research 
products.  In fact, the archival community has shown little interest on the archival user as seen 
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from actual historical research. More research with a narrowed topical approach like this study 
would generate empirical insights on the realistic status of the usage of archival holdings. 
This study also raised more questions than it actually answered about drawing a clear 
picture of the correlation between archival documents and the public knowledge and/or public 
memory of an event. Archival documents previously had been seen as one of the most 
influencing source materials on public memory through research in the archival field. However, 
there has been little research in the archival field that addresses the empirical understanding on 
the impact of archival materials on the public memory of a certain event. In the No Gun Ri case, 
it was proved that archival materials played an important role in creating public knowledge and 
played a part in building public memory. However, No Gun Ri is still an on-going event which 
has not been yet settled legally and whose history needs more accumulation and comprehension 
in research. Therefore, it would be meaningful to research an analysis of the relationship between 
archival materials and public memory in selecting another historical event that has already been 
researched/ remembered/ revisited/ reconstructed for some time. It could provide a better 
understanding for the current role of archival materials in creating public memory in an empirical 
setting.  
However, even though No Gun Ri became known quite recently, it drew a great attention 
from the public as well as researchers in various fields.  Therefore, as more publicity about the 
incident was gained in Korea as well as in the U.S., more approaches to the incident from various 
aspects have been attempted. Since the first publicity, books have been written, conferences and 
symposiums convened, cartoons created, a movie filmed, and numerous exhibitions held about 
the No Gun Ri massacre. With the understanding that all these activities of remembering and 
recollecting work as building blocks for public memory, further research about the public 
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memory of No Gun Ri, presented through these activities, can be performed. In this way, more 
diverse approaches to the No Gun Ri history could be possible beyond seen from archival 
materials.  
In addition, users’ perceptions of record should be understood by archivists and applied to 
archival services. In the No Gun Ri case, archival records were used to increase the credibility of 
evidence, mainly with absolute facts or circumstantial information. Records were not perceived 
to represent the truthfulness of a certain activity. Some records, whose contents could be 
interpreted in multiple ways, were not given full credibility by researchers. In fact, No Gun Ri 
research exhibited two different versions of the story - Korean survivors’ and the U.S. 
government’s - and interpretation of military records from one point of view was different from 
that of another’s. Due to this situation, researchers considered records as supplementary evidence 
for oral history and as accountable evidence only for factual information.  They instead regarded 
the context surrounding records more important (for example, missing records from the 7th 
Regiment) and believed the interpretation process to be an essential step of their research. In this 
sense, researchers’ perceptions about the property of a record, its characteristics, and its 
definition should be considered in further research in the archival field because how they think of 
records will determine how they use them. Thus, if how users think of archives is different from 
how archivists think of them, the service that archivists offer their users might not be fully 
effective and helpful to their users. Therefore, further research about the concept of records 
perceived by archival researchers in an empirical situation should be attempted to better 
understand their archives’ users and their research and finally provide truly helpful and efficient 
services. 
 217 
7.3 CONCLUSION 
In this study, there was no preconceived idea or extant theory to verify in the first place. From 
the collected data by content analysis of publications and interview, the author tried to find an 
explanation and tendency of researchers’ work patterns and the relationship and impact of 
archival materials in their work. By understanding the uniqueness of the No Gun Ri massacre, 
about the massacre itself and the research process, this study began with the basic premise that 
archival documents played an important role in the process of building public knowledge of the 
incident. In fact, archival documents were essential source materials to researchers for their 
publications and a major player for stimulating heated controversies and discussions and, 
consequently, providing the impetus for further publications to No Gun Ri researchers.  
In this process of understanding the No Gun Ri research and the researchers, some 
specific aspects and phenomena were identified. The following is a brief summary of these 
findings learned from this study.  
1. From the publication analysis, it was revealed that archival materials were used to 
support the details of researchers’ arguments an enormous number of times. However, in the 
interviews it was determined that many researchers, in reality, considered oral history as the most 
valuable and influential evidence for their major ideas and they used archival documents to 
provide hard facts related to the details of oral history.  That is, major arguments were built based 
on the oral histories of survivors and veterans, and then later, researchers sought archival 
evidence for specific facts and details that, in part, confirmed their arguments. Oral history was 
the primary source for building arguments of the majority of researchers in their perception, 
unlike the assumption that archival materials would be the chief source in research. Also, the 
researchers acknowledged that there could be many cases of incompleteness and bias of archival 
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documents, especially military records created in a harsh war situation. The U.S. government’s 
investigative team and an American military historian announced their suspicions of “collective 
memory” and the infallibility of human memory, but most other researchers seemed to accept 
oral history as a major source. 
 2. Not everyone was aware of archives and eager to search for evidence at the same level. 
Some researchers were more intent on obtaining archival evidence than others. These major 
discoverers of archival documents showed very active attitudes for searching within archives. 
However, the majority of other researchers only passively approached archival documents due to 
information sharing by survivors and other journalists and web postings of the image files of 
major documents. The major archival researchers for No Gun Ri were survivors and families of 
the incident (none of them had a history or research background), some journalists from major 
news agencies and some historians (including a military historian). The portion of historians 
among the active archival researchers was rather small, unlike archivists’ preconceptions about 
users. 
 3. There was no big difference in the behavior of No Gun Ri researchers, in general, in 
searching archives and conducting research. Many researchers began their research on No Gun 
Ri when they first obtained critical archival documents (either through their own discovery or by 
being provided by other researchers). All of them had a general interest in the incident. From 
such interest, the incident at No Gun Ri caught their attention. Thus, when they were then 
exposed to related evidence, they finally began further and more indepth research. Many 
researchers often began their research by “tracking down” relevant materials from other related 
research’s citations. Then they attempted narrowing their searches within archives.  Some 
researchers with a history background seemed to be more familiar with using archives than 
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others. However, even historians with a number of prior archival experiences still met with 
difficulty when using searching tools that finally lead to the actual archival evidence and also in 
terms of a practical approach to making copies of actual documents. 
4. Archival materials played a critical role in understanding the No Gun Ri incident.  
Archival documents were the critical pieces of evidence for specific information about the 
incident as well as a good source for the background and circumstantial information. Dates, 
military positions and movements, the war situations at Yongdong, as well as the general refugee 
policies and the air bombardment policies during that time and over the whole wartime were 
confirmed and proved through the use of archival documents. General record keeping situations 
such as missing documents (not the actual contents of them) also provided a circumstantial 
context of the incident. Major controversies over the incident were raised and argued based on 
the new discovery of archival documents.  
5. Even though archival materials were used heavily in the No Gun Ri research, their 
truthfulness was not fully accepted by the researchers. Interpretation of archival documents was 
the most important procedure in the No Gun Ri research, and a certain record could be used in 
different contexts with different interpretations according to a researcher’s argument. In fact, for 
the No Gun Ri massacre where there exist two conflicting versions of the story, interpretation of 
documents varied according to a researcher’s argument. The fact that military documents were 
created and maintained by those who were responsible for the No Gun Ri killing made 
researchers suspicious about the trustworthiness of the documents. Therefore, many researchers 
tried to find and use only hard facts and absolute details from documents. In this sense, No Gun 
Ri researchers did not give full credibility to all archival documents as evidence to understanding 
the incident. 
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These aforementioned findings provide concrete ideas of how archival materials were 
used in the actual research, the impact of archival sources on the No Gun Ri research, the actual 
research patterns of No Gun Ri researchers and how they located and approached archival 
materials for their research. From these findings, additional insights could shed light on future 
directions of archival activities to approach potential archives users. 
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APPENDIX A.  
LIST OF PUBLICATIONS ON THE NO GUN RI MASSACRE 
A.1 LIST OF PUBLICATIONS BEFORE SEPTEMBER 29 1999 
<Journalistic Publications> 
 
Author Title Journal Title/ Publisher, Publication Year Page 
1 
Oh, 
Yeon-ho  
오연호 
First Testimony – Massacre of 300 Villagers by 
the American Soldiers in Yong-dong Chung-buk 
in the Korean War  
최초증언 6.25 참전 미군의 충북 영동 양민 
3 백여명 학살 사건 
Monthly Mal, July 1994 
월간  말 1994 년 
7 월호 
36-45 
2 Hwang, 
Sun-gu 
황순구 
Survivors of No Gun Ri Claim Compensation to 
the U.S. 
미군 노근리 양민 학살 피해 유가족/ 미에 
손해배상 요구계획 
Hankyoreh, July 3 1994  
한겨레  July 3 1994 pg. 15 
3 Hwang, 
Sun-gu 
황순구 
American Massacre/ Time for Memorials of the 
No Gun Ri Victims 
미군 양민학살' 노근리의 제사철 
Hankyoreh, July 21 
1994  
한겨레 July 21 1994 
pg. 17 
4 Hwang, 
Sun-gu 
황순구 
U.S. Soldiers’ Massacre of Refugees/ Survivors 
Organization Legal Claim to Government 
한국전 당시 미군 양민집단학살/ 
노근리대책위 국가상대 손배소 
Hankyoreh, August 25 
1994  
한겨레 August 25 
19944 
 
5 So, 
Chung-
gwon 
서중권 
Refugee Killing by US Soldiers in the Korean 
War/ Legal Claim to Government 
6.25 때 미군이 양민학살/ 국가 상대로 손배소 
제기 
Munhwa Ilbo, August 
27 1997 
문화일보, August 27 
1997 
pg. 29 
6 Chi, 
Chang-
eun 
지창은 
The Massacre of Korean Refugees by American 
Solders, Need to Claim for Compensation 
미군 양민학살, 국가 배상하라 
Hankyoreh 21, 174, 
Sept. 11 1997 
한겨레 21, 174 호, 
Sept. 11 1997 
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 Yi, Sung-
han 
이승한 
40 년 전 집단학살, 왜 쏘았나 
Kungmin Ilbo June 15 
1998 
국민일보 June 15 1998 
pg. 21 
7 Yi, Sung-
han 
이승한 
Seeking for Truth and Compensation/ Eun-yong 
Chong, President of Survivors’ Organization 
진상밝히고 피해보상을/ 노근리학살사건 
대책위원장 정은용씨 
Kungmin Ilbo June 15 
1998 
국민일보 June 15 1998 
pg. 21 
8 Yun, 
Sang-ho 
윤상호 
Eun-yong Chong, President of Survivors’ 
Organization 
정은용 '노근리 사건' 대책 위원장 
Tong-A Ilbo July 27 
1998 
동아일보 July 27 1998 
pg. 17 
9 Oh, 
Yeon-ho 
오연호 
American Soldier Finally Testify the Massacre 
of 400 Refugees in Yongdong in July 1950 
50 년 7 월 영동주민 400 명 학살관련 미 
제 1 기병사단 병사들 마침내 입열다 
Wolgan Mal 156, June 
1999 
월간 말 156, June 1999 
77-79 
 
<Academic Publications> 
 
Author Title Journal Title/ Publisher, Publication Year Page 
1 Chong, 
Eun-yong 
정은용 
Have You Heard of Our Agony?  
그대, 우리의 아픔을 아는가  
Seoul: Tari Media, 
1994 
다리 미디어, 1994 
 
2 Choi, 
Pyong-su 
and Ku-do 
Chong 
최병수, 
정구도 
A Study on A Massacre of Civilians in 
Young-dong area,  Chung-chong Province in 
the Early Stage of the Korean War (1)  
6.25 동란 초기 충북 영동지구의 민간인 
살상사건에 관한 연구(1) : 老斤里의 美軍 
對良民 集團殺傷事件을 중심으로 
Journal of Humanities 
17:1 (1999) 
人文 學誌 - 
충북대학교 
인문과학연구소 17:1 
(1999) 
245-
283 
A.2 LIST OF PUBLICATIONS FROM SEPTEMBER 29 1999 TO MAY 10 2000 
<Journalistic Publications> 
 Author Title Journal Title/ Publisher, Publication Year Page 
1 
Choe Sang-Hun 
Charles J. Hanley 
and Martha 
Mendoza 
War’s Hidden Chapter: Ex-GIs Tell of 
Killing Korean Refugees 
Associated Press 
9/29/1999  
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2 
Choe Sang-Hun 
Charles J. Hanley 
and Martha 
Mendoza 
Korean Villagers Recall Death and 
Terror Beneath A Bridge 
Associated Press 
9/29/1999  
3 
Charles J. Hanley 
and Martha 
Mendoza 
It's been good to talk about these 
things 
Associated Press 
9/29/1999  
4 황순구 Hwang Sun-gu  
노근리 양민학살 대책위원장 
정은용씨 우리정부의 무관심 분통 
미국배상 받아낼 터 
Chong Eun-Yong the Representative 
of No Gun Ri Victims’ Organization 
Expresses Indignation with Our 
Government’s Indifference  
한겨레 Hankyoreh 
9/29/1999  
5 황순구 Hwang Sun-gu  
노근리 피난민 적으로 취급하라: 
미군 양민학살 공식문서 확인 
Treat Them as Enemy: American 
Documents Discovered  
한겨레 Hankyoreh 
9/30/1999 Pg. 1 
6 황순구/ 오철우 이본영 
피난민 500 여명 모아놓고 무자비한 
전투기 폭격/ 제네바 협약 근거로 
정부가 협의 나서야 
한겨레 Hankyoreh 
9/30/1999 Pg. 14 
8 김의구 6.25 '노근리 비극' 실체 벗겨지나 국민일보 9/29/1999 Pg. 19 
10 지명훈, 이기진 AP 통신, 한국전 ㄷ때 '미군의 양민 대량 학살사건' 특집기사 
동아일보 
9/30/1999 pg. 21 
11 유태종 AP '노근리 사건' 보도: 미군 6.25 때 양민학살 문서확인 조선일보 9/30/1999 pg. 29 
12 김영이 50 년만에 드러난 미군 만행 경향신문 9/30/1999 pg. 23 
13 Elizabeth Becker Pentagon Says It Can Find NoProof of Massacre 
New York Times 
9/30/1999 A16:5 
16 황순구 노근리학살 폭로한 AP 최상훈 기자 한겨레 Hankyoreh 10/1/1999 pg. 7 
17 황순구 Hwang Sun-gu  
 노근리 양민학살 곳곳에 참극 상흔 
온가족 몰살 호적정리도 못해 
The Scene of Tragedy Everywhere in 
No Gu Ri  
한겨레 Hankyoreh 
10/1/1999 
18 황순구 노근리 양민학살/ 굴다리입구 기관총설치 무차별 발포 
한겨레 Hankyoreh 
10/1/1999 pg. 6 
19 승인배 미 킨 사단장 명령서 조선일보 10/1/1999 pg. 29 
20 조무주 노근리 양민학살' 호적에도 흔적 국민일보 10/1/1999 pg. 5 
21  노근리 사건 생존자 증언 서울신문 10/1/1999 pg. 21 
22 Charles J. Hanley Korean Vets Could Have Been Court-Martialed But Not Today, Experts Say
Associated Press 
10/1/1999 
23 David Briscoe Review of 50-Year-Old Korean Incident Could Take a Year 
Associated Press 
10/1/1999 
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24 Paul Richter Pentagon Will Investigate Vets' Massacre Story 
Los Angeles Times 
10/1/1999 pg.1 
25 Elizabeth Becker U.S. to Revisit Accusations of a Massacre By G.I.'s in '50 
New York Times 
10/1/1999 A3:4 
26  A Dark Korean War Episode Belatedly Comes to Light 
USA Today 
10/1/1999 18A 
27 Michael Dobbs, Roberto Suro 
Army Dismissed Massacre 
Allegation; Koreans Sought Redress 
for 5 Years; Cohen Orders Probe 
Washington Post 
10/1/1999 A01 
28 윤희영 한국인 기자의 숨은 노력 있었다; ap '노근리' 보도 
조선일보 
10/2/1999 pg. 35 
29 오일만, 최철호 노근리 양민학살 규명 급진전 배경 서울신문 10/2/1999 pg. 21 
30 국기연 노근리 학살/ 미 칼데라 육군장관 긴급 회견 
세계일보 
10/2/1999 pg. 5 
31 윤승용 [노근리학살] 미언론 "학살 의심 여지없다" 
한국일보 
10/2/1999 pg. 26 
32 박두식 노근리 사건' ap 보도 파장 조선일보 10/2/1999 pg. 33 
33 유태종 노근리 사람들' 그후의 삶 조선일보 10/2/1999 pg. 33 
34 한민수 [노근리사건] 정부 '진상조사' 표현조차 인색 
국민일보 
10/2/1999 pg. 5 
35  미 교회 협의회 '노근리' 정의의 대가 받아야 
국민일보 
10/2/1999 pg. 5 
36 홍은택 [노근리 재조사] '반인륜 대량학살' 미 언론에 밀려 
동아일보 
10/2/1999 pg. 30 
37 김학준 [김학준 칼럼] '노근리 학살'과 국가 기록 
동아일보 
10/2/1999 pg. 6 
38 김도연 노근리' 보도 최상훈씨 "진실규명 역사 바로쓰고파" 
문화일보 
10/2/1999 pg. 5 
39 
Charles J. 
Hanley, Martha 
Mendoza 
Unanswered Questions Still Haunt 
Korean Killing Field 
Associated Press 
10/2/1999 
40 Sang-hun Choe 
South Korean President Seeks U.S. 
Cooperation in Probing Reported 
Killings 
Associated Press 
10/2/1999 
41 Calvin Sims South Koreans Call on U.S. To Apologize For Killings 
New York Times 
10/2/1999 A6:6 
42 
Richard T. 
Cooper and Judy 
Pasternak 
Fear, Confusion Fueled Korean 
Massacre; War: Ill-trained and Under 
Attack, U.S. Soldiers Agonized but 
Followed Order 
Los Angeles Times 
10/3/1999 pg. 1 
43  The Atrocity Allegations New York Times 10/3/1999 
pg. 
4.16 
44 Craig R. Whitney No Place for Civilians New York Times 10/3/1999 pg. 4.4 
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45 원재연 노근리 양민학살 사건 의문점 투성이 
세계일보 
10/4/1999 pg. 4 
46 김영이 시신매장 참여 이근복옹이 전한 '노근리 학살' 참상 
경향신문 
10/4/1999 pg. 27 
47 Michael Munk Nogun-ri Massacre: The Record of the First Cav's 2nd of the 7th in Korea
http://www.kimsoft.co
m/1997/nogun.htm
10/4/1999 
48 오연호 노근리와 AP 와 사대주의 한겨레 Hankyoreh 10/5/1999 
49 김도형 
노근리 한미 공동조사 추진, 정부 
미에 제의키로. 중순이전 합조단 
발족 
한겨레 Hankyoreh 
10/5/1999 pg. 2 
50  [LA 타임스] "노근리사건 오판등 복합적인 결과" 
한국일보 
10/5/1999 pg. 22 
51  노근리학살 무지, 오판서 비롯 -- 
LA 타임스 분석 
경향신문 
10/5/1999 pg. 2 
52 Kim Yong Geun A Korean’s View of No Gun Ri 
The Christian Science 
Monitor 
10/6/1999 
pg. 8 
53 James Webb The Bridge at No Gun Ri Wall Street Journal 10/6/1999 
54 최보식, 장일현 
노근리 생존자 증언,미군, 주민 
700 여명 나흘간 인솔 철길 내몬뒤 
기총소사-매복 사격 
조선일보 
10/6/1999 pg. 31 
55 최보식, 장일현 노근리 사건' 밝혀야할 쟁점; 이웃마을 주민은 왜 끌고 갔나 
조선일보 
10/6/1999 pg. 4 
57 지명훈 노근리 학살' 시신 발굴한다 동아일보 10/7/1999 pg. 22 
58 진철수 <미군 '노근리'양민학살> 당시 참전병사 2 인의 증언 
문화일보 
10/7/1999 pg. 5 
59 홍은택 노근리 총격가담 미 병사 증언, "부대장 전원사살 명령" 
동아일보 
10/8/1999 pg. 5 
60 윤희영 노근리 미군들 잇단 증언 조선일보 10/8/1999 pg. 4 
61 Carl F. Bernard 
Commentary; Perspective On 
Warfare; "We Were a Speed Bump 
for the North Koreans"; If Civilians 
Were Massacred at No Gun Ri, It Was 
By Untrained and Under-equipped 
U.S. Soldiers Under Brutal Assault 
Los Angeles Times 
10/8/1999 pg. 9 
62 황순구, 김규원 노근리 희생자 사망장소 "철교아래" 기록 발견 
한겨레 Hankyoreh 
10/9/1999 pg. 22 
63 David Steinberg(?) 
<특별기고> '노근리' 저변에 깔린 
인종편견 
문화일보 
10/9/1999 pg. 7 
64 조호연 정부, '노근리학살' 자료 방치 경향신문 10/11/1999 pg. 1 
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65  "I've Tried to Repent" Newsweek 10/11/1999 58 
66  I Still Hear Screams Newsweek 10/11/1999 59 
67 Joseph L. Galloway New light on an old atrocity 
U.S. News & Work 
Report 127:14 
10/11/1999 
49 
68 노향란 [사이버세계] 노근리 학살사건 반응 한국일보 10/13/1999 pg. 7 
69 이승철, 김석구 <들어봅시다> 정해주 노근리사건 대책단장, 국무조정실장 
경향신문 
10/13/1999 pg. 7 
70 Sang-hun Choe 
Top U.S. Official Promises Close 
Coordination in No Gun Ri 
Investigation 
Associated Press 
10/13/1999 
71 배연해 Pae Yon-hae  
충북 영동 노근리 양민학살 미군은 
피란민을 적으로 취급했다 : 
AP 통신 한국전쟁 당시 미군 
작전명령서 최초 확인 
American Soldiers Treat No Gun Ri 
Villagers as Enemy: The AP 
Confirmed Operational Records of the 
Korean War for this Issue  
주간한국 Weekly 
Hanguk  
1791 
10/14/1999 
44-45 
72 이주훈 분명 학살인데 우리는 왜 침묵했나 
주간한국 1791 
Weekly Hanguk 1791 
10/14/1999 
46-47 
73 이기봉 노근리 학살의 진상, 사건진실 일부 부풀려졌다 
주간동아   
Weekly Donga 204 
10/14/1999 
74 김의구 노근리' 특종보도 AP 통신 최상훈 기자 
국민일보 
10/16/1999 pg. 5 
75 유병권 <'노근리 양민학살' 화두풀기> 전문가 5 인 사이버 대담 
문화일보 
10/16/1999 pg. 8 
76 Robert Burns Cohen Sets Up Oversight Group for Alleged Massacre in Korea 
Associated Press 
10/16/1999 
77 김상온 "No Gun Ri" 와 "제 7 기병대" 국민일보 10/21/1999 pg. 6 
78 황순구 노근리 학살 미군 국군도 적으로 간주' 
한겨레 Hankyoreh 
10/22/1999 pg. 14 
80 
Col. David 
Hughes, 
USAP(ret) 
The Harder Lessons of No Gun Ri Voice of the Grunt 10/22/1999 
81 Paul Richter 
Deal Weighed in Korean War Slaying 
Probe; Military: Pentagon may grant 
blanket immunity for all GIs 
connected to alleged massacre of 
civilians. Some legal experts question 
move. 
Los Angeles Times 
10/23/1999 
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82 Peter Hong 
In L.A., Response Muted to Reports 
of GI Atrocities; War: Korean 
American leaders say community 
suspected crimes, but is reluctant to 
criticize ally. 
Los Angeles Times 
10/25/1999 
pg. 1 
83 Bruce Cuming Korean My Lai The Nation 10/25/1999 
84  한국전 당시 미전투기 무차별 공격필름 발굴 
세계일보 
10/25/1999 pg. 2 
85 국기연 노근리사건 관련자 일괄기소면제 검토 
세계일보 
10/25/1999 pg. 4 
86 정운현 [인터뷰] '노근리사건' 첫보도 말지 오연호 기자 
서울신문 
10/27/1999 pg. 15 
87 Doug Struck 
Airing an Ugly Secret; U.S., Seoul 
Fear Massacre Reports May Harm 
Relations 
Washington Post 
10/27/1999 A. 24 
88 Robert Burns No Decision Yet on Legal Immunity for Korea War Vets 
Associated Press 
10/28/1999 
89 정은용 Chong Eun-yong  
중화기로 난민 학살’ 증인 있다 : 
노근리 대책위원장 정은용씨 
‘부풀려졌다’에 반론...미군 6 명도 
자인 ‘공개토론하자’ 
 There Is Evidence for the Massacre: 
Refutation for the ‘Exaggeration in  
Testimony’ and Admission by Six 
American Soldiers  
주간동아   
Weekly Donga 206 
10/28/1999 
48-49 
90 박창식 
쌍굴다리에 먹구름이 낀다 : 노근리 
학살 공동조사단 구성 좌절...학계 
관 중심 대책반에 문제제기 
Clouded in the Bridge Culvert: 
Problems Raised by Academics and 
Governments for the Formation of 
Cooperative Investigation Committee 
Park Chang-sik  
한겨레 21   
Hankyoreh21  
280 
10/28/1999 
28-30 
91 이원섭 Lee, Won-sup 
Madness at Nogun-ri and Bein Hoa 
[Korean War tragedy] 
Korea Focus(Seoul) 
7:6 
11/1/1999 
112-
114 
92 David Briscoe Experts Join Pentagon Investigation into No Gun Ri Killing 
Associated Press 
11/2/1999 
93 김수혜 노근리학살' 기관총사수 데일리씨 단독 인터뷰 
조선일보 
11/3/1999 pg. 3 
94 Sang-hun Choe Ex-GI meets Korean Survivors of Alleged Mass Killing 
Associated Press 
11/4/1999 
95 William J. Aceves 
Investigating War Crimes: The 
Struggle for Accountability Hits 
San Diego Union-
Tribune 
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Home 11/4/1999 
96 박중현 피해자는 용서와 화해, 가해자는 회한과 참회 
조선일보 
11/5/1999 pg. 31 
97 김수혜 노근리 피해자 - 데일리 5 시간 만남 조선일보 11/5/1999 pg. 29 
98 공동취재단 [노근리] 가해자-피해자 '49 년만의 만남' 
한국일보 
11/5/1999 pg. 22 
99 Sang-hun Choe Three Survivors of Korean War Killings Leave For U.S. Visit 
Associated Press 
11/8/1999 
100 최영재 Choi Yong-Jae  
학살 미군 응징할 수 없다?: 국제법 
으로 풀어본 '노근리 사건'/미국의 
전쟁 범죄 다룬 국제 재판 전무 
Cannot Punish the Soldiers who 
Killed Civilians? Understanding ‘No 
Gun Ri Incident’ with International 
Law/ There is Actually No Case to 
Have Dealt with American War 
Crime 
Sisa Journal   
시사저널 524 
11/11/1999 
64-65 
101 William Claiborne 
Unhealed Wounds of Korean War: 
Survivors of Incident Meet With U.S. 
Vets 
Washington Post 
11/11/1999 A03 
102 Gustav Niebuhr 50 Attack in Korea Remembered New York Times 11/11/1999 A14:4 
103 Sang-hun Choe 
Korean Survivors Tell Pentagon 
Stories of Mass Killing By U.S. 
Troops 
Associated Press 
11/12/1999 
105 최갑수 [대한광장] 기록과 국가 서울신문 11/15/1999 pg. 7 
106 Tom Verdin Korean-Americans Remember No Gun Ri 
Associated Press 
11/16/1999 
107 K. Connie Kang Koreans Give Horrifying Accounts of Alleged Attack 
Los Angeles Times 
11/17/1999 pg.1 
108 Kyong-hwa Seok North Korea Proposes Working With South On Killings Probe 
Associated Press 
11/20/1999 
109 Sang-hun Choe U.S., South Korean Investigators Meet to Disscuss No Gun Ri 
Associated Press 
12/14/1999 
110 Jason Ma No Gun Ri: Exploring Reactions to the Korean War Tragedy 
Asian Week 21:18 
12/23/1999 
111 
Sang-hun Choe, 
Charles J. 
Hanley, and 
Martha Mendoza 
Korean, U.S. Witnesses, Backed by 
Military Records, Say Refugees Were 
Strafed 
Associated Press 
12/28/1999 
112 조무주, 한민수 [미군 민간인 공습] "한눈에 피란민 알아봤지만 폭격" 
국민일보 
12/30/1999 pg. 5 
113 지명훈 [미공군 양민공습] "피란민 무차별 총격 … 300 명 희생" 
동아일보 
12/30/1999 pg. 3 
114 Choe Sang-hun U.S. Army Head Rules Out Associated Press 
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Investigation of Every Korean War-
era Allegation 
1/9/2000 
115 김현수 조사 상반기 마무리 노력/ 공동회견 일문일답 
한겨레 Hankyoreh 
1/12/2000 pg. 2 
117 Chong-suk Han What Happened at No Gun Ri? 
International Examiner 
27(2) 
2/1/2000 
pg. 11 
118 Dobbs, Michael  
 Shoot Them All; Half A Century 
After the Korean War Members of the 
7th Cavalry Regiment Had Hoped for 
Recognition; Instead They Are 
Having to Account For What 
Happened at No Gun Ri 
Washington Post 
Magazine 
2/6/2000 
pg. 
W08 
119 김수혜 일징용- 노근리 손배소 '마이클최' 변호사 
조선일보 
2/8/2000 pg. 31 
120 윤승용 [워싱턴저널] WP 사이트 '노근리사건' 공방 
한국일보 
2/10/2000 pg. 11 
121 Beth Gardiner AP Expose of Korean War Killings Wins Investigative Pulitzer 
Associated Press 
4/10/2000 
122 권혁철 노근리보도'로 퓰리처상 받은 최상훈 AP 통신 특파원 
한겨레 Hankyoreh 
4/12/2000 pg. 15 
 
<Academic Publications> 
 Author Title Journal Title/ Publisher, Publication Year Page 
1 오연호 Oh, Yeon-ho  
노근리 그후 : 주한미군범죄 
55 년사 : 20 세기 야만과의 결별을 
위한 현장보고서(제 1 부 노근리의 
진실, 1 장 경부선은 안다) 
After No Gun Ri, the 55 Years History 
of the Crime of American  
Soldiers: Spot Investigation Report to 
Farewell to the Savageness in the 20th 
Century  
Seoul: Monthly Mal  
월간말 
10/28/1999 
 
2 임필수 
노근리, 군사작전으로서의 
양민학살 
<http://kilsp.jinbo.net/publish/99/9911
08.htm>
현장에서 미래를 49 
Nov. 1999  
3 오연호 Oh, Yeon-ho  
노근리,그리고 힘의 질서 
No Gun Ri, the Order of Power  
Contemporary Critiques 
당대비평 9  12/1/1999 
189~ 
202 
4 김찬규 노근리 사건과 시제법 국제법평론 12 12/1/1999 85-89 
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5 
이재곤, 정구도, 
오윤석 
Lee, Chae-gon et 
al  
전시 민간인 보호를 위한 국제법적 
규제: 한국전쟁 시 소위 
‘충북,영동군 황간면 노근리 민간인 
살상사건”과 관련하여 
International Legal Regulation for the 
Protection of Civilians in  
Armed conflict with Special Emphasis 
on the case of No-GunRi Bridge in 
the Korean War  
Chungnam Law  
Study 충남대 
법학연구 
10:1  
12/30/1999 
111-
136 
6 정창인 Chong Chang-in  
‘노근리’ 어떻게 볼 것인가 
 How to Interpret the ‘No Gun Ri 
Incident’  
자유 317 
1/1/2000 18-20 
7 최득진 Choi, Tuk-jin  
 한국전쟁 중 미군에 의한 민간인 
학살사건 
A Massacre of Civilians by American 
Soldiers During the Korean War 
Chung-ang Journal  
of Legal issues 
중앙대법정논총 
49  
1/1/2000 
12-40 
8 이기봉 북한은 노근리 사건을 어떻게 보는가 
북한 338 
2/1/2000  
9 최병수 Choi, Pyong-su  
노근리 양민학살사건에 관한 몇 
가지 검토 : 6.25 동란 초기 
충북영동지구의 민간인 
상해사건에 관한 연구Ⅱ 
A Study on A Massacre of Civilians 
in Young-dong area, Chung-chong 
Province in the Early Stage of the 
Korean War (2)  
Journal of Humanities 
 人文 學誌 - 
충북대학교 
인문과학연구소 
19:1 
2/1/2000 
261-
283 
10 
Sang-hun Choe, 
Charles J. 
Hanley, and 
Martha Mendoza 
The Bridge at No Gun Ri Dissent 47:2 3/1/2000 39-43 
11 
Walzer, Michael  
and Marilyn B. 
Young 
The Bridge at No Gun Ri: Responses Dissent 47:2 3/1/2000 44-46 
12 강정구 Kang, Chong-gu  
노근리의 해원을 넘어 베트남 
학살의 참회로 
To the Confession of the Massacre in 
Vietnam Over the Wide  
Ocean of No Gun Ri Mass Killing  
Hwanghae Cultures  
황해문화 
26 
3/1/2000 
430-
441 
13 조시현 
노근리 등 미군에 의한 민간인 
학살사건에 대한 올바른 대응을 
위한 의견서  
<http://www.humanrights.or.kr/HRLi
brary/HRLibrary 15-shcho2.htm>
4/24/2000  
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A.3 LIST OF PUBLICATIONS FROM MAY 11 2000 TO JANUALRY 11 2001 
<Journalistic Publications> 
Author Title Journal Title/ Publisher, Publication Year Page 
1 Ed Offley New Evidence Challenges No Gun Ri Massacre Charges 
The Stars and Stripes 
5/11/2000 
2 Steven Butler Too Frightened Even to Cry 
US News & World  
Report vol.128, no.20 
5/12/2000 
52 
3 Galloway, Joseph L.  Doubts about a Korean ‘Massacre’ 
US News & World  
Report vol.128, no.21 
5/12/2000 
4  
Reliable Sources?: Examining the 
Discrepancies in Eyewitness 
Accounts 
US News & World  
Report 5/12/2000 
5 송상근 "노근리증언 미군 2 명 당시 현장에 없었다" 동아일보 5/12/2000 1 면 
6 윤승용 미성조지 '노근리는 우발사건' 보도 의미 한국일보 5/12/2000 29 면 
7  "AP 노근리 총격 보도 허위" 조선일보 5/12/2000 2 면 
8 서영석 노근리사건/ 참전 미군등 증언청취, 미정부 배상 적극자세 '청신호' 국민일보 5/12/2000 2 면 
9 정진성 <포럼> 노근리 해법 '인권존중' 문화일보 5/12/2000 6 면 
10 여시동, 최원석 미 성조지 "노근리보도"에 문제제기 조선일보 5/13/2000 4 면 
  미 국방부, AP 통신 ‘노근리 진상’ 설전 국민일보 5/13/2000  
11 Paul Richter 
Questions Raised About No Gun Ri; 
Korea: Army Probe into Alleged 1950 
Massacre Finds Contradictory 
Accounts. One Witness is described 
as 'Not Credible' 
Los Angeles Times 
5/13/2000 pg. 5 
12 Michael Dobbs, Thomas E. Ricks 
Account of GIs' Korean War 
Massacre Challenged 
Los Angeles Times 
5/13/2000 pg. A4 
13 
Becker, 
Elizabeth,  
and Felicity 
Berringer 
Report Disclosing Massacre By G.I.’s 
Is Under Question 
 New York Times 
5/13/2000 Pg.A1 
14 Felicity Barringer Reporters and Editors Defend A.P. Story on Korea Massacre 
New York Times 
5/14/2000 
Section 
1, Pg 6  
15 국기연 노근리 대책위' 재미변호사 마이클 최 인터뷰 세계일보 5/15/2000 10 면 
16 윤국한 노근리' 미 언론 논란 한겨레 hangyoreh 11 면 
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5/15/2000 
17 한기홍 노근리 사건/ 미군 데일리 증언 진위 논란 확산 동아일보 5/15/2000 2 면 
18 Matthew Rose Questions Arise About AP Article On Korea Massacre 
Wall Street Journal 
5/15/2000 pg. 1 
19 홍은택 NYT 지 "P 노근리 학살 기사 빛 못 볼 뻔 했다" 동아일보 5/16/2000 12 면 
20 최철호 미언론 '노근리' 보도 논란 서울신문 5/16/2000 25 면 
21 Felicity Barringer A.P. Releases Files in Debate Over Massacre in Korean War 
New York Times 
5/16/2000 Pg A 12
22 Howard Kurtz At the Associated Press, a Drawn-out Battle Over Korean War Story 
Washington Post 
5/16/2000 pg. C01 
23 유숙렬 AP 노근리 보도, 미 언론계 '한편의 드라마' 문화일보 5/17/2000 28 면 
24  AP ‘노근리보도 의혹’ 반박 국민일보 5/17/2000 2 면 
25 Michael Dobbs War and Remembrance; Truth and Other Casualties of No Gun Ri 
Washington Post 
5/21/2000 pg, B01 
26 Berringer, Felicity 
A Press Divided ? Disputed Account 
of a Korean War Massacre 
New York Times 
5/22/2000 Pg. C1 
27  한국전쟁 50 돌 학술포럼, 
'노근리사건' 전시인도법 위반 서울신문 5/25/2000 7 면 
28 Felicity Barringer Ex-G.I. in A.P. Account Concedes He Didn’t See Korea Massacre 
New York Times 
05/26/2000  
29  Vet Admits He Learned of No Gun Ri Secondhand 
Los Angeles Times 05-
26-2000 pg.19B 
30 박완규 노근리 사건 증언 미참전용사 증언 번복 세계일보 5/27/2000 10 면 
31 주용중 데일리씨 증언 번복; 노근리 학살 결론엔 영향없어 조선일보 05-27-2000 4 면 
32 Charles J. Hanley Ex-Soldier Admits He Wasn't at No Gun Ri 
Washington Post  
05-27-2000 pg.A19 
33 
Brian Duffy,  
Joseph L. 
Galloway 
A Soldier's Story Stirs Things Up 
US News & World  
Report vol.128, no.21 
05-29-2000 
20 
34 Michael Moss The Story Behind a Soldier's Story New York Times 05-31-2000 pg.A1 
35  Incident At No Gun Ri PBS Online NewsHour 05-31-2000 
36 Charles J. Hanley Ex-GI Acknowledges Records Show He Couldn't Have Witnessed Killings
The Associated Press 
06-01-2000 
37 Joseph L. Galloway The Mistery of No Gun Ri 
US News & World 
Report vol.128, no.22 
06-05-2000 
32 
38 Robert Burns Air Force Memo Says U.S. Strafed Korean Civilians At Army's Request 
The Associated Press 
06-06-2000 
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39 신치영 미군 6.25 양민학살 물증 첫 발견 -- 당시 미장교 보고서 동아일보 06-07-2000 1 면 
40 박선호 
노근리사건 현장기록 발견, 본보 
당시상황 보도 '조선인민보' 
단독입수 
문화일보 06-07-2000 
41 최철호 노근리 양민학살사건 미군지시 증거 첫발견 서울신문 06-07-2000 1 면 
42 최철호 미 노근리학살 문서 발견 서울신문 06-07-2000 25 면 
43 Paul Richter 
Memo Discusses Korean War 
Strafing; Investigation: Air Force 
 Attacked Civilians Because Enemy 
Soldiers Might be Present, According 
to Newly Found Document. Pentagon 
is Seeking corroboration 
Los Angeles Times pg. 9 
44  US Studies Link Between Strafing Memo, No Gun Ri 
Washington Post 06-
07-2000 pg. A08 
45 윤국한 미, 한국전때 민간인 학살 인정 한겨레 Hankyoreh 06-08-2000 8 면 
46 Brian Duffy  Memory and Its Flaws U.S. News 06-12-2000 
47 
Choe Sang-Hun 
and Martha 
Mendoza 
Captured North Korean Document 
Describes Mass Killing by U.S. 
Troops 
The Associated Press 
06-15-2000 
48 박선호 노근리사건 현장증언 --AP 통신 종군기자 편지 공개 문화일보 06-16-2000 
49 Sang-hun Choe Pentagon Hands Over Interviews With U.S. Verterans 
The Associated Press 
06-22-2000 
50 Jerry Lembcke No Good News from No Gun Ri The Asian Reporter 06-27-2000 pg.7 
51 최영재 Choi Yong-Jae  
 미국은 노근리 사건을 50 년 
당시부터 알고 있었다 
American Government Knew of the 
Massacre from the Time of the 
Korean War 
Shindonga 新東亞 490 
07-01-2000 
 
236-249
52 Sang-hun Choe Korean Investigators Collect Bullets at No Gun Ri 
The Associated Press 
07-20-2000 
 박선호, 정충신 노근리 사건 94 년 국방부 무성의 조사 
문화일보  
07/26/2000 28 면 
53 Paul Shin 
South Koreans commemorate 
anniversary of alleged killings at No 
Gun Ri 
The Associated Press 
07-26-2000 
 234 
54 이창곤 Lee Chang-gon  
진실만 캐라 진실만! : 국방부의 
'노근리 사건 조사결과' 단독 입수 
진상조사에 미군 기여도 재조명이 
웬말 
Tell the Truth!: An Exclusive for the 
Final Report of Investigation by the
 Ministry of National Defense  
한겨레 21 Hankyoreh 
21 320 08-10-2000 12- 15 
55 Sang-hun Choe Korean Investigators Determine U.S. Stroops Killed Korean Civilians 
The Associated Press 
08-18-2000 
56 Ackerman, Seth 
Digging Too Deep at No Gun Ri; 
AP’s Massacre Exposes Survived  
Corporate Pressure and Criticism ? 
but not Apathy 
Extra 09-01-2000 
http://www.fair.org/extr
a/0009/nogunri.html 
 
57  양성철 주미대사 Korea Times 회견내용 
Korea Times 09-20-
2000 
58 류태종, 송동훈 양 주미대사 "우발적 사건" 조선일보 09-23-2000 33 면 
59 최현미, 김충남,  강연곤 
양성철 주미대사 발언'에 시민 
단체들 분노 문화일보 09-23-2000 
60 부형권 양성철 주미대사 '노근리' 발언 파문/ 시민단체 반발 
동아일보  
09-24-2000 5 면 
61 박혜경 강력한 사퇴요구에 직면한 양성철 주미대사 이윈컴 09-25-2000 
62 Rachel E. Dry Professor Affirms Massacre Report The Harvard Crimson 10-25-2000 
63 Richard Pyle Ex Gis: U.S. Troops in Korea War Had Orders to Shoot Civilians 
The Associated Press 
11-21-2000 
64 Richard Pyle Ex-Gis Tell of Orders to Fire on Korean Civilians 
Los Angeles Times 11-
22-2000 
65  "노근리 발포 상급부대서 명령" 한국일보 11-23-2000 1 면 
66 Richard Pyle 
Two Former Gis Give Accounts of 
No Gun Ri; Soldiers Tell Pentagon 
Investigators that American Troops 
Were Ordered to Shoot Korean 
Civilians 
The Washington Post 
11-24-2000 
pg. A.18 
A 
Section 
67 Sang-hun Choe U.S., Koreans Differ Over Refugee Killings in Korean War 
The Associated Press 
12-01-2000 
68 Ed Offley No Gun Ri Probe Nears Finish Amid New Conflicting Allegations 
12-04-00 
http://www.intelln
et.org/news/2000/
12/21/1954-1.html 
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69 Kyong-hwa Seok Lawmakers Call on U.S. to Conduct Open, Fair Inquiry 
The Associated Press 
12-05-2000 
70  No Gun Ri: Update 
PBS Online NewsHour 
12-06-2000 
http://www.pbs.org/ne
wshour/media_watch/n
ogunri_12-6.html 
 
71 Christopher Torchia 
U.S.-Korean Officials Trying to 
Narrow Difference Over No Gun Ri 
The Associated Press 
12-06-2000  
72 
Christopher 
Marquis, Steven 
Lee Myers 
U.S. Report Confirms Killings of 
Civilians by G.I.'s in Korean War 
The New York Times 
12-06-2000 
Section 
1, pg. 
A.7 
73 Thomas E. Ricks 
No Gun Ri Massacre Blamed on 
Panic; Korean War Probe Finds No 
Proof of U.S. Orders to Shoot 
The Washington Post 
12-06-2000 
Section 
A,  
Pg. A01
74 Robert Burns Army Concludes Soldiers Killed Unarmed Refugees in Korean War 
The Associated Press 
12-06-2000  
75  미 노근리 민간인 위협사격 인정 국민일보 12-07-2000 2 면 
76 유용원 한미 진상대책회의 오늘 발표, '노근리 발포' 고의성 못가려 진통 조선일보 12/7/2000 4 면 
77  U.S. and Korean Officials Meet to Discuss Wartime Massacre 
The New York Times 
12-07-2000 
A 
Section, 
pg. A.8 
78 Christopher Torchia 
South Koreans Say Progress Made in 
Talks with U.S. on No Gun Ri 
The Associated Press 
12-07-2000 
79 하태원 한미 노근리 합의 실패, 연내 2 차회담 갖기로 동아일보 12-08-2000 2 면 
80 Samuel Len South Koreans Grow Impatiend With U.S. Stand on '50 Massacre 
The New York Times 
12-08-2000 
Section 
A;Pg5;C
olumn ; 
Foreign 
Desk 
81 Robert Burns 
U.S. and South Korea Reach 
‘Understanding’ on Events at No Gun 
Ri 
The Associated Press 
12-08-2000 
82 Robert Burns US, South Korean Negotiators Reach 'Understanding' on No Gun Ri 
The Associated Press 
12-09-2000 
83 Sang-hun Choe 
South Korean Civilian Advisers Head 
For Washington to Review No Gun Ri 
Probe 
The Associated Press 
12-12-2000  
84 진재학 노근리' 사격명령 여부 평행선 한겨레 12-13-2000 5 면 
85  
Official: Gis Weren't Ordered to Kill; 
No Gun Ri Report Disputes 
Allegation 
The Washington Post 
12-15-2000 pg. A.18
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86 지명훈 미 육군장관 "포 상부지시 증거없다"  동아일보 12-16-2000 2 면 
87 한기흥  미국, 노근리 직접배상에 난색, 20 일 공동발표문 논의 동아일보 12-18-2000 2 면 
88 조계완 Cho Kye-wan  
노근리 진실 '의도적 은폐' : 미국의 
논리에 휘말려 정치적 타협책 
모색... 주권국가 자존심 버리고 
양민학살에 면죄부 안길 건가 
‘Intentional Suppression’ of the Truth 
about No Gun Ri: Seeking Political  
Compromise Tangled by American 
Logic?  
Hankyoreh 21 
한겨레 21 338  
12-21-2000 
 20-22  
89 윤국한 대책위 주장/ '미 노근리사건 보고서는 속임수' 한겨레 12-21-2000 2 면 
90 Paul Richer U.S. Won't Apologize for No Gun Ri, Officials Say 
Los Angeles Times 12-
22-2000 
Sec A; 
Pt 1; pg 
4 
91  No Formal Apology by the U.S. For Korean War Civilian Deaths 
The New York Times 
12-22-2000 
Section 
A; p.5; 
column 
3 
92 진재학 노근리진실' 미 법정서 가리나 한겨레 12-23-2000 4 면 
93 국기연 막내린 노근리사건 워싱턴 회의 세계일보 12-23-2000 5 면 
94 국기연 [특파원리포트]노근리 해법' 공수표? 세계일보 12-25-2000 3 면 
95  Forever Cloaked in Smoke of War Los Angeles Times 12-27-2000 
PtB. 
Pg.B.8 
96 이용욱 노근리 진상조사 결과 곧 발표, 미 "양민사상” 시인 경향신문 12-28-2000 5 면 
 
<Academic Publications> 
Author Title Journal Title/ Publisher, Publication Year Page 
1 Baik, Tae-ung A War Crime Against an Ally’s Civilians: The No Gun Ri Massacre 
Master’s Thesis, Notre 
Dame Law School 
5/1/2000 
2 방선주 Pang, Son-ju  
한국전쟁 당시 북한 자료로 본 
‘노근리’사건  
No Gun Ri Incident Seen from the 
North Korean Documents During the 
Korean War 
Korean Studies  
Quarterly 
정신문화연구 79 
6/1/2000 
19-47 
3 강정구 한국전쟁전후 민간인 학살의 실태 한국전쟁전후 민간인학살 6/21/2000 3- 22 
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심포지움 : 전쟁과 인권 -학살의 
세기를 넘어서 
4 Stephen R Schuit First Person: The Grapes of No Gun Ri 
The Humanist vol.60, 
no.4 07-01-2000 45-47 
5 강정구 한국전쟁과 양민학살 
현장에서 미래를 58 
8/1/2000 
http://kilsp.jinbo.net/pu
blish/2000/0008914.ht
m 
6 오연호 Oh, Yeon-ho  
Do You Know Our Agony? Massacre 
of Villagers by the U.S. Soldiers 
During the Korean War 
Asian Solidarity 
Quarterly (Seoul) 2, 
9/1/2000 
80-90 
7 
조시현, 이장희 
Cho, Si-hon, and  
Chang-hee Lee  
한국전쟁 5 년이 남긴 
국제인도법적 문제 
50 Years After the Korean War; 
Issues of International Humanity Law
제 28 회 학술 심포지엄 
Asian Social  
Science Institution 
사단 법인 아시아 
사회과학 연구원 
9/1/2000 
8 Christopher  D. Booth 
“Prosecuting the ‘Fog of War?’ 
Examining the Legal Implications of 
an Alleged Massacre of South Korean 
Civilians by U.S. Forces During the 
Opening Days of the Korean War in 
the Village of No Gun Ri,” 
Vanderbilt Journal of 
Transnational Law 
Vol.33, no. 4 10/1/2000 
933-
986 
9 이만열 
노근리사건의 진상과 그 성격 
(in A Proceeding of the Symposium 
for the Investigation of the No Gun Ri 
Massacre, the 9th Policy Symposium 
for the International Human Rights ) 
국회인권포럼 제 9 회 
정책 심포지움; 
노근리 사건 
진상규명과 해결 
방향에 관한 심포지움 
12/4/2000 
1-20 
10 정진성 
인권침해 문제로서의 노근리 사건
(in A Proceeding of the Symposium 
for the Investigation of the No Gun Ri 
Massacre, the 9th Policy Symposium 
for the International Human Rights ) 
국회인권포럼 제 9 회 
정책 심포지움; 
노근리 사건 
진상규명과 해결 
방향에 관한 심포지움 
12/4/2001 
23-44 
11 조시현 
노근리 학살사건에 대한 
국제인도법의 적용 
Adaptation of the International 
Humanity Law for the No Gun Ri 
Massacre  
(in A Proceeding of the Symposium 
for the Investigation of the No Gun Ri 
Massacre, the 9th Policy Symposium 
for the International Human Rights ) 
국회인권포럼 제 9 회 
정책 심포지움; 
노근리 사건 
진상규명과 해결 
방향에 관한 심포지움 
12/4/2002 
47-80 
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12 박선원 
노근리사건과 한미관계의 발전적 
재조명  
(in A Proceeding of the Symposium 
for the Investigation of the No Gun Ri 
Massacre, the 9th Policy Symposium 
for the International Human Rights ) 
국회인권포럼 제 9 회 
정책 심포지움; 
노근리 사건 
진상규명과 해결 
방향에 관한 심포지움 
12/4/2003 
83-101
13 
Hanley, Charles 
J., and Martha 
Mendoza 
The Bridge at No Gun Ri: 
Investigative Reporting, Hidden 
History, and Pulitzer Prize 
Harvard International 
Journal of Press/ 
Politics vol.5, no.4 
9/1/2000 
112-
117 
14 Gregg, Donald P.. 
Looking Back: The Incident at No 
Gun Ri [Korean War] 
Korea Society 
Quarterly (New York) 
vol.1, no.2 Summer 
2000 
4-5, 44
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1 Roberto Suro, Thomas E. Ricks 
Clinton to Express Korean War 
Regret; U.S. Fails to Take 
Responsibility for Deaths of Unarmed 
Refugees at No Gun Ri 
The Washington Post 
1/11/2001 A7 
2 Sang-hun Choe 
No Gun Ri Report: U.S. Soldiers 
Killed Civilians, but No Proof of 
Orders to Fire 
The Associated Press 
1/11/2001 
3 Robert Burns Army Says GIs Killed South Korean Civilians, Clinton Expresses Regret 
The Associated Press 
1/11/2001 
4 Charles J. Hanley Investigation Leaves Key Question Unanswered 
The Associated Press 
1/11/2001  
5 Robert Burns Clinton Expresses Regret for GIs' Killing of S. Korean Civilians 
The Associated Press 
1/11/2001  
6  Joint No Gun Ri Report Released PBS Online NewsHour 1/11/2001  
7  No Gun Ri: Clinton's Statement PBS Online NewsHour 1/11/2001  
8  Timeline of the Korean War The Associated Press  
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1/11/2001 
9 김용태 노근리 유족들 반응/ "보상 미비 … 알맹이없어 분통" 
문화일보 
1/12/2001 30 면 
10 이태희, 유병권 미 노근리학살 공식 사과 문화일보 1/12/2001 1 면 
11  노근리 희생자위해 위령비 건립, 기금 조성'/ 클린턴 유감성명 
한겨레 
1/12/2001 1 면 
12 구정은 "더 늦기전에" 미국식 과거사 청산 문화일보 1/12/2001 3 면 
13 Elizabeth Becker Army Confirms G.I.'s in Korea Killed Civilians 
New York Times 
1/12/2001 A1 
14  Statement on Koreans: 'Refugees Were Killed or Injured' 
New York Times 
1/12/2001 A6 
15 Norman Kempster 
Clinton 'Regrets,' Doesn't Apologize 
for, No Gun Ri; Asia: South Korean 
Survivors Denounce the President's 
Statement. Defense Secretary Details 
Findings of Inquiry. 
Los Angeles Times 
1/12/2001 A4 
16 Robert Burns U.S. Mindful of Need to Preserve Alliance with South Korea 
The Associated Press 
1/12/2001  
17 Sang-hun Choe Survivors of No Gun Ri Dismiss U.S. Army's Findings as a Whitewash 
The Associated Press 
1/12/2001  
18 Joohee Cho, Doug Struck 
U.S. Statement on Killings 
Disappoints South Koreans; 'Regret' 
for Civilian Deaths Falls Short of an 
Apology 
The Washington Post 
1/12/2001 A18 
19 김영식, 한기흥 "개별 소송에 도움될 것" 한미 노근리조사책임자 문답 
동아일보 
1/13/2001 3 면 
20 부형권, 한기흥 한-미 공동조사결과 발표/ 미국 '노근리 사살' 첫 인정 
동아일보 
1/13/2001 2 면 
21 지명훈 노근리사건 피해자들 분노, 허탈 "돈이나 몇푼 주겠다니…" 
동아일보 
1/13/2001 31 면 
22 안수찬 Ahn, Su-chan  
[뉴스인물]노근리대책위 정은용 
위원장/진실가린 '유감' 표명 유감 
한겨레 Hankyoreh 
1/13/2001 2 면 
23 이원섭 Lee, Won-sup 
곁에서 본 '노근리' 규명 성과와 
한계/ 두터운 은폐 뚫고 '절반의 
규명' 
한겨레 Hankyoreh 
1/13/2001 4 면 
24 윤국한, 진재학, 안수찬 미 '노근리 학살' 공식인정 
한겨레 Hankyoreh 
1/13/2001 1 면 
25 진재학 노근리' 발표 내용, 의미 한겨레 Hankyoreh 1/13/2001 3 면 
26 김회승, 오윤주 미 노근리 사과 반응/ 부실한 '사과' 50 년 한 풀리겠나 
한겨레 Hankyoreh 
1/13/2001 19 면 
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27 이만열 [특별기고] 노근리 아픔은 끝나지 않았다 
한국일보 
1/13/2001 8 면 
28 이태희, 정녹용 노근리조사 발표 의미/ 학살인정 '절반의 성공' 
한국일보 
1/13/2001 3 면 
29 이태희 미, 노근리학살 실체 인정 한국일보 1/13/2001 1 면 
30 이태희 노근리 조사, 협상 뒷얘기/ 단어선택 하나하나 '신경전' 
한국일보 
1/13/2001 4 면 
31 윤승용 한미 노근리조사 미 입장/ "전투중 일어난 불행한 사고" 
한국일보 
1/13/2001 4 면 
32 최진환 "발포 책임자 규명 안됐다", AP, 문제지적 
한국일보 
1/13/2001 4 면 
33 이용욱 노근리 학살 '유감' 남긴 "유감" 표명 
경향신문 
1/13/2001 3 면 
34 이승철 
노근리 학살 한-미 '진상조사' 
뒷얘기- '사격지침' 확인에 분위기 
반전 
경향신문 
1/13/2001 4 면 
35 이하원 노근리 한미공동조사 발표 의미 조선일보 1/13/2001 3 면 
36 유태종 노근리 사건/ 피해자 유족, 현지 반응 - "사과, 보상 형식적" 분노 
조선일보 
1/13/2001 8 면 
37  Regret for No Gun Ri The Washington Post 1/13/2001 A20 
38 이장희 [시론] 묻을 수 없는 '노근리 진실' 경향신문 1/15/2001 7 면 
39 유병화 [기고] '노근리 배상' 이제부터 시작 동아일보 1/15/2001 6 면 
40 현홍주 [시론] 노근리, 그 비극을 넘어 조선일보 1/15/2001 6 면 
41 박용옥 [발언대] 노근리 사건, 이젠 매듭짓자 
한국일보 
1/15/2001 7 면 
42 Bernard E. Trainor 
The Anguish of Knowing What 
Happened at No Gun Ri 
The Washington Post 
1/21/2001 B1 
43 Joseph L. Galloway A Verdict in a Korean Tragedy 
U.S. News & World 
Report 130:3 
1/22/2001 
32 
44 윤승용 "노근리 양민학살 전쟁범죄 아니다" 
한국일보 
1/23/2001 2 면 
45 박찬운 Park Chan-wun  
노근리 배상 법정싸움은 이제부터: 
명백한 범죄 전쟁에 관한 국제접 
직접 적용해 미 법원에 소송해볼 만
Weekly Donga 
주간동아 269 
1/25/2001 
26-28 
46 조계완 Cho Kye-wan  
작은 성과 큰 실망... : 한·미 양국 
노근리 진상조사반 결과 발표... 
양민학살 인정, 그러나 책임회피 
의도 역력 
한겨레 21 Hankyoreh 
21  
343 
2/1/2001 
16-17 
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47 한홍구 Han Hong-gu  
우리는 무덤위에 서 있다: 죽이는 
이야기 - 한국 사회 건설의 기초 
한국전쟁에서의 학살 1 
We Are Standing on the Graves: 
Killing Stories ? A Massacre in the 
Korean 
 War 1  
한겨레 21 Hankyoreh 
21  
354 
4/19/2001 
86-88 
48 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(1)- 양민학살 전모를 실화소설로 
펴내다- 
뉴스메이커 426 
5/31/2001  
49 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(2)- 미국을 상대로 인권 회복에 
나서다- 
뉴스메이커 427 
6/7/2001  
50 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(3)- 조선인민보에서 양민학살 
단서를 찾다 
뉴스메이커 428 
6/14/2001  
51 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(4)- 드디어 미국 CNN 방송서 
보도하다- 
뉴스메이커 428 
6/21/2001  
52 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(5)- '골리앗 미국'에 대적할 원군을 
얻다- 
뉴스메이커 429 
6/28/2001  
53 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(6)- 한국 정부도 손해배상 신청 
기각 했다- 
뉴스메이커 430 
7/5/2001  
54 안수찬 Ahn, Su-chan  
트루먼에게 유죄를 선고함: 
한국전쟁 당시 미군에 의한 민간인 
학살을 법의 이름으로 단죄한 
‘코리아 전범재판 
한겨레 21 Hankyoreh 
21  
365 
7/5/2001 
10-12 
55 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(7)- AP 통신 노근리 보도로 
퓰리처상을 받다- 
뉴스메이커 431 
7/12/2001  
56 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(8)- 뉴욕타임즈와 워싱턴포스트 
1 면기사로 '노근리' 보도- 
뉴스메이커 432 
7/19/2001  
57 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(9)- 미 정부 드디어 조사 착수를 
발표하다 - 
뉴스메이커 433 
7/26/2001  
58 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(10)- 미국은 '망자의 절규'가 들리지 
않는가- 
뉴스메이커 434 
8/2/2001  
59 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(11)- 한국 정부 공동조사 요구 
묵살당했다- 
뉴스메이커 435 
8/9/2001  
60 정구도 [시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 뉴스메이커 436  
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(12)- 용서 구한 가해 미군, 드디어 
열린 미 방문길- 
8/16/2001 
61 김충남 <기획취재> 미 '노근리' 이틀간 공중공격 
문화일보 
8/20/2001 1 면 
62 김충남, 오남석, 유희연 
<기획취재: 노근리의 진실> 1950 년 
7 월 26, 27 일, 노근리의 진실 
문화일보 
8/20/2001 5 면 
63 김충남, 오남석, 유희연 노근리 법정투쟁으로 가면 
문화일보 
8/21/2001  
64 안수찬 Ahn, Su-chan 미공군 노근리 공습은 사실 
한겨레 
8/21/2001 15 면 
65 안수찬 Ahn, Su-chan 노근리 공중폭격 문서 파장 
한겨레 
8/21/2001 14 면 
66 김충남 취재수첩: 진실 외면하는 국방부 문화일보 8/22/2001  
67 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(13)- 법적 책임 회피한 '클린턴 
성명'에 허탈- 
뉴스메이커 
437 
8/23/2001 
 
68 오남석 
기획취재: 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(상): '억울한 희생' 누군가가 
책임져야 
문화일보 
8/23/2001 28 면 
69 차세현 Cha, Se-hyon  
[특집] 美 정부 '노근리 보고서' 
축소조작  
뉴스메이커 News 
Maker 438 
8/23/2001 
32-35 
70 차세현 Cha, Se-hyon  
[특집] 지금이라도 진실 인정하고 
적절한 조치 취하라!"  
뉴스메이커 News 
Maker 438 
8/23/2001 
36-37 
71 김충남 기획취재: 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (하): "진상 규명돼야 진정한 화해" 
문화일보 
8/24/2001 28 면 
72 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(14)- '한국 정부 보고서'도 왜곡 
투성이였다- 
뉴스메이커 
438 
8/30/2001 
 
73 차세현 Cha, Se-hyon  
정부, 과연 노근리 진실규명 의지 
있는가 
뉴스메이커 News 
Maker 439 
8/30/2001 
 
74 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(15)- 쌍굴다리의 비극, 그리고 
49 년만의 해후- 
뉴스메이커 
439 
9/6/2001 
 
75 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(16)- 가해 미군 데일리와 유족들의 
'용서와 화해'- 
뉴스메이커 
440 
9/13/2001 
 
76 Choe Yong-shik Unfortunate Encounters of U.S. Forces and Korean Civilians in 1950 
The Korea Herald 
9/18/2001  
77 정구도 [시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 (17)-피해자 대표들 드디어 미국 
뉴스메이커 
441  
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방문길에 오르다- 9/20/2001 
78 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(18)- 가해 미군들과 화해 기원 
예배를 드리다- 
뉴스메이커 
442 
9/27/2001 
 
79 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(19)- '용서와 화해'의 길은 아득히 
멀었다- 
뉴스메이커 
443 
10/4/2001 
 
80 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(20)- 한국전쟁 참전기념탑에 
헌화하다- 
뉴스메이커 
444 
10/11/2001 
 
81 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(21)- '철옹성' 펜타곤 드디어 우리를 
받아들이다- 
뉴스메이커 
445 
10/18/2001 
 
82 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(22)- 내셔널 프레스클럽에서 
기자회견 하다- 
뉴스메이커 
446 
10/25/2001 
 
83 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(23)- 피해자들의 애절한 증언 큰 
반향 불러- 
뉴스메이커 
447 
11/1/2001 
 
84 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(24)- '노근리 청문회' 열리기를 
염원하다- 
뉴스메이커 
448 
11/8/2001 
 
85 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(25)- '노근리 학살' 저변엔 미국의 
인종 편견이…- 
뉴스메이커 
449 
11/15/2001 
 
86 Richard Pyle New Book Details Still More Killing of Civilians During Korean War 
the Associated Press 
11/19/2001  
87 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(26)- 유대인 인권단체장의 '노근리 
충고'- 
뉴스메이커 
450 
11/22/2001 
 
88 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(27)- 노근리 대책위, KNCC 인권상 
받다- 
뉴스메이커 
11/29/2001  
89 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(28)- 노근리 자문위원단과의 
첫만남- 
뉴스메이커 
12/6/2001  
90 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(29)- 정은용 위원장, 미 육군성 
장관 논박하다- 
뉴스메이커 
12/13/2001  
91 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(30)- "민간인 사격명령 거절했다가 
중대장에 총살당할 뻔했다"- 
뉴스메이커 
12/27/2001  
92 Lee Williams Kill'em All': American Military Conduct in the Korean War 
BBC 
1/2/2002  
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93 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(31)- 미 정부와 '또 한 판의 체스' 
준비하다- 
뉴스메이커 News 
Maker  
1/10/2002 
 
94 김충남 노근리 학살' 부대원 속죄편지 문화일보 1/14/2002 31 면 
95 김충남 노근리 학살거부자 처형 위협' 문화일보 1/14/2002 1 면 
96 최기수 "노근리학살 명령따라 발포" . . . 미군병사 '속죄 편지'서 밝혀져 
한국일보 
1/15/2002 31 면 
97 오윤주 
51 년간 고통속에 살았습니다'/ 
노근리 현장 주둔 얼리 발포명령 첫 
증언 
한겨레 
1/15/2002 18 면 
98 김용태 노근리 사죄' 편지 받은 서정갑 씨 문화일보 1/15/2002 31 면 
99 김충남 노근리 학살 재조사 요구 문화일보 1/16/2002  
100 최호원 "노근리 학살 미군 책임" 현역장교 논문서 주장 
동아일보 
1/24/2002 29 면 
101 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(32)- '노근리' 한.미 정상회담 
의제로 요구하다- 
뉴스메이커 News 
Maker  
1/24/2002 
 
102 김충남 미국, 여러곳서 양민학살 문화일보 1/25/2002  
103 김충남 BBC 한국전 다큐서 드러난 새사실/ 작전지역 모든 민간인 '적' 간주 
문화일보 
1/25/2002 31 면 
104 김충남 작전지역 민간인 적 간주 문화일보 1/25/2002  
105 김충남 노근리 진실 외면하는 미국 문화일보 1/26/2002  
106 최기수 영 BBC, 6.25 관련 문서, 증언 발굴 "미군, 여러곳서 양민학살" 
한국일보 
1/26/2002 27 면 
107 윤양섭 "미군 6.25 때 양민 무차별 학살" 동아일보 1/26/2002 4 면 
108 김충남 노근리'은폐- 축소자 처벌요구 문화일보 1/26/2002  
109 김충남 노근리 전쟁일지 있다 문화일보 2/1/2002  
110 김충남 적-피란민 구별 안해 학살 방조 문화일보 2/2/2002  
111 김충남 미 육군성 양민학살 조직적은폐 문화일보 2/2/2002 1 면 
112  미군 노근리 전쟁일지 작성' 한겨레  2/2/2002 19 면 
113  The World; BBC Cites U.S. Killings in Korea; Report: Up to 400 People 
Los Angeles Times 
2/2/2002 A7 
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Died on a Beach at the Start of War in 
1950, Documentary Contends. 
114 최기수 영 BBC 방송주장, 미 국방부 '노근리 사건' 은폐의혹 
한국일보 
2/4/2002 30 면 
115 김충남 범국민위 한국전 학살 진상조사 촉구 
문화일보 
2/4/2002  
116 김충남 노근리 사죄편지' 받은 서정갑씨 답장 공개 
문화일보 
2/6/2002 31 면 
117 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(33)- 국제봉사단체 젊은이들의 
노근리 현장 방문- 
뉴스메이커 News 
Maker  
2/7/2002 
 
118 Christopher Marquis 
Korean Veteran Is Charged With 
Fraud 
New York Times 
2/9/2002 A14 
119  
The Nation; Korean War Veteran 
Charged with Defrauding 
Government 
Los Angeles Times 
2/9/2002 A16 
120 차세현 Cha, Se-hyon  
노근리사건은 우발적' 미 주장 
허위로 
뉴스메이커 News 
Maker 11:7 
2/14/2002 
22~23 
121 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(34)- 미 정부 추모비 건립 약속 왜 
안 지키나- 
뉴스메이커 News 
Maker  
2/28/2002 
 
122 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(35)- 노근리대책위는 반미단체가 
아니다- 
뉴스메이커 News 
Maker  
3/7/2002 
 
123 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(36)- 미의 쌍굴다리 총알 적출 
저지하다- 
뉴스메이커 News 
Maker  
3/14/2002 
 
124 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(37)- 미 일부 언론 AP 보도를 
반격하다- 
뉴스메이커 News 
Maker  
3/21/2002 
 
125 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(38)- 미국 내 음모세력 AP 보도를 
공격하다- 
뉴스메이커 News 
Maker  
3/28/2002 
 
126 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(39)- 제동 걸린 미국 내 노근리 
음모세력- 
뉴스메이커 News 
Maker  
4/4/2002 
 
127 Michael Taylor 
A War of Words on a Prize-Winning 
Story; No Gun Ri Authors Cross Pens 
on First Amendment Battlefield 
San Francisco 
Chronicle 
4/7/2002 
D3 
128 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(40)- 보스워스 대사를 면담하고 
강력히 항의하다- 
뉴스메이커 News 
Maker  
4/18/2002 
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129 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(41)- 서울 도심에서 미국의 
무성의를 성토하다- 
뉴스메이커 News 
Maker  
4/25/2002 
 
130 정구도 
[시리즈] 노근리는 끝나지 않았다 
(42)- 미 CBS 방송이 공중폭격 문서 
공개했다- 
뉴스메이커 News 
Maker  
5/2/2002 
 
131  Another Side to the No Gun Ri Tragedy 
Korea Times 
5/7/2002  
132  US Students Urge Bush to Apologize for Nogun-ri Massacre 
Korea Times 
5/14/2002  
133 Lisa Stein Witness to Nothing 
U.S. News & World 
Report 133:12 
9/30/2002 
34 
134 이종도 
"피난민은 적, 사살하라"/ MBC, 
BBC 노근리 특종다큐 "킬 뎀 올" 
방송 
한국일보 
11/13/2002 45 면 
135 김용태 노근리 사건' 연극무대에 극단 새벽 영동국악당서 
문화일보 
11/13/2002 28 면 
136 노형석 노근리 다리, 서울시청사 등록문화재 지정 
한겨레 
4/25/2003  
137 심은정 6 월의 하나됨 7 월의 평화로/ 3 부 공존, 노근리의 진실과 화해 
문화일보 
6/27/2003 
138 엄경용, 김신일 끝나지 않은 '노근리' 고통 내일신문 12/3/2003 
139 이재명 
"노근리사건 피해보상 꼭 
이뤄져야" 진상조사-특별법제정 
이끈 정구도 대책위 대변인 
동아일보 
7/6/2004 29 면 
140 윤영철 "노근리 명예회복 사업 서둘러야" 내일신문 8/13/2004 21 면 
141 장기우 [충북] 노근리 희생자 총 152 명, 충북도 심사 실무위 현장검증 
동아일보 
3/2/2005 12 면 
142 오윤주 노근리 피해자 2428 명 명단확정 한겨레 3/16/2005 12 면 
143 유태종 노근리 희생자 늘어 충북도 69 명 추가 인정 
조선일보 
3/16/2005 16 면 
144 장기우 [충북] 노근리사건 피해자 모두 2428 명 인정 
동아일보 
3/17/2005 14 면 
145 정혁준 노근리 희생자/ 218 명 공식인정 한겨레 5/24/2005 11 면 
146 엄경용 노근리 찾은 한, 미 대학생 '역사아픔 나누기' 
내일신문 
6/3/2005 21 면 
 247 
147 유태종 
노근리 현장서 한미 대학생 
평화캠프; 노근리 인권 평화연대 
주최 
조선일보 
6/8/2005 12 면 
148  [충북] 노근리에 평화, 인권 싹 틔운다 
한국일보 
6/16/2005  
149 오윤주 
노근리에 선 미국 청년들/ "전쟁은 
끝났지만 유족, 희생자 전쟁은 
계속" 
한겨레 
6/22/2005 12 면 
150 오윤주 노근리 참상 55 년 흘렀건만/ 명예회복, 보상 언제쯤이나 
한겨레 
6/24/2005 15 면 
151 이미경 함께하는 교육-출판인이 뽑은 책/ "노근리 그해 여름" 
한겨레 
9/26/2005 29 면 
152 김은형 
노근리'로 영화감독 데뷔하는 
연극연출가 이상우씨/ "초등생 
시선으로 '악몽같은 사건' 
풀어헤쳐" 
한겨레 
11/15/2005 23 면 
153 오윤주 노근리 위령공원 청사진 나와 한겨레 12/13/2005 15 면 
154 한정숙 [세상읽기] 다시 노근리를 생각하며 
한겨레 
1/10/2006 31 면 
155 고광일 노근리 일대 3 만 5000 평에 2009 년까지 역사공원 조성 
문화일보 
2/7/2006 12 면 
156 윤민용 
미, 한국전 관련 해제 문서 다시 
'기밀' 묶어…'반미 키울라' 내용 
숨기기 
경향신문 
3/1/2006 12 면 
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APPENDIX B 
     MILITARY DOCUMENTS  
B. 1. GLOSSARY FOR MILITARY DOCUMENTS USED FOR NO GUN RI RESEARCH 
Communication Log (Journal) 
Communication logs are chronological records of communication messages, usually through 
radio transmission. A communication log records date, time, senders, and messages. For No Gun 
Ri research, communication logs of the 7th Cavalry Regiment and other neighboring units were 
used to identify refugee policy that was received through radio communication from higher 
commanders. 
 
Intelligence Report 
An intelligence report is defined as “a specific report of information, usually on a single item, 
made at any level of command in tactical operations and disseminated as rapidly as possible in 
keeping with the timeliness of the information” by the Department of Defense.267 Intelligence 
reports were useful for evaluation of the positions and war effectiveness of enemy and 
extensively used by the U.S. investigation team for the No Gun Ri research.  
 
 
                                                 
267 http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/data/i/02750.html. (last accessed October 25 2007) 
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Map Coordinate 
A coordinate is “one of a series of two-digit numbers shown on a map grid in order to produce 
grid references.”268 It was usually used to check the marks for the movement of units in the 
broader area around No Gun Ri. The map coordinates were used mainly by the AP team for 
locating the army unit at No Gun Ri at the time of massacre. 
 
Mission Report 
A mission report is defined as “a standard report containing the results of a mission and 
significant sightings along the flight route” by the Department of Defense.269 Some after mission 
reports of aircrafts were discovered in the process of the No Gun Ri research and they provide 
evidence that air strafing on refugees was prevailed during the Korean War as well as during the 
time for the killing at No Gun Ri. 
 
Morning Report 
The morning report is well described in Wikipedia as “a document produced every morning for 
every basic unit of the Army, by the unit clerk, detailing personnel changes for the day. The 
morning report details changes in the status of soldiers in the unit on the day the change occurs, 
including transferring to or from the unit, temporarily assigned elsewhere, on leave, absent 
without official leave or deserted, in custody, promoted or demoted, and other such information. 
When a soldier is transferred to or from another unit, his or her orders specifying the exact date 
that the soldier is counted as leaving one unit and officially entering the other. In this fashion, the 
morning report provides a complete history of changes in a unit's personnel.”270  Morning reports 
were especially importantly utilized to prove the veracity of some veterans’ testimony about their 
participation in the No Gun Ri killing. 
 
 
 
                                                 
268 Bowyer, Richard. Dictionary of Military Terms [electronic version], 2nd ed., s.v. “coordinate.” 
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/pitt/Doc?id=10022155&ppg=54>  
269 http://www.fas.org/news/reference/lexicon/dem.htm. (last accessed October 25 2007) 
270 Excerpted from the entry, Morning Report, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morning_report_(United_States_military) (last accessed October 25, 2007) 
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Operation Plan 
Operation Plan is also called a military plan or a war plan. It is “a formal plan for military 
operations, as drawn up by leaders to plan action against likely enemies. Military plans are an 
aspect of military doctrine.”271 The operation plan document that was used for the No Gun Ri  
research described the plans in the broader area of Hwanggan two days before the killing. This 
document says the 7th Cavalry Regiment’s mission is as Division’s reserve to support the 5th 
Cavalry and 8th Cavalry. 
 
Roster 
Oxford English Dictionary defines roster as “a list or plan exhibiting the order of rotation, or 
turns of duties and service, of officers, men, and bodies of troops.” Also, it describes, “esp. U.S., 
a simple list or register of officers, divisions of a regiment, etc., with various particulars relating 
to them” in the military sense.”272  The AP reporters tried to identify veterans’ names from 
rosters to find those who were at No Gun Ri or who heard about No Gun Ri. 
 
War Diary  
War diary is “a unit journal compiled during combat operations as an historic narrative to 
accompany official records.”273 While communication logs or journals focus on messages that 
are received or sent, war diary is more narrative to explain the situation that a unit faces or the 
unit’s implementation of military operation. For the No Gun Ri case, refugee related situation of 
the units around No Gun Ri was well described in war diaries. Also, the 7th Cavalry Regiment’s 
war diary showed the fact that this unit withdrew on July 29 1950 from No Gun Ri. 
 
 
                                                 
271 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_plan. (last accessed October 25 2007) 
272 Oxford English Dictionary [electronic version], s.v. “roster.”  
273 (http://www.combat.ws/S4/MILTERMS/MT-W.HTM. (last accessed October 24 2007) 
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B. 2. MAJOR MILITARY DOCUMENTS USED FOR NO GUN RI RESEARCH 
(Chronological Order) 
Memorandum, Headquarters (HQs) 1st Cavalry Division (1CD), 23 Jul 50, sub: Control of 
Refugee Movement. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, 1st 
Cavalry Division, Box 127, RG 338, NARA.  
This is the general policy for the refugee movement that was issued a few days before the No 
Gun Ri incident. It explains the evacuation rules for refugees. This document was reported by the 
U.S. Army report, No Gun Ri review. Following is the text from the document. 
Movement of civilians and refugees in the 1st Cavalry Division area was permitted from 10:00 
AM to 12:00 noon only;  
no ox carts, trucks, or civilian cars were allowed to operate on highways;  
no fields could be worked;  
no schools, shops, or industries could be operated unless they were essential to the war 
effort;  
and municipal authorities, local police, and National Police were to enforce this directive.  
The National Police would collect all refugees from the countryside and highway and carry them 
by rail or trucks to screening points. Division Counter-Intelligence Corps (CIC) personnel, 
including an attached Korean CIC Team, would screen the refugees at established roadblocks 
and checkpoints. Units within the Division had instructions to turn over refugees to CIC or G-
2 (Intelligence) Interrogation for screening. 
 
 
Communication Log, the 8th Regiment of the 1st Cavalry Division, July 24th 1950. In 
Records of U.S. Army Commands, Cavalry Regiments 1940-1967, Box 42, RG 338, NARA. 
This document was discovered by the AP team and records the instructions from the 1st Cavalry 
Division headquearters for controlling refugees, which is described as “fire everyone tring to 
cross lines” at 1000 hours, or 10 a.m. on July 24, 1950. Following is that actual text from the 
document. 
0900  2nd Bn Co E sighted 300 NK’s yds in front of Co E position. Arty FO contacted 
abs plane. If confirmed, will use arty. Will keep contact with us. Notified S-3.  
1000  G-3 Ln  No refugees to cross the front line. Fire everyone trying to cross lines. Use 
discretion in case of women and children. 
1020  Div Arty Suspected Korean carrying radio at 1073.5-1475.4. 
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War Diary, 25th Infantry Division, 24-30 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports (War Diaries), 
1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Box 3746, RG 407, NARA.  
This war diary on July 24 1950 from a neighbor Division displays the army units’ concerns about 
refugee problems.  Washington Post reporters reported this document. Following is the text from 
the document. 
The control of refugees presented a difficult problem. No one desired to shoot innocent people, 
but many of the innocent-looking refugees dressed in the traditional white clothes of the 
Koreans turned out to be North Korean soldiers transporting ammunition and heavy weapons 
in farm wagons and carrying military equipment in packs on their backs. They were observed 
many times changing from uniforms to civilian clothing and back into uniform. There were so 
many refugees that it was impossible to screen and search them all. 
 
 
The 1st Cavalry Division; Operation Plan Number 10-50; Hwanggan(1088-1483); 1950. 7. 
24. 23:15)   
This document is for a war operation plan on a broader area of Hwanggan where No Gun Ri is 
located two days before the incident. This document indicates the 7th Cavalry Regiment as 
Division’s Reserve to support the 5th Cavalry and 8th Cavalry. This document was discovered 
and reported by a Korean survivor’s family. Following is the text from the document. 
The 1st Cavalry Division; Operation Plan Number 10-50; Hwanggan(1088-1483); 1950. 7. 24. 
23:15)    
 
Task Organization 
. . . 
 
2. This division will secure the high ground east of Yongdong (1076-1476), and prevent the 
movement of the enemy to the east.  
3. Scheme of Maneuver 
a. The Bns of 5th Cav and 8th Cav will take new positions and disengage from contact with the 
enemy as follows:  
b. 8th Cav. 
(1) . . . 
(2) Disengage and secure the high ground east of yongdong and North of road to prevent 
enemy penetration to the east.  
c. 5th Cav. 
. . .  
d. 7th Cav. 
(1) Div Reserve prepared to counter any enemy penetration of our lines. 
(2) Conduct aggressive and continuous patrols on high ground parallel with 
HWANGGAN-YOUNGDONG road to prevent enemy infiltration and harassing fire on road.  
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Memorandum to General Timberlake, “Policy on Strafing Civilian Refugees,” Colonel T.C. 
Rogers, DCS/Operations, HQ 5AF Advance, 25 Jul 50.  
This document is a memo from Col. Turner C. Rogers, U.S. 5th Air Force officer. He noted that 
Air Force planes were strafing refugee groups approaching U.S. positions, complying with an 
Army request. This memo was written one day before (July 25, 1950) the refugees were strafed 
at No Gun Ri. He concerned that such activities could receive wide publicity and may cause 
embarrassment to the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. government. This document was reported by a 
CBS correspondent in June 2000. Following is the full text of the document. 
FIFTH AIR FORCE 
APO 970, Unit 1 
25 July 1950 
 
MEMO TO GENERAL TIMBERLAKE 
Subject: Policy on Strafing Civilian Refugees 
 
I. THE PROBLEM: 
1. To determine the policy for guidance of all Fifth Air Force units in regard to strafing 
of civilian refugees on the highways. 
 
II. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM: 
2. It is reported that large groups of civilians, either composed of or controlled by 
North Korean soldiers, are infiltrating U.S. positions. 
3. The army has requested that we strafe all civilian refugee parties that are noted 
approaching our position. 
4. To date, we have complied with the army request in this respect. 
 
III. DISCUSSION: 
5. Our operations involving the strafing of civilians is sure to receive wide publicity and 
may cause embarrassment to the U. S. Air Force and to the U. S. government in its relation with 
the United Nations.  
6. It appears that such civilian groups are marching on the highways through U.S. 
ground positions. It is not understood why the army is not screening such personnel or 
shooting them as they come through if they desire such action. Further, it is felt that more 
suitable targets are available for the air effort, the destruction of which would be of more value 
to the army in the long run. 
 
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS: 
7. For the protection of the Air Force, it is recommended that a policy be established 
whereby Fifth Air Force aircraft will not attack civilian refugees, unless they are definitely 
known to contain North Korean soldiers or commit hostile acts. 
8. It is further recommended that we so inform 8th army headquarters. 
 
      TURNER C. ROGERS 
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      Colonel, USAF 
      D C/S Operations 
 
 
 
S-2-3 Journal, 5th Regiment: Ka-Ri, Korea, July 25-29 1950 
This document records the situation at Ka-ri, a nearby area of No Gun Ri, about refugee groups 
passing by the U.S. units on the previous night of the killing. This document was discovered by a 
survivor’s family member from the NARA. 
S-2-3 Journal 
5th Cav 
       251305/K July 50 
       Ka-ri, Korea 
Time Time               Action Taken 
  In           Out      No.  dated     Incidents, Msgs, Orders, & c. 
25 JULY  (n)15   251305/K   Msg fr Adapt Red to CO Adapt – request arty fire on forward 
high ground occupied by Able. Bn shooting down wounded fr 
position. 
1350K     (p)16    1339 CO 1st Bn: Req at least 10 ambulances or trucks for wounded.  S-P 
1445        (q)17    1430 CO 1st Bn: In answer to disp of trucks to be used for ambulances – 
they are to be sent to 1st Bn rear CP. 
. . .  
 
1720        (u)21    1720 Alerted for air alert: five(5) on aircraft in the air.   S 
1815        (v)22    1815 Capt Pickering rptd in at CP & said Lt Rand and his Plt got caught in 
roadblock; only 6 got out alive. States his 1st Sgt is missing.  
         S 
------        (w)23 2400 Journal closed 252400/K July 50. 
. . . 
 
0200 26 JUL  1        0135/K Msg to CO 5 Cav as fol: An est 50 natives w/ ox carts rptd earlier 
to have been near this unit in hills coming out & headed toward rear. 
None appear armed; we have not opened fire; req an immed answer. 
CO 2nd bn.                 S-P 
0210      2  0200 To CO 2 Bn (msg 1): re natives w/ ox carts – round them 
repreat round them immediately. CO 5 Cav.    SF 
0310               3  0220 CO 2d Bn: Outpost rpts on tanks & infantry.    SF 
0410               4 0340 Fr CO 2d Bn: Fire defending 035 to 0355.      SF 
0455               5 0410 2d Bn: req concentration at the fol cords: (80.5-79.5), (81.0-
74.0), (86.5-73.5)        SF  
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Journal, Headquarters 25th Infantry Division, July 26, 1950. 
A 25th Infantry Division headquarters journal shows that at 10 p.m. on July 26 1950, the first 
day of the No Gun Ri massacre, General Kean has decided civilians in the war zone should be 
“considered as unfriendly and shot.” This document was also discovered by the AP team. 
Following is the actual text from the document.  
2145 735 Tel Call fr Col Crenelino to Maj McGovern re request for personnel and auth 
for 2 constrt teams in Sig co. 
2200 736 CG (KEAN) directed me notify Chief of Police that all civilians moving 
around in combat zone will be considered as unfriendly and shot. 
2200  737 Periodic report no 13, this hq. 
 
 
 
Message, EUSAK, CNR: G 20578 KGP, 26 Jul 50, sub: Controlled Movement of All 
Refugees. In Records of U.S. Army Commands, Korean Military Advisory Group, Box 23, 
RG 338, NARA. 
On July 25, 1950, a conference took place at the Capitol Building in Taegu. Participants from the 
Republic of Korea Government, American Embassy, National Police, United Nations, and the 
Eighth U.S. Army Korea (EUSAK) agreed upon a plan to control refugee movement. As a result 
of this meeting, EUSAK issued a four-part, detailed message on July 26, 1950, just hours before 
the refugee killing at No Gun Ri. Following is the full text of the document. 
Ser No-80 – Fm: 8A: Controlled movement of all refugees. 261000K Jul 50 
THIS MSG IN FOUR PARTS, SUBJECT: Controlled movement of All Refugees. 
 
Part I: Effective immediately the following procedure will be adhered to by all commands 
relative to the flow or movement of all refugees in battle areas and rear areas. No repeat no 
refugees will be permitted to cross battle lines at any time. Movement of all Koreans in groups 
will cease immediately. No areas will be evacuated by Koreans without a direct order from 
Commanding General EUSAK or upon order of Division Commanders. Each division will be 
assigned three National Police liaison officers to assist in clearing any area of the civilian 
populace that will interfere with the successful accomplishment of his mission.  
 
Part II: Procedure for clearing areas. Division commanders will inform National Police Officers 
of the area or sector to be evacuated, the route, and the time the area will be cleared. National 
Police will immediately clear the area. Food, water, and comfort items for these refugees will be 
provided by the Vice Minister of Social Affairs through the National Police. All refugees will 
move along their predetermined route to selected concentration areas from sunup until 
 263 
sundown. This will be a controlled movement under the direction and supervision of the 
National Police and representatives from the office of Korean Welfare Affairs.  
 
Part III: Movement of Korean civilians during hours of darkness. There will be absolutely no 
movement of Korean civilians, as individuals or groups in battle areas or rear areas, after the 
hours of darkness. Uniformed Korean police will rigidly enforce this directive. 
 
Part IV: To accomplish the procedure, as outlined in this directive, leaflets will be prepared and 
dropped in all areas forward and rear of the battle line to effectively disseminate this 
information. National Police will further disseminate this information to all Korean civilians by 
means of radio, messenger, and the press. 
 
 
 
American Embassador John Muccio’s Letter to Assistant Secretary of States Dean Rusk, 
26 July 1950, Box 4266, Central Decimal Files 1950–54, Record Group 59, National 
Archives, College Park, MD. 
This document was discovered by a historian, Sahr Conway-Lanz. It described how the 
American Embassy felt about the refugee policy after the meeting at Taegu on July 25 1950. 
Conway-Lanz mentioned that this letter at least implied that Embassador Muccio had an 
understanding that the top officials of the U.S troops had decided to use fire force for refugee 
control. Following is the full text of the document. 
THE FOREIGN SERVICE 
OF THE 
UNITED STATES OF AMERIC 
 
PERSONAL - CONFIDENTIAL    American Embassy 
        July 26, 1950 
 
Dear Dean: 
The refugee problem has developed aspects of a serious and even critical military nature, 
aside from the welfare aspects. Necessarily, decisions are being made by the military in regard to 
it, and in view of the possibility of repercussions in the United States from the effectuation of 
these decisions, I have thought it desirable to inform you of them. 
 
The enemy has used the refugees to his advantage in many ways: by forcing them south 
and so clogging the roads as to interfere with military movements; by using them as a channel 
for infiltration of agents; and most dangerous of all by disguising their own troops as refugees, 
who after passing through our lines proceed, after dark, to produce hidden weapons, and then 
attack our units from the rear. Too often such attacks have been devastatingly successful. Such 
infiltrations had a considerable part in the defeat of the 24th Division at Taejon. 
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Naturally, the Army is determined to end this threat. Yesterday evening a meeting was 
arranged, by 8th Army HQ request, at the office of the Home Minister at the temporary Capitol. 
G-1, G-2, Provost Marshall, CTC, the Embassy, the Home and Social Affairs Ministries, and 
the Director of National Police. The following decisions were made: 
1. Leaflet drops will be made north of US lines banning the people not to proceed south, 
that they risk being fired upon if they do so. If refugees do appear from north of US lines they 
will receive warning shots, and if they then persist in advancing they will be shot. 
2. Leaflet drops and oral warning by police within US combat zone will be made to the 
effect that no one can move south unless ordered, and then only under police control, that all 
movement of Korean civilians must end at sunset or those moving will risk being shot when 
dark comes. 
3. Sould the local tactical commander consider it essential to evacuate a given sector he 
will notify the poice liasison officers attached to his HQ, who through the area Korean National 
Police will notify the inhabitants, and start them southward under police control on specified 
minor roads. No one will be permitted to move unless police notify them, and those further 
south not notified will be required to stay put. 
4. Refugee groups must stop at sunset, and not move again until daylight. Police will 
establish check points to catch enemy agents; subsequently Social Ministry will be prepared to 
care for, and direct refugees to camps or other areas. 
5. No mass movements unless police controlled will be permitted. Individual 
movements will be subject to police checks at numerous points. 
6. In all cities, towns curfew will be at 9 p.m., with effective enforcement at 10 p.m. Any 
unauthorized person on streets after 10 p.m. is to be arrested, and carefully examined. This last 
item is already in effect. 
 
 Sincerely, 
 
 John J. Muccio 
 
 
 
 
Memorandum, Commander, 25th Infantry Division, 27 Jul 50. In AG Command Reports 
(War Diaries) 1949-1954, 25th Infantry Division History Jul 50, Entry 429, Box 3746, RG 
407, NARA.  
This is a memo that Gen. Kean ordered to the 25th Infantry Division to consider civilians as 
enemy. This document was issued the second day of the massacre. It was discovered by the AP 
team. Following is the full text of the document. 
Headquarters 25th Inf Div 
Sangju, Korea 
27 July 1950 
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MEMO TO: 
Commanding Officers, All Regimental Combat Teams 
Staff Sections, This Headquarters 
 
Korean police have been directed to remove all civilians from the area between the blue lines 
shown on the attached overlay and report the evacuation has been accomplished. All civilians 
seen in this area are to be considered as enemy and action taken accordingly.  
 
OFFICIAL: 
       KEAN 
       Maj Gen USA 
 
 
 
War diary (July 29 1950), 1st Cavalry Division, June-July 1950. In the Records of U. S. 
Army Commands, Cavalry Divisions 1940-1967, Box 131, RG 338, NARA.  
This war diary described the 7th Cavalry division’s withdrawal operation from No Gun Ri on July 
29, 1950. There is no mention of the event at No Gun Ri in this entry, but this document implies 
that this unit stayed in the area from July 26 to 29 during the period the No Gun Ri killing 
occurred. This document was discovered by the AP team. Following is the text from the 
document. 
At 0530 hours the 2nd Battalion, 7th Cav Regt received the order to withdraw. During the night 
movement they received tank and artillery fire. The 1st Battalion withdrew ahead of the 2d 
Battalion, slightly misting up the plan and causing some delay. By 0820 hours elements of the 1st 
and 2d Battalions had passed the Hwanggan railroad station heading into their new area. 
Extensive patrols to the front as well as flanks were initiated. Refugees continued to be 
evacuated and caused much trouble. A 1st Battalion patrol located 6 enemy soldiers moving 
south on a trail at (92.85-76.75). At 2100 hours the I&R Platoon was dispatched to block the 
road between the 8th Cav Regt on their right and the 2d Battalion, 7th Cav Regt. 
During this day’s action, considerable confusion existed. The 27th Regt was being relieved by 
elements of the 5th RCT. Other elements of the Division were ordered to withdraw. The 
infiltration tactics of the enemy and the large numbers of refugees made movement and 
communications very difficult. Units were not aware, in all cases, of proposed movements of 
adjacent elements of the Division. This resulted in flanks being exposed and units who though 
they were in reserve found themselves to be facing the enemy. 
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News Report from Choson In Min Bo (조선인민보, Korean People’s Daily), by Chon Uk 
(전욱). Aug 19 1950.  
A North Korean newspaper reported No Gun Ri in August 1950 after correspondents visited the 
site of massacre. This newspaper was collected by the U.S. army and housed in the NARA. One 
Korean archives has a microfilm copy of this newspaper and a Korean survivor’s family found 
and reported this article. Following is the Korean text of the news article.  
방금 패전에 패전을 거듭하고 있는 미군은 우리 조국의 많은 도시와 농촌을 
무차별적으로 맹폭하여 우리의 아름다운 강산을 우리의 사랑하는 부모 형제 재마들의 피로써 
물들이고 있는 바 놈들은 지난 7 월 29 일 충청북도 황간에서도 수많은 무고한 인민들을 
학살하였다. 
즉, 29 일[7 월 29 일을 말함] 해질 무렵이었다. 대구 방면으로 진격하는 우리 인민군 부대 
장병들이 황간역 북쪽 로응리에 다달았을 때 들과 철교 밑에서 무엇이라고 형용할 수 없이 
참혹한 장면에 부닥쳤다. 동지점 일대의 들의 초목과 철교밑 시냇물은 피로 물들여 있고 두겹 
세겹씩 덮인 시체로서 처참한 수라장을 이루어 우리 인민군 전투원들의 가슴을 어지럽게 
하였다. 발디딜 곳조차 없는 현장에는 늙은이 젊은이 어린이 약 400 명의 시체가 널려져 
있었고 그중의 젊은 녀성들은 반라체가 되어 거꾸러져 있었다. “아저씨 아저씨” 우리들은 
별안간에 어린애 목소리에 놀랐다. 6, 7 세 가량으로 보이는 소녀가 등에 젖먹이를 업고 벌벌 
기어 나오는 것이었다. 그 뒤에 머리가 흰 로파가 따라 기어 나오는 것이었다. 우리들은 
그들에게 달려들어 사유를 물었더니 그들은 얼빠진 사람처럼 멍하니 우리들을 쳐다 보고만 
있었다. 우리들은 재빨리 부대로 뛰어가 우선 우유와 빵을 가져다 그들에게 먹이었다. 
그랬더니 차차 정신이 드는 모양이었다. 조금씩 조금씩 말을 주고받고 보니 소녀는 계산리에 
사는 최순자였고 그 등에 업은 젖먹이는 자기 동생이라는 것이었다. 그리고 머리가 흰 로파는 
소녀들의 이웃집에 사는 김사랑씨였다. 
로파의 말에 의하면 자기의 여섯 식구가 모두 들에서 학살되었고 최순자 소녀의 
일곱식구도 학살되어 자기들은 간신히 살아 남았다는 것이었다. 이들은 계속 동지점에서 
벌어진 미군의 입에도 담지 못할 학살 사건을 우리들에게 이야기하며 눈물을 흘리는 
것이었다. 
 
 
 
Morning Report Mar. 18, 1949 of the 27th Ordnance Maintenance Company. 
Morning Report Mar. 22, 1951 of 27th Ordnance Maintenance Company. 
Morning Report Mar. 24, 1951 of 7th Cav. Regt. 
Several morning reports show Edward Daily was not at No Gun Ri during the time that the 
incident occurred. These documents describe that he arrived at the the 27th Ordnance 
Maintenance Company to serve as a mechanic on March 18, 1949 and left this company to join 
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the 7th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, on March 16, 1951. These documents also show 
that his rank was not a Lieutenant as he claimed, but a corporal. These documents were 
discovered by a military historian, Robert Bateman through a FOIA requet and shared with 
journalists of U.S. News and World Report and Strips.com. Daily’s story was reported by these 
journalists and it resulted in another wave of controversies about the incident. Following is the 
part that describes about Daily in the morning reports. 
MORNING REPORT   22 MAR 1951 
27TH ORDNANCE MAINTENANCE COMPANY   ORD 
Yongdu-ri Korea  APO  201    CS856563 
 
. . . 
Daily Edward L RA15380215   Cpl 
 Fr dy to reld fr asgd & reasgd to Co H 7th  
cav par 2 SQ 48 Hq 1st Cav Div APO 201 
RDCMR 16 Mar 51 
 
. . .  
 
 
MORNING REPORT   24 MAR 1951 
CO. H   7TH Cav Regt  Inf 
Cord 98.2x26.1 APO201 
 
. . .  
Daily Edward L.  RA15380215   Cpl. 4812 
 Asgd & jd fr 27th Ord Maint Co. 
 APO 201 para 2 SO 48 Hq 1st Cav 
 Div APO 201 Records not available 
 RDCMR 16 Mar 51 
  RECORD of RVRNTS SECTION 
. . .  
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APPENDIX C 
      INTERVIEWS 
C.1 LIST OF INTERVIEW SUBJECTS (AUTHORS OF PUBLICATIONS) 
 
Robert Bateman 
Si-hyon Cho 
Sanghun Choe 
Ku-do Chong 
Sahr Conway- Lanz 
Charles Hanley 
Chung-nam Kim 
Yun-jong Kim 
Yon-ho Oh 
Moo-bong Ryoo 
Marilyn B. Young 
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C.2 INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. How does your research involve using archives and historical material about the No Gun Ri 
massacre? 
2. Did you need to use archives for the No Gun Ri research and if so, how did you locate the 
materials you used? 
3. What kinds of archives and historical materials did you use for your research on the No Gun 
Ri massacre? 
4. Can you describe your research procedure for your No Gun Ri research? 
5. How much weight and credibility did you give archival materials among other resources you 
used in general? 
6. For the building of your major points and arguments concerning the No Gun Ri research, how 
much do you think you have been influenced by archival materials among other resources? 
7. Have your views of and research about the massacre changed as new archival materials have 
been discovered? Can you describe the specific archival documents that changed your 
research results? 
8. What were the barriers that you experienced in using archives? For example, were these 
barriers preservation issues, accessibility issues, classification/declassification issues, or 
others? 
9. How did you deal with any practical problems of approaching and using archives, such as 
traveling to the United States or Korea and language differences? 
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C.3 COVER LETTER SAMPLE 
          September 00, 2004 
 
Dear 
 
As a major writer in the area of the No Gun Ri history, I would like to interview you with 
regard to my Ph D dissertation research at the University of Pittsburgh. My objective is to 
examine how archival records play a role in historical research about the No Gun Ri massacre 
with the consideration of research patterns, hypothesis-building, interpretation process, and as a 
whole the results of research products. 
From the publications about the No Gun Ri massacre, I identified you as a major 
researcher in this area, and I am writing to enlist your participation and your input in my 
dissertation study, “Records and the Understanding of Violent Events: Archival Documentation, 
Historical Perception, and the No Gun Ri Massacre in the Korean War.” 
The results will aggregate the information obtained, and, of course, no individual 
participant will be identified. 
To permit a careful consideration of your responses to my questions, and to minimize 
mistakes on my part, I hope that you will agree to permit me to tape record the interview. This is 
a standard practice in studies of this sort and I would be pleased to provide you with a copy of 
the transcript if you wish. Should you prefer to be interviewed without the tape recorder, 
however, I will certainly oblige. Your participation will be very much appreciated and add 
significantly to the value of my doctoral dissertation. 
I plan to visit you in June through October 2004 at your convenient. I will email or 
telephone you to see whether you will be free for an interview during this period. Alternatively, 
you may contact me to arrange a time by email or phone at dosst22@pitt.edu and 412-XXX-
XXXX. 
 
 
Sincerely, 
Donghee Sinn 
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